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European legal history, as a field of scientific enquiry, is a relatively young 
discipline that can trace its roots back to the German jurist Savigny, whose work on 
the jurists of the medieval ius commune is commonly seen as the first of its kind. As 
one of the foremost German scholars of the nineteenth century and a fierce opponent 
of German codification, Savigny laid the foundation for generations of subsequent 
historians, not only in terms of the scope, but also in terms of the method of enquiry. 
Thus, in the generations after Savigny, European legal history tended to be 
approached in terms of general narratives charting the development of the European 
legal order through successive historical epochs. Within these narratives, jurists 
played a prominent role. Thus, the creation of the legal order of Europe was based 
upon a translatio studii from the Roman jurists via the medieval ius commune to civil 
codes of the nineteenth century. By grouping jurists into “schools” or “movements”, 
modern commentators, so it was argued, were able to assess the impact of these on the 
narrative of European legal history. 
Although, since the end of the Second World War, this narrative has become 
more nuanced, the jurists remain central to it. This has had a number of consequences. 
The main consequence of this focus on jurists (mostly academic figures teaching at 
universities) has been the marginalisation of legal practice and legal practitioners in 
the narrative of European legal history. And yet, as recent research on the rise of 
central courts in Europe has shown, legal practice clearly had an impact on the 
development of the European legal order. In light of these insights, this thesis seeks to 
contribute to the narrative of European legal history by focusing not on the works of 
academic jurists, but on the activities of legal practitioners.  
This statement requires delimitation. Rather than focusing on a number of 
legal practitioners over a long period of time, this thesis will focus on a single legal 
practitioner who flourished during a specific period in European history using the 
principles of a microhistory. The individual in question is the French lawyer Nicolas 
Bohier (1469-1539). The reasons for this specific focus are twofold. First, a focus on 
a specific individual and his works allows for greater scrutiny in depth, thus providing 
a counterbalance to (and also a means of testing and verifying) the broad sweep 
accounts found in most works on European legal history. In second place, Nicolas 
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Bohier and his oeuvre cry out for a critical analysis and, until now, remain largely 
unstudied. As a practising lawyer and eventually president of the regional court of 
Bordeaux, Bohier was at the coalface of French legal practice in the sixteenth century. 
As a prolific writer and editor, Bohier left a rich corpus of work consisting of records 
of decisions of the court in Bordeaux, legal opinions as well as customs of the region. 
Furthermore, sixteenth-century France is a particularly exciting topic of investigation. 
This period not only saw the rise and solidification of Royal authority, but also saw 
the beginning of the homologation of customary law in France. On an intellectual 
level, the sixteenth century saw the rise of “legal humanism”, a particularly 
controversial intellectual movement in the context of European legal history as shown 
by recent research.  
This then brings us to the central point of this thesis. If, during the sixteenth 
century, the medieval ius commune was being replaced by “national” legal orders 
across Europe, as the general surveys of European legal history state, the works of a 
legal practitioner would show it much more clearly than the works of academic 
jurists. This thesis will therefore examine Bohier’s use of the term ius commune 
across his works to assess not only his understanding of the term, but also to assess 
how this concept operated in relation to other “sources of law”, for example statute 
and custom. Although the results of a microhistory study should not be generalised 
too far, it will permit us to interrogate the general narratives of European legal history 
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LAY SUMMARY 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the works of a French judge and legal practitioner 
of the sixteenth century, Nicolas Bohier (1469 – 1539). The aim of the investigation is 
to place this figure in context against the backdrop of the political and legal 
developments in sixteenth-century France. The reasons for this focus on Bohier are 
twofold. First, as a legal practitioner, Bohier and his considerable oeuvre have 
received much less attention than the works of University-trained French jurists of the 
same period. Until now, the established narratives of European legal history have 
tended to focus primarily on the transmission of legal doctrine from the medieval to 
the early-modern period. Legal practice tended to be largely overlooked in the context 
of the creation of such a narrative. In second place, the sixteenth century is a 
particularly vibrant period in the history of European legal thought. This period 
witnessed the rise of “legal humanism” and, on a political level, the consolidation of 
Royal authority and the recording of customary law in writing. If, as modern surveys 
of European legal history suggest, the emergence of French national law during the 
sixteenth century led to a decline of the medieval ius commune, the oeuvre of a judge 
and legal practitioner would demonstrate this much more clearly than that of 
academic jurists. This thesis therefore sets out to examine Bohier’s use of the term ius 
commune with a view to establish his understanding of the term and of its interaction 
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1. Object of thesis 
 
 
This thesis examines the life and works of Nicolas Bohier (1469-1539), a 
lawyer who lived in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century France. Bohier studied 
law at Montpellier, one of the great medieval universities of Europe and well known 
in the sixteenth century for maintaining the late-medieval traditions of the 
Ultramontani. He did not aspire to a career into academia, but instead entered legal 
practice. Despite being a practising lawyer, he retained an interest in the law as an 
academic pursuit, writing books and producing editions of great medieval legal 
works. This thesis is therefore about a man and his books. It is an attempt to place him 
within the context of sixteenth century France, a particularly complex place and time 
in the history of European legal development.  
The traditional narrative of European legal history has tended to focus on 
jurists of various historical epochs who have contributed to the formation of national 
legal orders.1 For much of the twentieth century, the aim of this narrative has been to 
establish an unbroken line of juristic thought from Rome to the modern day, whereby 
the proverbial “torch of learning” was passed from one school of jurists to the next. 
Much of this narrative is open to revision, as has recently been demonstrated by the 
volumes edited by Paul du Plessis and John Cairns on the late medieval period2 and, 
more recently, the sixteenth century.3 In their latest volume, legal humanism, the 
intellectual movement synonymous with sixteenth century France, has formed the 
subject of systematic debate.4 Its place and scope in the early modern period has 
recently been shown by Alain Wijffels to be highly problematic, especially as to its 
impact on legal practice.5 He claims that the lawyer continued to rely on those texts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example, F. Wieacker, A history of private law in Europe (Oxford, 1995) [translated from the 
original German].   
2 P. du Plessis and J. Cairns (eds.), The creation of the ius commune: from casus to regula, (Edinburgh, 
2010).  
3 P. du Plessis and J. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing legal humanism and its claims: petere fontes?, 
(Edinburgh, 2016). 
4 Ibid.  
5 A. Wijffels, “Antiqui et recentiores: Alberico Gentili – Beyond mos italicus and legal humanism”, in 
du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 2), pp. 11-40, at 14.  See also A. Wijffels, “Early modern consilia and 
decisiones in the low countries: the lost legacy of the mos italicus”, in P. Maffei and G. Varanini (eds.), 
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the mos italicus tradition, and that sixteenth century practice orientated literature 
appears to have been largely unaffected by legal humanism.6  This legal philosophical 
movement is therefore particularly problematic in the case of Nicolas Bohier, who 
was first and foremost a practising lawyer.  
This thesis aims to provide a more nuanced picture of this part of the narrative 
of European legal history. The primary aim is to reveal the meaning of the term ius 
commune in legal practice through an examination of its relationship with the ius 
proprium, one of the most nebulous and understudied aspects of the development of 
national legal orders in early modern Europe. This will enable an assessment of the 




As recent studies have shown, the narrative of European legal history cannot 
be evaluated without an investigation into legal practice. So far, the traditional focus 
of legal historical studies has largely left the legal practitioner and their works aside.7  
Any work on European legal history will reveal a plethora of references to the 
ius commune. The term is generally used in these works to refer to the utrumque ius, 
certainly in the late medieval period. Every book on European legal history will tell 
you that it meant an amalgam of Roman, Canon and Feudal law. It is typically cited in 
general terms, with broad frames of reference. Such broad sweeping works do not 
adequately explain what occurred in any particular locale or whether the term had a 
consistent meaning. Ultimately, this definition works well on a broad scale in an 
intellectual style history, but it is clearly open to a lot of problems when it comes to 
detail.  
The early modern period was chosen for a number of reasons. The perception 
of Europe at this time is of a vast and complex succession of reforms, conflicts and 
evolving legal and political orders. Of course, it should also be remembered that this 
period is especially turbulent and marked by wars, civil unrest and plague.8 The state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Honos alit artes. Studi per il settantesimo compleanno di Mario Ascheri. La formazione del diritto 
comune (Florence, 2014), pp. 127-142.  
6 Wijffels, “Antiqui et Recentiores”, ibid. 14; Wijffels, “Early modern consilia and decisiones”, ibid.  
7 Wieacker, (n. 1); F. Von Savigny, The history of the Roman law during the middle ages, (Edinburgh, 
1979) [translated from the original German].  
8 On the Early modern period, see J. Ruff, Violence in early modern Europe: 1500-1800, (Cambridge, 
U.K., 2001); Bercé, Y., Revolt and revolution in early modern Europe: an essay on the history of 
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of the law was no less complicated. Locating the precise role of the ius commune in 
this period is a difficult task, but it is arguably also the best time at which to view its 
influence in legal practice. The period is most conspicuously marked by advancement 
towards the nation state and the role of the lawyer in this was significant. This is the 
period where there is thought to have been a shift away from ius commune to national 
legal decisions and this is visible in judicial decision making.  
France offers an interesting setting for this thesis. It was not yet fully 
developed as a nation state by the beginning of the sixteenth century.  It still lacked a 
comprehensive state bureaucracy and in many respects was still a medieval “state”. 
The role of custom in France during this period means that the potential for 
investigation into its relationship with ius commune is considerable. France's legal 
system was fragmented: a diversity of the legal regimes existed from region to region 
and a division between the Northern customary law (pays de coutumes) and the 
Southern version of written law regions (pays de droit écrit), which relied more 
heavily on Roman law, complicated matters further.9  
Historically, before the fifteenth century, customs were written down in a 
piecemeal fashion, seemingly without any official purpose. In 1453, the Royal 
Ordinance of Montil-les-Tours started the process by which customs were selected 
and written down.10 Different forms of court and Royal justice applied to various 
legal regimes. However, the decline of Feudal and municipal justice was gradual.11 
From the mid to late sixteenth century, France saw a homologation of its customs. 
This movement, led by the Crown, saw lawyers play a prominent role in compiling 
and revising custom. This process would reconcile different localities to bring them 
under a more unified system of law12 and was an integral part of a state building 
process in early modern Europe.13   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
political violence, (Manchester, U.K., 1987); D. Shlapentokh, Societal breakdown and the rise of the 
early modern state in Europe, (New York, 2008).  
9 M. Bellomo, The Common legal past of Europe, 1000-1800, (Washington, D.C., 1995) [translated 
from the original Italian] [1988], p. 102.  
10 D. Margolf, Religion and royal justice in early modern France: the Paris chambre de l'édit, 1598-
1665, (Kirksville, 2003), p. 15.  
11 É.Chénon, Histoire générale du droit français public et privé des origines à 1815, (Paris, 1929), 
volume 1, p. 491.  
12 M. Kim, “Custom, community, and the crown: lawyers and the reordering of French customary law”, 
in C. Parker and J. Bentley, (eds.), Between the middle ages and modernity: individual and community 
in the early modern European world, (Lanham, 2007), pp. 169-186, at p. 170. On customary law see 
also J. Dawson, “The codification of the French customs”, (1940) 38 Michigan Law Review 765; D. 
Kelley, “Second nature: the idea of custom in European law, society and culture”, A. Grafton and A. 
Blair (eds.), The transmission of culture in early modern Europe (Philadelphia, 1990), p. 150; F. 
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Lawyers played an important role in the creation of the nation state of France. 
The narrative of legal history in the Early Modern period will be tackled from this 
perspective; by focusing on the legal practitioner who stands in the broader shadow of 
the legal humanist movement but is somewhat apart from it. Bohier was also a 
scholar, with a sound university education in law. Because of his professional interest 
in the practice of law, the works he produced offer an insight into what was relevant 
or of interest to the lawyer in France in the early sixteenth century.  
The middle of the sixteenth century represented a so-called “fault line”14 
where a movement from the mos italicus to the usus modernus is believed to have 
taken place. However, it seems that many practitioners would still refer to the old 
tradition.15  Recently, Xavier Prévost recognised that even those regarded as legal 
humanists, such as Jacques Cujas (1520-1590), still adopted the commentator stance 
on certain topics.16 Bohier was born around the start of the Early Modern period, and 
died just before the middle of the sixteenth century. He is therefore positioned at the 
very cusp of the change from medieval to the early modern and his lifetime spanned a 
crucial, and lesser-studied, period of legal history. By studying his written works the 
extent to which he still referred to the sources of the mos italicus will be assessed.  
In approaching the question of the ius commune from a practitioner’s 
perspective, it was first necessary to ask “which practitioner?” It was decided that a 
lawyer who was not an academic jurist, but not removed entirely from it, would be the 
best candidate. In 2012, Gerard Guyon published a collection of articles on the history 
of law in Bordeaux, Le droit Bordelais dans tous ses états.17 Within this work, a 
chapter on Nicolas Bohier and the scientific nature of his Decisiones may be found.18 
This work demonstrated the value of this figure who aside from this chapter by 
Guyon, had been without a dedicated study on his oeuvre of works.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Olivier-Martin, La coutume de Paris: trait d’union entre le droit romain et les législations modernes, 
(Paris, 1925).   
13 Kim, (n. 12), p. 170.  
14 Wijffels, “Early modern consilia and decisiones”, (n. 5), p. 127.  
15 Ibid.  
16 X. Prévost, “Reassessing the influence of medieval jurisprudence on Jacques Cujas’ (1522-1590) 
methods”, in du Plessis and Cairns (n. 3), pp. 88-107, at pp. 100-102. Reliance on fourteenth century 
jurists, such as Baldus, Bartolus, Albericus de Rosate, is mirrored in the works of renowned humanist, 
Jacques Cujas.  
17 G. Guyon, Le droit Bordelais dans tous ses l’états: les anciennes coutumes, les jurists et la justice, 
les institutions de l’Eglise locale, (Limoges, 2012).  
18 G. Guyon, ‘Un arrêtiste bordelais: Nicolas Boerius (1469-1539’), in ibid, pp. 128-149.  
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Bohier offers three main advantages as the focus of this microhistory. First, he 
wrote two important works documenting law in action: the Consilia, and perhaps 
most importantly the Decisiones Burdegalenses. Second, given the important role of 
custom in the ius commune-ius proprium relationship, his work on the customary law 
of Bourges, the Consuetudines Biturigium, is of particular value as an early record of 
written custom in the region. Third, his professional activities, which included the 
positions of avocat, conseiller, and president of the Bordeaux parlement, as well as 
author and editor, meant that he offered an interesting perspective on legal practice in 
this region in France. The role of the ius commune in legal practice will therefore be 
analysed through the life and works of a multi-faceted individual and will facilitate a 




Throughout this thesis, a number of terms are used and a definition of these 
terms from the outset is necessary. The terminology outlined here are the textbook 
definitions and the extent to which Bohier’s understanding of these terms corresponds 
to them will be considered in the course of the three textual chapters in this thesis.  
The ius commune is traditionally understood as representing a body of law 
which developed, initially mainly through university teaching but later also through 
legal practice, and consisted of a synthesis of Roman, canon and feudal customary 
law.  This body of law was said to exist concurrently with the ius proprium, the local 
(mainly customary) laws of the various medieval city states and to operate as a 
repository of concepts, terminology and ideas with which to enhance local law.  
Historically, “customs” of the various French regions were unwritten. 
Reference to “custom” in the context of Bohier’s use of the term refers to the 
emergence of a form of legal literature, the “coutumiers”, in the twelfth century set 
the customs of a region in writing, and many of these texts relied on Roman and 
Canonic sources. By the late fifteenth century, these written customs had become 
royal law, having been ratified by the Parlements, and consequently a process of 
homologation took place that saw the systematic recording and collation of these 
customs en masse across the French regions.  When the term “stylus” is used, it refers 
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to the stylus curiae of a court, namely the “styles and manners of conducting legal 
proceedings.”19 
 The term “jurist” is used throughout this work. The meaning is a broad one, 
but generally the term’s use refers to the professional category of learned authors 
based in universities, from the twelfth century onwards. The rise of law faculties in 
universities at this time saw the emergence of a professional class of jurist, and 
together with the creation of legal method, which was developed by glossators and 
commentators, through the interpretation of Roman law. A jurist was someone who, 
by virtue of his training, could give an “opinion” on law and would be respected by 
other jurists. If one jurist cited authority for an opinion it would likely be the written 
view of another jurist. As James Gordley has explained: "Law was based, as much of 
it still is, on the exposition of authoritative texts."20  
 A definition of legal humanism, or as it is otherwise known, mos gallicus, is 
problematic. According to Douglas Osler, legal humanism is “an expression generally 
used to refer to the study of Roman law by 16th Century philologists.”21 When the 
term is used in this thesis, it ought to be understood as referring to the school active in 
sixteenth century France that applied historical and philosophical methods to 






I first assessed the oeuvre of Bohier to establish the available material. He 
wrote a number of works. Given that the focus of this thesis is role of the practitioner, 
it was important to identify which of these works would be best suited to a study of 
this kind. This selection was carried out with two principal aims in mind: first, to 
identify those works that best represent law in action; secondly, to identify those that 
offer interesting examples of the way in which the term ius commune and ius 
proprium were handled. This is not to say that only those sources that had a large 
number of references to the term ius commune were considered. The Consilia, for 
instance, has comparatively few references to the term in comparison with other 
works. However, the use of the term offered a number of interesting examples.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 L. Waelkens, Amne adverso: Roman legal heritage in European culture, (Leuven, 2015), p. 163. 
20 J. Gordley, The jurists: a critical history, (Oxford, 2013), p. 32.  
21 D. Osler, “Images of legal humanism”, (2001) 9 Surfaces 101.   
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In each of the chosen works, I searched for where Bohier used the term “ius 
commune”. An assessment of the importance of the term in each fragment selected 
was made. The product of this can be seen in the tables presented throughout this 
thesis for each of the works. This was followed by a philological analysis and an 
examination of Bohier’s source use. Such an analysis was carried out with an 
awareness of the complexities of sources used at this time and the understanding that 
some of the sources cited by Bohier may have been secondary in nature or taken from 
lists of sources that were compiled by others.22 Furthermore, the search for the term 
ius commune relied on text that had been scanned and made available through Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR) method. There are limits to this kind of search within 
uncorrected OCR text, particularly with Latin texts, such as the possibility that some 
words may not be recognised when searched for. On account of this, a control was 
added by using two editions of the same work for the Consilia (Lyon, 1554 and 
Venice, 1574) Decisiones (Frankfurt, 1574 and Lyon, 1611) and Consuetudines 
(Lyon, 1529 and Paris, 1547).   
The fact that Bohier may not necessarily have consulted the works he cites is 
therefore taken into account in this thesis. However, this concern is overcome as far 
as it is reasonably possible to do so. Bohier’s source use is only one of the indicators 
of his understanding of the term ius commune. Where he refers to certain jurists and 
their works, this was noted where it was deemed significant in his reasoning or the 
outcome of the case before him. Even if we assume that Bohier did not cite it first-
hand, the way in which he employs the source can still reveal the extent to which his 
reasoning suggests a shared approach with that contained in the source. In any case, 
Bohier’s citation practices are not the only indicator of how he approached the ius 
commune, and, though important, is not the sole focus of this thesis. Instead, it is the 
ius commune-ius proprium relationship that is its central concern.  
Where the ius commune is mentioned, the focus has been on identifying what 
sources of law were also present, and how Bohier used them.23 The ius proprium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 M. Van Ittersum, “The working methods of Hugo Grotius: which sources did he use and how did he 
use them in his early writings on natural law theory?’, in du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 3), pp. 154-193. 
23 It should be noted that Bohier’s use of certain sources in sections of the text that do not refer to the 
ius commune have also been consulted. This comparison has revealed that Bohier’s use of these 
sources was largely consistent with those sections that did use the term: Baldus and Bartolus still 
feature prominently, for example. However, these examples are less useful in establishing Bohier’s 
understanding of the ius commune and other key concepts such as custom. An assessment of these 
examples would also go beyond the remit of this thesis and have therefore not been included.  
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largely occurs in the same context as custom (consuetudo) and statute (statutum), 
although also the likes of stylus (stylus curiae) in certain instances. Where these 
sources and the ius commune were mentioned alongside each other, the way in which 
Bohier employed the sources was examined in detail. This interplay is revealing of 
what he perceived the position of the ius commune to be. The extent to which there 
was rivalry between the sources, or if there was a detectable source hierarchy at this 
time will be assessed.   
This thesis is written using the principles of a microhistory. This approach is 
characterised by a focus on certain cases and persons, allowing an intensive historical 
study of the subject.24 The purpose of a microhistory is more far reaching than that of 
a case study: the former typically look for answers to big questions when studying 
small objects.25 Its value lies “in its power to recover and reconstruct past events by 
exploring and connecting a wide range of data sources so as to produce a contextual, 
three dimensional, analytic narrative in which actual people as well as abstract forces 
shape events.” 26  The temporal aspect of microhistory is the “relationship of a 
particular or peculiar event to a larger context.”27 Through books documenting law in 
action, which contain particular cases and local laws, it is anticipated that a 
microhistory will bring us closer to understanding the larger issue of the ius commune 
in sixteenth century legal practice.  
The three books that form the basis of this microhistory differ substantially 
from one another. These include the Consilia (legal opinion), Decisiones 
Burdegalenses (law report) and Consuetudines Biturigium (customary law). Each of 
these is considered in a dedicated chapter, which looks at their format and contents, 
and then proceeding to a study of selected references to the ius commune.  Their 
differences rest not only in their format, but also the motivations behind their 
production. The Consilia and Decisiones, for example, are direct products of law in 
action: the former contains the legal opinions of one lawyer; and the Decisiones is 
made up of a collection of court decisions. The Consuetudines, although not as 
obviously linked to legal practice as the other two works, is still related to law in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 S. Magnússon and I. Szijártó (eds.), What is microhistory?, (London, 2013), p. 5. 
25 Ibid.  
26 R. Brown, “Microhistory and the post-modern challenge”, in Renders and de Haan (eds), Theoretical 
discussions of biography: approaches from history, microhistory, and life writing, (Leiden, 2014), pp. 
119-128, at p. 127.  
27 M. Peltonen, “What is micro in microhistory?”, in Renders and de Haan (eds), ibid, pp. 105-118, at 
p. 107. 
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action. It was compiled with the practitioner in mind, who sought a comprehensive 
account of the customary laws of the region.  
In the early modern period, given the nature of printing practices, texts were 
moveable not only between editions but also in editions.28 Therefore, a degree of 
sensitivity to editions used for this work is required. Douglas Osler has recognised the 
importance of this.29 Those editions closest to Bohier’s death have been selected 
because they are thought to best represent the thoughts of the author more clearly than 
those published significantly later.30 Given that the Consilia and Decisiones were 
published posthumously, those editions closest to 1539 were chosen.31  
 
4.1 Limitations  
 
One criticism of microhistory as an approach is its tendency towards “the 
singularisation of history”.32 It is not possible to know more than a small part of a 
large story, and the sources relied on preserve only a minute selection of historical 
facts. Of course, it is true that this thesis only looks to one man and his written works 
in order to try and address part of a larger issue: the role of the ius commune in 
sixteenth-century legal practice. However, the value of a microhistory lies in the fact 
that it typically looks for answers to “great historical questions” in the minutiae.33 It is 
of course true that, as with any method, there are definite limits as to what a 
microhistory can reveal.  
 First, the broad spectrum of the role of the ius commune in legal practice in 
France during this period will not be addressed in this thesis. It will not assess the role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 J. Cairns, “The moveable text of Mackenzie”, in J. Cairns and O. Robinson (eds.), Critical Studies in 
Ancient Law, Comparative Law and Legal History, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 235-248 at p. 245.  
29 D. Osler, “Towards a legal-historical bibliography: a census of 16th century legal imprints”, (1988) 
Ius Commune 232; also “Dies diem nocet”, (1991) Ius Commune 207. Cited in ibid, p. 245.  
30 Wherever possible, those sources examined are closest to 1539. However, in some cases direct 
reference was not possible, and so latest editions were used.  
31 The Consuetudines was first published in 1508, but the earliest version available for reference was 
the 1529 (Lyon) edition. A control element was built in by referring to two editions for each of the 
works. This meant that searches for the use of the term ius commune were conducted in both works. 
For the Consilia, the 1554 (Lyon) and 1574 (Venice) editions were used. For the Decisiones, the works 
of 1574 (Frankfurt) and 1611 (Lyon) were relied on. Finally, in the case of the Consuetudines, 
reference was made to the 1529 (Lyon) and 1547 (Paris) editions. The choice of editions was motivated 
by their accessibility. This selection does have limitations given that only two of each are represented. 
The editions chosen for the Decisiones have their own particular limitations in that those selected are 
not only published many years after Bohier’s death in 1539, but also the 1611 (Lyon) publication is a 
pirate edition.  
32 Magnússon and Szijártó, (n. 24), p. 115.  
33 Ibid.  
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of the ius commune in legal practice in France more generally. France, as a 
developing nation state, with its large number of regions, together with the various 
regional parlements and other institutions, is too large a topic for a work of this kind.  
No broad conclusions about whether Bohier’s use of the ius commune is common or 
exceptional will be reached. This would only be achieved as part of a much larger 
work that considered the role of other lawyers and other parlements. This is 
something to be revisited and expanded, perhaps at postdoctoral level, but is not the 
aim of this work.  
 Secondly, those cases selected for study within the oeuvre of Bohier will not 
be subject to investigation beyond philological analysis. Reference to the particular 
legal issue at the centre of the example will of course be noted and discussed, but this 
will be brief and only to the extent that it is relevant for understanding the role of the 
ius commune in the case. Each area of law considered in this thesis would merit a 
dedicated study of its own legal history, origins and role. Also, ascertaining what the 
law is in any given situation during this period is difficult. The books of the jurists 
will not tell you beyond what the law formally is and so, in very practical terms, we 
do not know precisely what law would apply on a given issue during this time.   
 Finally, much more can be said about Bohier and his works. I have offered a 
history of him in a specific context, but there is equally a thesis to be written on the 
man himself. Despite all these limitations, the contribution of this work is that a small 
part of an answer to the large question of the ius commune will be offered, namely 
whether the medieval meaning of the ius commune had endured into the early modern 
period or whether it had undergone some change.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BOHIER’S FRANCE (1469-1539) 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter seeks to place the lawyer, conseiller and magistrate, Nicolas 
Bohier within the broad and complex history of the sixteenth century so that his 
works, decisions, and professional roles can be better understood and his motivations 
behind them exposed. At the centre of this, the question of the state as an emerging 
entity, together with currents of legal nationalism, loom large. State formation is the 
key to understanding the ius commune, and its meaning and function in sixteenth 
century France. Historians have traditionally struggled to understand how the law 
shaped politics and governance in this period.1  The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a more informed reading of the law and the relationship between lawyers and 
institutions; the growth of a nation; and the concept of statehood.   
Made up of a bewildering mixture of conflicts, radical reforms, evolving 
political and legal orders, and intellectual revolution, early modern France represents 
a real challenge to anyone trying to approach it in a critical fashion.  Placing the lone 
figure of a lawyer born in 1469, a year bordering the medieval and early modern, 
within this period is therefore an unenviable task.  It is however from their perspective 
that this chapter is written. This chapter seeks to present a portrait of the period 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth century touching on the major events of the time, 
and asking throughout how this would have affected an individual lawyer, and the 
extent to which they would have recognised them as significant in their everyday life 
and practice.2 It attempts to humanise what is now perceived as the extraordinary 
change that occurred in early modern France, and in this sense also, relate this reform 
in politics and religion, to legal practice generally.  The parlements, in Paris and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 D. Parker, La Rochelle and the French monarchy: conflict and order in seventeenth-century France, 
(London, 1980), p. 19. However, see the recent work of D. Lee, Popular sovereignty in early modern 
constitutional thought, (Oxford, 2016), which offers a fascinating insight into the concept of popular 
sovereignty and the role of Roman law during this period.  
2 K. Bezemer, What Jacques saw: thirteenth century France through the eyes of Jacques de Révigny, 
(Frankfurt, 1997) [translated from the original German] [1996] presented a unique approach to the life 
of a lawyer and the era in which he lived.  
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throughout France, ought to be seen as living societies central to government and the 
power-brokering that engaged the monarchy. The relationship between these 
institutions and the King had a direct and intimate bearing on the nature of law, its 
authority and practical operation.  Only through a better understanding of the impact 
of the various competing influences of this time, and assessing its likely affect on the 
individual lawyer or parlementaire, will the aim of this work be reached.  
The decisive break from Middle Ages to the early modern era is generally 
identified as taking place in 1453; the year that marked the Ottoman capture of the 
Byzantium Empire’s Capital, Constantinople, and signified the end of the Eastern 
Roman Empire.3  This year also signalled the end of the Hundred Years War between 
France and England, where the French restored their domestic authority and re-
emerged as a leading Western power.4  Johannes Gutenberg had ushered in modernity 
in 1440, with his invention of the printing press, which would forever change the way 
individuals would conceive of the society around them.5 Universities were established 
throughout Europe at an unprecedented rate, satisfying a growing demand for an 
educated elite in office.6 However, none of these movements alone explains the 
ideological and indeed new self-confidence that came with the late fifteenth century.  
It is possible to attribute this, in part, to the shift in man’s individual relationship with 
God, which changed from one of anxiety and powerlessness to one of awareness, and 
the belief that their God-given ingenuity was there to question the universe in which 
they lived.7  It was the provision of tools en masse (the printing press and book 
production) by which previous understanding could be realised and then challenged.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 R. Runciman, The fall of Constantinople: 1453, (Cambridge, U.K., 1965), p. xi.   
4 R. Lesaffer, European legal history: a cultural and political perspective, (Cambridge, U.K., 2009), p. 
289.  See also D. Potter, “Anglo-French relations 1500: the aftermath of the hundred years war”, 
(1999) 41 Franco British Studies, Journal of the British Institute in Paris, 28; and C. Giry-Deloison, 
“France and England at peace, 1475-1513”, in G. Richardson (ed.), The contending kingdoms: France 
and England, 1420-1700, (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 43-60.  
5 For an account of the life of the inventor, Gutenberg, see: A. Kapr, Johann Gutenberg: the man and 
his invention, (Aldershot, 1996) [translated from the German] [1986]. See also generally on the politics 
of information in early modern Europe: B. Dooley and S. Baron (eds.), The politics of information in 
early modern Europe, (London, 2001); and on the printing press as an agent of change, with an English 
focus, but universally relevant in terms of the significance of the invention: D. Harvey, The law 
emprynted and englysshed: the printing press as an agent of change in law and legal culture, 1475-
1642, (Oxford, 2015).  
6 On the history of universities in early modern Europe, see P. Grendler (ed.), Renaissance education 
between religion and politics, (Aldershot, 2006); W. Courtenay, et al. (eds.), Universities and 
schooling in medieval Society (Leiden, 2000).   
7 N. Davies, Europe: a history, (Oxford, 2010), p. 471.  
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The Protestant Reformation8 and legal humanism9 were all marks of a newfound 
independence of thought.   
In this chapter, observations are made about the sixteenth century, and so 
some of these include the years that followed Nicolas Bohier’s life.  These are 
highlighted to enable a fuller account of the period and its movements, in order to 
contextualise the works produced by Bohier, some of which were published 
posthumously.  
 
1.1  Assessing Legal Humanism 
 
Why is the 16th century identified with legal humanism, and not, say, with the 
collections of legal opinions of contemporary jurists, the Consilia, or the 
Decisiones of the great regional and national supreme courts, both of which 
were printed in far greater numbers and disseminated throughout Europe?10  
 
Defining legal humanism and those considered as humanists is problematic. 
The recent work by du Plessis and Cairns has highlighted the problems with the 
categorisation of jurists.11 While the overall aim of this thesis is to identify what the 
term ius commune meant when used by Bohier in his works, it also needs to assess the 
validity of the claim that legal humanism is an appropriate representative for sixteenth 
century legal thought.  A rethinking of nature and purpose in the context of legal 
teaching and practice is a chief aim of this work.  
By the sixteenth century, it is often contended that the schools of humanism 
and scholasticism had hardened into more distinct groups, with their own identities 
and that most intellectuals had a clear sense of loyalty to one or the other.12  The rise 
of the public persona of the lawyer would have changed the nature of the law and 
perhaps further separated it from the university jurist, who appeared removed from 
the contentions and precarious nature of legal practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The inability of the church to console its people during the Middle Ages, at a time marked by plague 
and war, has been described as creating a “spiritual malaise”.  See G. Elton, Reformation Europe: 
1517-1559, (Malden, 1999), p. 29. 
9 For reference to the general impact of both the Lutheran Reformation and humanism, see H. Gelder, 
The two reformations in the sixteenth century: a study of the religious aspects and consequences of 
renaissance and humanism, (The Hague, 1964) [translated from the Dutch] [1955]. On new approaches 
to legal humanism, see P. Du Plessis and J. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing legal humanism and its claims: 
petere fontes?, (Edinburgh, 2016). 
10 D. Osler, “Images of legal humanism”, (2001) 9 Surfaces 101.  
11 Du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 9). 	  	  
12 K. Van Liere, “Humanism and scholasticism in sixteenth-century academe: five student orations 
from the university of Salamanca”, (2000) 53 Renaissance Quarterly 57.  
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Those who felt strongly associated with the intellectual movement of 
humanism, therefore, would have enhanced this demarcation and ultimately created a 
two-tier legal culture, divided between university teaching and writing and the 
practice of the law. The rigid periodization of legal history has caused the sixteenth 
century to become almost exclusively synonymous with legal humanism: “the scholar 
could be a humanist but the practitioner had to be a Bartolist.”13  It is this separation 
of professional and intellectual identity that has resulted in the jurist overshadowing 
the practitioner. This division was perhaps not as pronounced at the time as it is 
commonly said to have been today. This watertight distinction between the humanist 
and “other” (such as the practising lawyer) has been challenged.14  
 It is the later post-sixteenth century treatment of legal humanism that has 
given it, and the universities, centre stage.15 This is a possible explanation for the 
overwhelmingly humanist nature affixed to this period of legal history, and the pale 
figure of the practitioner within it.  The roles of the lawyer, the avocat, procurateur, 
and their writings, which were not always directly practice-oriented, were dominant 
ones and central to the narrative of sixteenth century legal history.  Legal humanism is 
mentioned here to acknowledge the revered place it holds in sixteenth century legal 
history.  However, given its mid- to-late sixteenth century presence, and the 
aforementioned oversight of legal practice, it is not at the basis of this work.  
 
2.   Evolving Legal Orders  
 
2.1  Placing the Parlement 
 
The legal system of the Ancien Régime was far from autonomous in the 
modern sense, with judges, parties and institutions subjected to the influences of high-
ranking officials with their kinship and clientage networks.  Michael Breen has 
commented that the law and its operation at this time ought to be considered as 
“working in tandem with clientage networks and other informal channels of 
influence.”16 Ancien Régime France has been described as a “judicial society where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 P. Stein, Legal humanism and legal science, (1986) 54 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 297. 
14 Du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 9).  
15 Osler, (n. 10).   
16 M. Breen, “Patronage, politics and the rule of law”, (2005) 33 Proceedings of the Western society for 
French history 95.  
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the experiences of the law courts were central to the way in which political action was 
conceptualised.”17  The parlement acted as a “judicial field”, by channelling conflicts 
into an environment where experts with recognised technical competence mobilised 
appropriate texts, arguments and tactics in an effort to secure a peaceful resolution 
that favoured their party and cause.18  This notion of channelling conflict and power is 
key to understanding the operation and importance of the parlement, in particular 
when considering the eventual regionalisation of these centres of judicial authority. 
The parlements were “curious institutions whose role is difficult for the modern 
observer to grasp.”19  They were as independent as a royal institution could be in that 
they were self-sustaining, self-perpetuating, and self-governing.20  
The judicial structure reflected the large topography and landscape of France 
itself, encompassing a range of tiers and levers by which justice could be delivered, 
and power exerted, throughout the land. The King and his Grand Conseil, with the 
parlements, Cour des Aides (which dealt with income from taxation) and Chambre 
des Comptes (which handled revenue from the domain) represented the highest level 
of the courts.21  The Baillages (Northern France) or Sénéchaussées (Southern France) 
were the intermediary courts and royal courts of first instance.22 French supreme 
jurisdiction belonged to the parlement of Paris, which co-existed alongside the 
regional parlements.  Composed of three chambers, the parlement held the Grand 
Chambre, Chambre des Enquêtes and the Chambre des Requêtes.23  The Grand 
Chambre was, as the name suggests, the central hub of the Parlement’s activity, and 
was the arena for holding trials.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 D. Bell, “The public sphere, the state and the world of the law in eighteenth-century France”, (1992) 
17 French Historical Studies, 933.  
18 P. Bourdieu, “La force du droit: elements pour une sociologie du champ juridique”, (1986) 64 Actes 
de la recherché en sciences sociales 3.  
19 W. Beik, Absolutism and society in seventeenth century France: state power and provincial 
aristocracy in Languedoc, (Cambridge, U.K., 1985), p. 77. 
20 L. Kim, “The judicial structure of sixteenth century France’, (2013) 16 Torch Trinity 34-59, at 35. 
For comparative examples of the history of central courts in Europe, see M. Godfrey, Civil justice in 
renaissance Scotland: the origins of a central court, (Leiden, 2009), and R. Van Rhee, Litigation and 
legislation: civil procedure at first instance in the Great Council for the Netherlands in Malines (1522-
1559), (Brussels, 1997).  
21 J. Strayer, On the medieval origins of the modern state, (Princeton, 2005) [translated from the 
original Portugese] [1969]. p. 72. 
22 M. Bubenicek and R. Partington, “Justice, law and lawyers”, in C. Fletcher, et al. (eds.), Government 
and political life in England and France, c. 1300-1500, (Cambridge, U.K., 2015), pp. 150-182, at p. 
159.  
23 C. Carpenter and O. Matteoni, “Offices and officers”, in ibid, at p. 90.   
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Its structure was ill suited to administrative tasks. Despite its mandate being a 
broad one, “concerned with everything from the price of firewood or the danger of the 
plague, to the choice of officers for the militia”24, in the case of local municipal 
business, its performance was really only reserved for the role of intermediary and 
overseer.25  Unsurprisingly, the arrival of regional parlements saw an increase in 
municipal activity in this regard, with their ability to dominate city agencies by their 
greater dynamism and accompanying superiority, and not necessarily because of 












Fig. 1: Nicolas Bohier as judge in the Bordeaux Parlement.27 
 
The physical space of the parlement in Paris is worth considering.  The image 
above depicts a scene at the parlement in Bordeaux, with Bohier sitting as judge. 
These regional parlements were based on the Paris parlement in terms of structure 
and organisation. The compound where the parlement held its sessions was 
collectively known as the Palais de Justice.  A raised dais dominated the courtroom, 
and was positioned at the Northwest corner of the Grand Chambre. It was reserved 
for the occasions where the King would visit the parlement.28  Chief magistrates were 
dressed in ceremonial red robes and other magistrates, dressed in black, sat on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 B. Diefendorf, Paris city councillors in the sixteenth century: the politics of patrimony, (Princeton, 
2014) [1982], p. 10. 
25 Ibid.  
26 G. Zeller, Les institutions de la France au XVIè siècle, (Paris, 1948), pp. 79-80.  Regional 
parlements are considered in greater detail later in this chapter.   
27 Picture taken from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicolas_de_Bohier.jpg (image is in the 
public domain). Accessed on 9th February 2016.  
28 S. Beam, Laughing matters: farce and the making of absolutism in France, (Ithaca, 2007), p. 84.  
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benches that framed the dais.29  The social and professional distance between the 
clerks and the magistrates was clearly illustrated and divisions were physically 
pronounced. Solicitors and clerks would work outside the Grand Chambre, usually 
based in the Grand Salle where “solicitors and barristers established benches and 
dealt with clients in a busy, crowded, semi-public environment.”30  Many cases 
brought before the parlement would be handled in a written pleading or were appeals 
of cases of a defendant who was not domiciled in Paris and so the work of the 
solicitor was crucial to a case’s conclusion.  Their role, however, lacked prestige.  The 
barristers, in contrast, although earning only marginally more than their solicitor 
counterparts, enjoyed a social standing that was considerably higher.  Their role as 
prosecutors gave them a visible standing and being formally trained in law would 
often present them with wider opportunities for advancement in royal service.31    
The pinnacle of the elite, however, was reserved for the magistrates.  
Magistrates enjoyed the possibility of geographic and social mobility.  The president 
of a provincial parlement could acquire an office at the parlement of Paris, and many 
magistrates held a number of posts in the capital city. Magistrates belonged to a 
lower-nobility, perhaps from the retail merchant class: the urban oligarchy.32  It is 
believed that it was their attendance at university, which was a requirement for their 
position, which marked them out from other members of this urban elite.33  Many 
magistrates would have travelled outside their native region for the purpose of study, 
often returning home to take up office at their own local parlement.34   
 
2.2  Regional rule 
 
2.2.1  National unity: challenge or purpose? 
 
The regional parlements were established at a time of royal territorial 
expansion. As well as being an extension of monarchical power, their formation can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 S. Hanley, The ‘lit de justice’ of the kings of France: constitutional ideology in legend, ritual and 
discourse, (Princeton, 1983), p. 63.  See also E. Maugis, Histoire du parlement de Paris de 
l’avenement des rois Valois a la mort d’Henri IV, (New York, 1967) [1913], pp. 285-286.  
30 Beam, (n. 28).  
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid, p. 87.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Beam, (n. 28).  See also J. Dewald, The formation of a provincial nobility: the magistrates of the 
parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610, (Princeton, 1980), pp. 24-28.  
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also be seen as promoting the importance of preserving local customs and 
privileges.35  These provincial parlements developed out of the courts that had existed 
in the great fiefs before their absorption into the kingdom.  They were modelled on 
the Paris parlement and so exercised a similar jurisdiction within their own areas.  In 
the majority of cases, these provincial institutions were seen as completing, not 
abolishing, a long established tradition of seigneurial justice as it had operated in each 
fiefdom, and further still, that they “constituted a single body and…were merely the 
‘classes’ of a unique and indivisible parlement dispersed throughout the kingdom for 
the convenience of justice.”36   
Undoubtedly, the importance of the parlement rested in its ability to make 
sense of the diverse collection of laws that governed its land. The geographic location 
of the parlements is revealing of the monarchic motivations behind their 
establishment.37   By 1515, there were six provincial parlements: Toulouse, Bordeaux, 
Dijon, Grenoble, Aix and Rouen.  Under King Francis I (1494-1547), the personnel of 
these parlements multiplied considerably.  In Bordeaux, the number of conseillers and 
presidents rose from 24 to approximately 80. 38   This increase was largely a 
consequence of increased legal business.  It is fair to say that: “the operative concepts 
of government were duplication, ambiguity, and competition.”39  The King would 
have been hesitant to abolish any existing orders and so built supplementary agencies, 
with each century bringing an accretion of new ones, familiar in their purposes but 
bearing new titles.  However, the requirement that all regional establishments follow 
the same basic procedures meant there was an element of uniformity in the operation 
of the parlements throughout the varied and disparate regions. Rebecca Kingston has 
argued that the parlements ought not to be seen purely as an extension of royal power, 
and that instead their role was as an institution recognising the customary laws as they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Of the considerable volume of literature on the parlement as an institution, most notably that of 
Paris, see: E. Fayard, Apergu historique sur le parlement de Paris, (Lyon, 1876); F. Aubert, Histoire 
du parlement de Paris, de l'origine a François I: 1250-1515, (Paris, 1894); E. Glasson, Le parlement 
de Paris: Son role politique depuis le règne de Charles VII jusqu'i la Revolution, (Paris, 1901); 
Maugis, (n. 29); R. Doucet, Étude sur le gouvernement de François ler dans ses rapports avec le 
parlement de Paris, (Paris, 1926); and J. Shennan, The parlement of Paris, (London, 1968).   
36 R. Kingston, Montesquieu and the parlement of Bordeaux, (Geneva, 1996), p. 63; R. Mousnier, The 
institutions of France under the absolute monarchy, 1598-1789, Volume 2: The organs of state and 
society, (1984) [translated from the original French] [1979], pp. 637-640.  
37 See figure 2 below for a sense of distinction between the different regional parlements. 
38 R. Knecht, French renaissance monarchy: Francis I & Henry II, (London, 1996), p. 18. 
39 D. Bell, Lawyers and citizens: the making of a political elite in old regime France, (New York, 
1994), p. 22. 
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operated in each area.40 Each regional parlement was born out of its own individual 
and unique circumstances.  The Bordeaux parlement, for example, took over the role 
of the older Cour superieure of Guyenne.41   
 
Fig 2: Map of France in the late fifteenth century.42 
 
The motivations underlying the creation of the regional parlements may well 
have been driven by the need for better application and understanding of regional 
customs.43  However, even if this position is accepted, they were still the product of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Kingston, (n. 36).  
41 E. Guillemain, Histoire de la reformation a Bordeaux et dans le ressort du parlement de Guyenne, 
Volume 1, (1523-1563), (Paris, 1894).  
42 Picture taken from Muir's historical atlas, (London, 1911): 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=8167754. Accessed on 9th February 2016.  
43 G. Small, Late medieval France, (London, 2009), p. 38.  
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royal influence and desire to better understand loose localities and their regional 
peculiarities.  The map above illustrates the complex geography of France in this 
period. The hesitancy of the monarch to impose bold new bodies in place of older 
institutions did not prevent it from ensuring a uniformity of practice within the walls 
of each parlement.  The attempt to recognise and understand customary laws as they 
applied in each region was in itself the very essence of royal expansion.  It was in 
many ways the only way in which a king could extend his influence.  
 
2.2.2  Statesman or servant? 
 
The operation of the parlement, with its complex roll-call of officials, each varied in 
their role and stature, was marked by a duality of identity: the self identity perceived 
by those in office, and the conferred identity of an individual by the monarch. The 
parlement, in Paris and those regionally, was an institution that enjoyed the status of 
having final appeal in their own respective regions. Furthermore, it has been shown 
above that rulings made in one parlement did not affect or change judgments and 
legislation in other parts of the kingdom.  National laws would be registered in Paris 
first and then passed to the provincial parlements to register, but Parisian laws would 
not undermine another parlement’s jurisdiction.44  Nancy Roelker refers to the Paris 
parlement as “the corporate institution par excellence… Guardian of the laws, 
parlement alone could apply the check of justice to the crown and maintain 
constitutional equilibrium.”45  
It is possible to legitimise the absolute authority of the monarch and reassure a 
parlementaire of their independent importance in the process of judicial 
administration.  Theorists distinguished the monarch’s absolute power from the rule 
of a tyrant by emphasising that the former governed according to the law and not their 
personal will.46  
 
2.2.3  Grand Conseil du Roi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Kim, (n. 20), 42.  
45 N. Roelker, One king, one faith: the parlement of Paris and the religious reformations, (Berkeley, 
1996), p. 80.  
46 Breen, (n. 16), 95.  
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The Grand Conseil, a superior court of Justice, was established in 1497, with 
jurisdiction over the entire kingdom.47  Situated in Paris, it was presided over by the 
Chancellor of France. 48  The relationship between the Grand Conseil and the 
parlement in Paris, and indeed regional ones, was characterised by tension. The 
Grand Conseil occupied an ambivalent place, lacking an independent, well defined 
sphere and territory of jurisdiction; largely judging in cases where the King 
considered the parlements’ rulings unacceptable.49  Its role also had an ecclesiastical 
element, taking oaths of fealty of bishops and judging in cases of litigation of 
religious orders.50   
Depicting the Grand Conseil as paralleling parlements would be misleading.  
In many ways, it was not a competing force, as that would imply a potentially equal 
share of authority.  Instead, it is better thought of as a checker on the parlements.  Its 
very existence and operation was as an oppositional force to the sovereign courts and 
designed to challenge their judicial decision making.  It was, however, capable of 
resolving conflicts.  With jurisdiction between parlements, it could adjudicate 
conflicts between judges responsible to different sovereign courts.51  Over time, 
important ecclesiastical establishments were transferred from the traditional 
jurisdiction of the parlement to the Grand Conseil in order to facilitate appointments 
that the king believed the parlement would not accept.52   
 
2.2.4  The right of remonstrance 
 
The balance of authority between the King and the parlement was largely 
predicated on the right of remonstrance held by the latter.  While its primary function 
was as a law court, the role of the parlement encompassed administrative and 
legislative branches of power also. Parlements had a role in the “national legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 D. Bjai, “Trois fois par mois? Dix fois par jour?: Montaigne et la réglementation du marriage dans 
sur des vers de virigile”, (2011) 38 Studia Romanica Pos Naniensia 23, at 26.  See also J. Laurent, “Le 
grand conseil”, in J. Laurent, Guide des recherches dans les fonds judicaires de l’Ancien Régime, 
(Paris, 1958), p 27.  
48 At the time of Bohier’s appointment to the Grand Conseil, the Chancellor was Jean de Ganay (1455-
1512).  
49 A. Kinneging, Aristocracy, antiquity, and history: an essay on classicism in political thought, (New 
Brunswick, 1997) [1994], p. 51. 
50 Ibid.   
51 Mousnier, (n. 36), p. 277. 
52 Roelker, (n. 45), p. 84.  
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process”:53 although the King promulgated the laws, each parlement needed to 
register them before they took effect in the jurisdiction of the particular parlement.  A 
technical point perhaps, but the attached right of remonstrance (although not 
constituting a veto, it must be stressed), enabled the parlement to remonstrate with the 
King if there was disagreement with the legislation.  Sarah Hanley explains that the 
use of this right remained a point of conflict throughout the Ancien Régime, its 
meaning in flux for some time: “was parlement’s use of remonstrance a privilege or 
an autonomous right, advisory or binding upon the king?”54  
The relationship between the Grand Conseil and the parlement was a topic of 
particular contention at the time. It is generally recognised that even before the Grand 
Conseil was separated from the King’s council to judge disputes between sovereign 
courts and administrative bodies in 1497, the Paris parlement complained that the 
recourse to judgment by the King’s council was unconstitutional.55  The parlementary 
remonstrance of 1489 is a marked example of power politics and is revealing of the 
prerogatives of the court and the response of the King, Charles VIII (1470-1498), to 
it.  The background is loosely thus: the parlement protested the summons of two 
conseillers by the bailiff of the Grand Conseil to the then Chancellor, (Chancellor 
Guillaume de Rochefort (1433[or 1439]-1492)).  Parlement had forbidden the two 
conseillers to obey the order, and with the signatures of a great number of conseillers 
expanded this into fully elaborated remonstrances.56  The remonstrance of 1489: 
 
shows that the parlement saw itself as a senatorial court that virtually eclipsed 
the monarchy… Because Roman law, as interpreted in late medieval Romano-
canonical jurisprudence, was viewed as a providential blueprint for the just 
state, this comparison reinforced the court’s belief in the sacred immutability 
of its place within the judicial hierarchy and encouraged its rejection of a 
perceived competitor.57 
 
    
The parlement therefore asserted that its powers were equivalent to the Roman 
senate, in which the Prince was both head and member.  This assimilation of Senate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Bell, (n. 39), p.25.  
54 Hanley, (n. 29), at pp. 145-146.  
55 T. Lange, The first French reformation: church reform and the origins of the old regime, (New 
York, 2014), p. 129. See also J. Krynen, L’État de Justice, France (XIIIe-XXe siècle), (Paris, 2009), for 
an interesting overview of the relationship between the sovereign’s delivery of justice and the demands 
of magistrates. 
56Lange, (n.55).   
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and parlement suggests that the parlement’s constitutional vision rested on an 
interpretation of the Roman constitution.58  According to the remonstrance, the 
parlement’s special nature was such that in it resided as “la souveraine justice du 
royaume de France, le vray [sic] siege, auctorite, magnificence et majeste du roy.”59   
 
3.  National identity 
 
The history of the sixteenth century is most conspicuously marked by a rapid 
advancement towards the nation state, which had “hitherto unknown strength, and 
tending to efface, in a larger territorial sovereignty, the independence of cities and 
smaller units.”60  The definition of nationhood at this time denoted a variety of things, 
including: “students at the University of Paris (organised into various nations), to 
speakers of languages, to those who shared a common set of customs, to geographical 
territory.”61  In 1517, Erasmus praised France’s supreme power and integrity, noting 
that it was at peace with itself and “pure” in its religion.62  Yet, this apparent peace 
saw writers preoccupied with borders and frontiers.  Colette Beaune has shown that 
the notion of a French “nation” in the medieval period was based on the portrayal of 
the English as a threat.63  The perception of vulnerability then, it seems, served two 
functions.  One was to cause individuals to seek assurances through the definition of 
community and the feeling of belonging by constructing an ideological group: a 
French nation, per se.  Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this translated into a 
tacit willingness for centralisation and unification through a state, at the head of 
which was the King.64   
Arguably, any perceived notion of a nation state and an intentional formation 
of such a system is flawed.65 Royal authority increased, and with it centralisation, due 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Ibid.  
59 E. Maugis, (n. 29), p. 374.  
60 J. Kelley, A short history of western legal theory, (Oxford, 1992).  
61 T. Hampton, Literature and nation in the sixteenth century: inventing renaissance France, (Ithaca, 
2001) [2000], p. 7.  
62 Ibid.  
63 C. Beaune, The birth of an ideology: myths and symbols of nation in late-medieval France, 
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to a convergence among governing elites who tended to produce support for the 
crown and in turn encourage royal dominance of a society that would come to mark 
early modern France.66  The extent to which individuals such as lawyers and office 
bearers would have been complicit in this growing sense of nation and national 
identity is unclear.  Towards the later half of the sixteenth century, the lawyer and 
member of the Paris parlement, Jean Bodin, published his République, which is 
widely regarded as the framework for the theory of sovereignty upon which the 
French monarchy was to rest,67 born out of France’s passing from late stages of 
feudalism through to a centralised state.  The first half of the sixteenth century poses a 
greater challenge in terms of identifying national mood and awareness of statehood.  
Would a conseiller of the parlement have considered himself as a statesman, or 
indeed as state-builder?  Or, is it likely that the general and gradual shift towards 
statehood happened to them, rather than purposively by them?68 The question of 
whether one holding office was a statesman or a servant, and how external identity 
was perceived by the royal court is equally relevant to considerations of nationalism 
and national identity: 
 
Early modern societies inherited a sense of identity that was profoundly local.  
Citizens might feel a generalised sense of themselves as part of larger national 
communities, particularly in time of war, but their primary points of 
identification were more specific: to kin, to their lord, to their parish or guild, 
to their city.69   
 
Much of the period’s shift towards a national cohesion was based on a 
framework of religious affiliation, and a growing shared hostility to Rome and 
perceived Papal control of religious administration, finance, and law.70  It is perhaps 
equally accurate, or indeed more accurate in some respects, to identify French 
national identity as being one of Gallicanism71 in the later sixteenth century, and an 
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eventual movement away from Rome, rather than a principled and concerted effort by 
individuals in office to construct a unified single nation. 
 
3.1  Language 
 
The role of language was a significant mark of the national and patriotic 
sentiment in sixteenth century France.72  King Francis I’s Ordonnance de Montpellier, 
enacted in 1537, established a legal deposit system, providing that the royal library 
receive a copy of every book to be sold in France.73  This ordonnance came following 
a period of gradual assimilation into one unifying language.  By the end of the 
fifteenth century, French was the only vernacular used for literary purposes in the 
North.74  The language spoken at this time was largely based on that of Paris, Orléans, 
and Tours, with regional variations in pronunciations and dialects peppered 
throughout.  French was still spoken by a minority in the South, but was steadily 
strengthening its position as the official language.  John Palgrave’s L'éclaircissement 
de la langue francoyse (1530) laid out a language hierarchy. The French language 
spoken in Paris was best; written French of the most worth was based on that spoken 
tongue.  Those holding office were expected to use this kind of French.75  Regional 
features would start to subside over the course of the sixteenth century, with the South 
becoming increasingly united with the North, and sharing a quasi-united language for 
official purposes.  The Ordonnance de Villers-Cotteret would officially remove 
remnants of written language rivalry in 1539 when it provided for administration and 
court proceedings to be written only in French to the exclusion of the regional 
variations and Latin.76   
Looking to the printed legal works of the sixteenth century, then, notions of an 
author asserting a sense of national identity through his prose are heavily 
compromised.  The choice of words and language as an indicator of identity or as a 
trademark of self-demarcation ought to be tempered with the institution to which the 
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work is affiliated or about.  Instead of an assertion of personal identity, works of an 
official nature are perhaps more accurately reflections of the status quo. The three 
works by Bohier that are examined in this thesis demonstrate this change in approach 
to language. Two of his works are written solely in Latin, the Consilia and 
Decisiones, and the third, the Consuetudines, is presented in both Latin and French.  
 
3.2  The Lawyer and print 
 
Nicolas Bohier was responsible for a range of publications, and these will be 
considered in detail later.77 For now, however, it is useful to examine the relationship 
between printing and legal practice in a broad sense so as to greater inform the 
context of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. 
In 1440, Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press revolutionised the way in which 
individuals engaged with the written word.78  The significance of this in the legal 
world is particularly evident.  While the effects of the printing press will have been 
gradual, in many respects, with some existing legal texts not being printed for some 
time, it would affect both legal doctrine and legal practice drastically.79 The printing 
press not only made mass publication possible, but it was accompanied with editing, 
indexing and marginal notes.80  Increased order and method was brought to bodies of 
law and familiarity with texts helped to reorder the thought of readers and observers 
of legal literature as well as other publications.  Its influence on the classical law was 
two-fold: it presented the prized works in a more accessible format and therefore 
allowed for greater appreciation of the content; however, this increase in analysis also 
allowed for a new kind of scrutiny and would facilitate a more critical form of textual 
analysis:81  
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Merchants and the noblesse de robe – nobles who held purchased offices – 
stood to gain from the dignity-of-man ethos of self-improvement and the 
humanist emphasis on the achievement of virtue through study and civic 
service.82   
 
This was especially critical for Bohier’s role as editor, which is discussed in 
detail in the following chapter of this thesis. Bohier published a significant number of 
medieval works and therefore encouraged new insight into their contents; aided by the 
mass printing of such texts which had before been available only to a limited market.  
Books in this period existed in a completely different cultural context. 83 Not 
all books were bought for reading, with many instead serving as symbols of prestige. 
By the sixteenth century, books had become sufficiently common so that they were no 
longer the most prized possessions in a household, but their expense, still being 
considerable, would have meant their purchase was still a considered act, rather than 
impulsive consumerism.84 Those who read for a living benefited from the marketplace 
of the Palais de Justice, where a veritable cornucopia of stallholders would sell 
luxury items including books.85 In French centres of commerce and trade, information 
would have been at a premium. The booksellers and their stalls aided the formation of 
marketplace opinion, and ultimately helped to create a news community. This 
relationship between the bookseller and the customer, such as conseillers, magistrates 
and other office bearers, was therefore of tantamount importance. Rapport and even 
friendships between these two groups would be built up over years of retail 
exchanges, and it would have represented a crucial link between the market and 
decision making.   
The relationship between the book collections of those working in royal or 
civic administration and their note-taking practices are worthy of special interest.86  
The way in which advocates constructed their pleadings before the parlement and the 
“types of commonplaces”87 used by them to persuade a judge and win a case are 
predicated on the growing identity of a so-called “professional” readership and their 
reading habits.88  The second half of the sixteenth century saw a movement towards 
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publishing lawyers’ pleadings, and lawyers, enterprising printers and merchant 
booksellers working together to produce them. Alongside the civil and royal 
ordinances, there would have been a range of staple items for the library of an 
officeholder or lawyer.  Those booksellers frequenting the Palais de Justice stocked a 
variety of books on history, moral philosophy and poetry in French.89 At a time when 
the capital, in particular, was dominated by the parlement and university, who were 
“united for the most part in their opposition by the growing claims of royal power”,90 
their stock habits would have been responsive to the collective reading habits of those 
in attendance at these institutions.91  
 
3.3  Reordering of customary law 
 
The homologation of customary law in the sixteenth century saw a systematic 
reordering of customs in written form in the French language.  This movement, led by 
the crown, saw lawyers, advocates, judges and legal scholars play a prominent role in 
compiling, revising and rationalising custom. This would reconcile different localities 
to bring them under a unified system of law.92  Reordering customary law and linking 
it to statutory laws was an integral part of a state building process in early modern 
Europe.93  In many respects, a symbiotic relationship between the state and the 
community “fashioned in this codification process a critical nexus between the 
crown’s assertion of legislative authority and the principle of representative 
institutions of the local community.”94  
By the middle of the sixteenth century, the majority of customs in the 
kingdom (including Paris) had been published. There is great agreement on the role of 
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legal humanism in promoting the feudal and customary laws of Europe, France 
especially, and ultimately in contributing towards the nationalisation of France by 
creating an “ideological climate sympathetic to the emergence of national law.”95  
This is not denied, but the importance placed on its role overshadows the background 
behaviour of the monarchy and its effort to centralise power, using jurists and lawyers 
to consolidate the customary laws.  The renowned jurist and Parisian lawyer, Charles 
Loyseau (1564-1627)96 alludes to the practical motivations behind homologation: 
 
Our customary laws… are so different and so confused that it is very difficult 
to extract from them a general and certain answer… the law must be married 
with the practice, usage with reason: in short, Roman law must be linked with 
our own.97 
 
The search for certainty then, or at least a defined source of authorities from 
which a lawyer could utilise, would have motivated the publication of customary law 
works. That the bulk of the commentaries written on customs were by legal 
practitioners is revealing of a practical purpose, or indeed necessity, behind their 
composition. The later half of the sixteenth century was an intensive period of 
homologation, but the likes of Nicolas Bohier in 1508, writing a commentary on the 
customs of Berry, and Barthélemy de Chasseneuz’s (1480-1541) work on the Duchy 
of Burgundy in 1517 (revised 1528), show the concerted effort by lawyers98 to 
produce works on this source of law earlier.  
Perhaps the most marked thing about sixteenth century jurists was “their 
insistence on the primacy of native traditions” and that there was a “reaction against 
Romanist influence”.99 The changing identity of customary law as being certain and 
applicable in courts all over France, was not universally accepted, with critics 
alluding to the inherent ambiguities in customs as individual sources.  However, it is 
perhaps the invocation of “reason” as a justifying factor in the application of a 
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custom.  From the medieval practice where a custom was required to be reasonable, 
this recourse to reason was a logical extension, identifying custom as a “secondary 
form of natural law”.100  Bohier himself offered an account of custom, where he wrote 
that it “shows by natural law that all men are born free.”101 Crafting a correlation 
between customary law and political thought about the state served to strengthen the 
case for a unified droit coutumier, which would peak in the late seventeenth 
century.102   
 




The Montpellier that Nicolas Bohier was born into in 1469 was an emerging 
centre of royal administration that would eventually become an administrative capital 
of Languedoc.103 Just two years previously, the Cour des Aides104 was established in 
the city, and was soon followed by several other tribunals of province-wide 
importance, securing Montpellier’s position as the centre of Languedocian financial 
administration.105   
Until the late twelfth century, Montpellier was under the commercial 
dominance of Genoa.106 At this time there was a recognised shift towards merchants 
asserting independence from the so-called “commercial hegemony of Genoa and Pisa 
which had been until then almost exclusive intermediaries in the supply of the 
markets of Montpellier with spices and other articles of the Mediterranean luxury 
trade.”107  Overland routes that linked Montpellier with Northern Italy also facilitated 
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an East-West exchange.108 However, this prosperity did not last beyond the end of the 
fifteenth century.  Frederick Irvine attributes the collapse of the Levant trade partly 
due to Marseilles joining the kingdom in 1481 and thereby taking Montpellier’s 
monopoly on spice trade.109  This turned Montpellier into a “centre of regional 
commerce.”110  Although overland trade with Lyon persisted, it was not as profitable 
as it had previously been, and so many merchant families moved away from 
commercial activities and instead focused on investing in seigneurial estates and robe 
offices.111  This aspiration to “live nobly”, as Irvine calls it, saw the creation of a new 
urban nobility.112  Those escaping bourgeoisie status would often set their sights on 
investing in royal offices in particular.   
The university served to benefit the town of Montpellier considerably.  The 
faculty of medicine in particular enjoyed an international reputation of excellence, 
and was responsible for much of the international contingent studying at the 
institution.113  The law school, in contrast, does not appear to have enjoyed the same 
reputation, and instead was predominantly made up of local students from 
Montpellier or those from within the Bas-Languedoc.114  Given the newly acquired 
status as a centre of royal administration, the university, together with the emerging 
urban nobility, would have offered a steady recruitment source for Montpellier royal 
administration. The officers of robe in Montpellier would have been marked by their 
varied origins, but Irvine has recognised that this group enjoyed a certain social 
cohesiveness.115  He attributes this to the focus the offices placed on an individual’s 
position in court and their date of admission as opposed to social background.116   
Marriage connections, which were of vital importance in this group, also crossed local 
elites.117   
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4.2  Bordeaux 
 
The parlement of Bordeaux was established in 1462.  Born out of the two 
parlements of Paris and Toulouse, its jurisdiction extended over a large proportion of 
Southern France (see map earlier in this chapter for a sense of the different regions 
and their parlements). It was created to rule in the name of the King as an instrument 
of royal justice, enforcing whatever ordinances had been registered, but with the right 
of remonstrance.118  However, it was to have its own role in the politics of the region 
and so, together with its royal relationship, it was a complex force of monarchic 
defender and critic of royal policy.   
Much of the history written about early modern France focuses on 
centralisation and homologation, and in the case of cities and municipalities, it has 
traditionally been assumed that there was a general shift by robe officers and so-called 
legal men to distance themselves from the urban community and align themselves 
with the crown, undermining the classical idea of the French bonne ville.119  However, 
Michael Breen has highlighted that the power and importance of France’s 
municipalities, while on the wane, remained “vital centres of governance and political 
activity.”120  He continues: “Although some urban centres were undoubtedly under 
close royal control, notables in many others maintained a strong sense of civic 
identity and attachment to their local privileges and institutions”.121 The case of 
Bordeaux demonstrates this through its own particular history of unrest and radical 
change of rule.  
Bordeaux was under English rule from 1152 until 1453 when the French 
victory over the English at the Battle of Castillon stripped them of all French assets 
(except Calais and the Channel Islands), and ultimately marked the end of the 
Hundred Years War.122  Located in the duchy of Guyenne, the city of Bordeaux then 
fell under the French crown again (except between 1469 and 1472, when King Louis 
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in the hundred years war, (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 69 – 82.    
	   33	  
XI (1423-1483) granted the duchy to his brother, Charles de Valois (1446-1472)).123  
After the fall of English Gascony, the reinstatement of French authority took many 
forms. Robin Harris has recognised that while some would have sought to radically 
reform the duchy’s institutions, there was no evidence of a concerted effort to 
transform the cultural or social identity of Guyenne.124  The parlement of Bordeaux 
assumed the jurisdiction and work of the Cour superieure of Guyenne.  There was a 
continued authority of traditional privileges, such as communal ones that included 
municipal control over police and administration in the region.125  This extended to 
local bourgeois of Bordeaux who were granted an exemption from personal and 
commercial taxes, among other benefits.126  However, this period was still marked by 
unrest. Douglas Johnson sums up the mood of the era of transition well: 
 
So great could be the resistance to the crown on financial matters, and so 
widespread and persistent were the privileges enjoyed by individuals, classes, 
corporative bodies and municipalities, that the history of the crown from the 
fifteenth century onwards is often one of great precariousness.127   
 
 
Indeed, the burghers of Bordeaux presented a long resistance to any attempt to 
limit their municipal freedoms.128  Of course, not each period of unrest can be solely 
predicated on some strong sense of regional autonomy or civic identity as a 
motivating factor, with many instances appearing to be simply the product of 
perceived unfairness in financial administration and collective protest to this effect.  
There was certainly a relationship between the pattern of royal intervention in the 
region and the nature of the responses to it by the public, and its direct impact in 
creating a unique tradition for the parlement of Bordeaux.129 Taxation was one major 
recurring contention.  One notable case can be found in 1514 when the town of Agen, 
near Bordeaux, saw a significant uprising as a reaction to the town consul’s levying of 
an impost on wine and other consumer items.  Rebels, overburdened with taxation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 D. Seward, A brief history of the hundred years war: the English in France, 1337-1453, (London, 
2003), chapter 1; see also D. Bryson, Queen Jeanne and the promised land: dynasty, homeland, 
religion and violence, (Leiden, 1999), p. 21. 
124 R. Harris, Valois Guyenne: a study of politics, government and society in late medieval France, 
(Woodbridge, 1994), p. 191.  
125 R. Kingston, Montesquieu and the parlement of Bordeaux, (Geneva, 1996), p. 63.  
126 Ibid, pp. 63-64. Other benefits included the control over wine sold in the city of Bordeaux.   
127 D. Johnson, “The making of the French nation”, in M. Teich and R. Porter (eds.), The national 
question in historical context, (Cambridge, U.K., 1993), pp. 35-62, at p. 41.  
128 Harris, (n. 124), at pp. 134-135.  
129 Kingston, (n. 125), at p. 64.  
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directed their frustration at local magistrates and the so-called plus apparens in charge 
of local offices that administered the city’s affairs.  The revolt lasted for two weeks, 
with the parlement of Bordeaux acting to suppress it, under the command of the 
King.130   
Generally, it seems that there was no uniform program of uprooting 
administrative and judicial institutions of English Gascony, but instead gradual 
adaptation. In the parlement of Bordeaux, for example, from its time of installation in 
1462, there was a trend towards greater use of French language in the notarial 
registers.  Harris states: “throughout the period French, Gascon, and very much in 
third place, Latin, are to be found side by side.”131 Furthermore, the Romano-
Canonical procedure of the different parlements did serve to strengthen national 
unity, however as was the case in the German territories, the variation of local 
customs within each province made the administration of justice a difficult task.  
Major cities had their own laws as a projection of their regional autonomy, but made 
use of the ius commune for its “cultural valences, its reasoning mechanisms, and its 
general principles”. 132  Further, despite apparent incongruences among the 
principalities, legal procedure and practice would have been generally familiar to 
lawyers trained in the ius commune.133  
The maintenance of public order in a particular region had far-reaching 
implications for all regions.  Force would have suppressed the immediate threat that 
the uprising presented to established order in Agen in 1514, mentioned above.  The 
law, however, would be used as instrument of force, which would have left a far 
greater mark than any physical injury sustained against those that revolted.  It offered 
an opportunity for the elaboration of preventive policies to avoid the formation of 
dissent, and for the monarch to flex their institutional muscle in the form of the 
parlement.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 D. Burg, A world history of tax rebellions: an encyclopedia of tax rebels, revolts, (London, 2004), p. 
144.  Nicolas Bohier was involved in the trial of the rioters, publishing a work on the trial, receiving a 
three-year royal printing privilege for the published treatise, entitled De seditiosis.  See also E. 
Armstrong, Before copyright: the French book-privilege system 1498-1526, (Cambridge, U.K., 1990), 
p. 30.  
131 Harris, (n. 124), p. 191.  Interestingly in England, the written languages of English law were three: 
Latin for the formulaic writ book and the final transcription of the plea roll; English for statute; French 
for the legal report.  See B. Cormack, A power to do justice: jurisdiction, English literature, and the 
rise of the common law, (Chicago, 2008) [2007], p. 5.  The role of language in creating national 
identity is considered earlier in this chapter, at 3.1.   
132 M. Bellomo, The common legal past of Europe: 1000-1800, (Washington, D.C., 1995), p. 105.  
133 R. Helmholz, The ius commune in England: four studies, (Oxford, 2001), p. 14.  
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The term seditio had its roots in the Roman republic, and was rediscovered in 
the early modern age by jurists looking for an understanding in law of what appeared 
to be a succession of endemic violent uprisings and movements against the 
established authorities. It appears that the description of sedition, or at least what can 
be considered to be so, began from the reference to the Codex Iustinianus, where 
seditio was defined as a “general perturbation of the public peace.” 134   The 
publication of the treatise Tracatus de Seditiosis in 1515 by Nicolas Bohier was the 
first systematic attempt to bring order to the topic.  Following the Roman law 
definition, and citing the Codex, Bohier states “seditio est quietis publicae 
perturbatio.”135  The context of seditio was broadly drawn, so as to include “in 
exercitu, in classe, in campo, in schola.”136  This ought to be seen as a construction of 
legal doctrine that served political needs and control public spaces en masse.  By 
“defining a crime that was suitable for the brutal repression of any forms of protest 
against authority”,137 this legal treatise constructed a ideological axe with which to 
grind down those who took part in, or were involved in preparation of, so-called 
seditious acts.  From one region’s behaviour followed a responsive rule that was in 
operation across France.  It was therefore a unifying action and one that promoted a 
definition that was based on the infraction of political loyalty, which all subjects were 
bound to, regardless of regional residency.  The broad definition of the locus required 
for sedition may be interpreted as a conscious effort to blur regional identity, merging 
into a collective one, as a royal safeguard to the differences inherent in each region.  
The implications of this would therefore be felt beyond the particulars of this offence. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion   
 
 This chapter has asked “what of the lawyer?” in late fifteenth and sixteenth 
century France. The profession was as varied as the institutions they worked in. The 
period is marked by the advancement towards the nation state, and the role of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 F. del Vera, “Quietis publicae perturbatio: revolts in the political and legal treatises of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries”, in M. Griesse (ed.), From mutual observations to propaganda war: 
premodern revolts in their transnational representations, (Bielefield, 2014), pp. 273-308, at p. 280.  
The title of the Codex referred to here is C.9.30, De seditiosi et his qui plebem audent publicam 
quietem colligere. 
135 De seditiosis, 2, n. 1, 114.  
136 De seditiosis, 2, n. 4, 115.  Fabrizio del Vera discusses this in detail at p. 287. 
137 Del Vera, (n. 134). Kourad Braun, who in 1550 printed his treatise De seditionibus libri sex, 
followed Bohier.  Bohier’s work was referred to in this treatise.	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lawyer in this was significant. Bohier, like all figures, is a man in context. This potted 
history of the period in which he lived has been offered to demonstrate that he was a 
man with a range of identities: professional, regional and increasingly national ones. 
It is therefore likely that this would have informed his understanding and approach to 
the law.   
The regionalisation of centres of judicial authority, most notably the 
parlements, were symptomatic of the monarchic extension of power into localities, 
with an aim to better understand custom and regional differences.  The arrival of 
regional parlements saw an increase in municipal activity in the towns in which they 
sat, with their ability to dominate city agencies by their greater dynamism and 
accompanying superiority.  
French nationalism, or more accurately, its origins and movement towards it, 
are to be found in the sixteenth century, and the extent to which an individual 
lawyer’s own identity was purposively crafted by them to meet nationalist sentiments, 
to serve as a statesman of a new France, have been considered.  French ecclesiastical 
nationalism, or Gallicanism, accounts for much of the successful forging of a national 
identity in the later half of the sixteenth century, with an emphasis on the historic 
distinctiveness of France, and its independence of papacy and empire.138 It has been 
shown that jurisdictional conflict between magistrates and clergy meant that the 
competition for authoritative rule would have featured, in some cases prominently and 
in others more latently, in decisions made by the parlement, for example, where the 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NICOLAS BOHIER: A HISTORY 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Despite his achievements, Nicolas Bohier, an avocat, professeur and President 
of the Bordeaux parlement, has not received much attention in contemporary 
scholarship. The most complete accounts of his personal life and achievements are to 
be found in Gerard Guyon’s “Le droit bordelaise dans tous ses états: les anciennes 
coutumes, les jurists et la justice, les institutions de l’Église locale”, where he devotes 
a detailed chapter to Bohier,1 and a nineteenth-century work by Georges Calmon, 
Avocat Général of the Cour d’Appel of Bordeaux.2  Delivered as a lecture to the 
Palais de Justice, Calmon’s biography accounts for Bohier’s birth, marriage and 
career but is lacking in its use of authorities and so reliance cannot rest too heavily on 
it.  Information can also be found in the introduction to Bohier’s Decisiones 
Burdegalenses, provided by Jean Alesme, a conseiller at the Bordeaux parlement.3    
However, this brief history is a simple celebration of Bohier’s life and is more of a 
eulogy than a biography, being highly stylised and lacking objectivity. Together with 
the footnotes of related histories and brief entries in biographical works,4 these are the 
only known accounts of Nicolas Bohier’s life currently on offer.  
The Bohier name has a long and distinguished history in France.5 It can be found 
in many of the prestigious positions of the Early Modern period, including those held 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G. Guyon, “Un arrêtiste Bordelais: Nicolas Boerius (1469-1539)” in G. Guyon, Le droit Bordelais 
dans tous ses états: les anciennes coutumes, les juristes et la justice, les institutions de l’église locale: 
recueil d'articles, (Limoges, 2012), p. 127-149.  
2 G. Calmon, Le Président Bohier (Boerius), (Bordeaux, 1880).  
3 Decisiones Burdegalenses (Lyon, 1547).  
4 An example being J. Hoefer, Nouvelle biographie générale, Volume 6, (Paris, 1852).  
5 One of the most famous undoubtedly being Thomas Bohier (1460-1523).  Like Vincent Bohier, 
Thomas was also born in Auvergne.  Married to Katherine de Briçonnet, a French noblewoman and 
daughter of Guillaume Briçonnet, a French Cardinal.  Thomas served as Chamberlain for King Charles 
VIII of France but is perhaps best known for the construction of the château de Chenonceau, which 
would eventually belong to King Francis I, passing to King Henry II (1519-1559), who offered it as a 
gift to his mistress Diane de Poitiers (1499-1566).  See C. Chevalier, Histoire abrégée de Chenonceau, 
(Lyon, 1879).   
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in the Church and the parlement.6   Nicolas Bohier upheld this family lineage of 
professional success, and this biographical history will enable a clearer reading of the 
lawyer’s publications that form the basis of the case study in this work.   
 
2.  Early life   
 
Bohier was born in May 1469, in Montpellier, to parents Jeanne Fornerie and 
Vincent Bohier.7  According to Calmon, Bohier’s father came from the province of 
Auvergne and moved to Montpellier to be closer to the University so that he could 
attend classes there.8  Given that he died when Bohier was young, it can therefore be 
assumed that his involvement in his son’s upbringing was brief.  Indeed, Calmon’s 
account mentions the encouraging devotion of only Nicolas’s mother in his early 
education.9   
Bohier studied law at the university in Montpellier, but would later leave the town 
to visit a number of provinces.10  He eventually settled in Bourges, the town of his 
mother Jean Fornerie’s birth.11  On 8th July 1499, Bohier married Marie Labourrin.12  
Her Uncle was Guillaume de Cambray, Archbishop of Bourges and once a conseiller 
of the Paris parlement. 13   This alliance seems to have provided for Bohier’s 
attachment to the area, in particular his customary law work on the province of 
Berry.14  There is no mention of children in Bohier’s will.15  In his lifetime, Bohier 
was a jurist, an avocat, a conseiller in the Grand Conseil and President of the regional 
parlement in Bordeaux.  He resided in Montpellier, Bourges, Paris and finally 
Bordeaux, where he died in 1539.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 N. Roelker, One king, one faith: the parlement of Paris and the religious reformations of the sixteenth 
century, (Berkeley, 1996), p.45.  
7 Calmon, (n. 2).   
8 Ibid, p.7.  
9 Ibid. Calmon states: “sous l'égide d'une mere tendrement dévouée qui fut son guide et son soutien 
dans les premiers pas de la vie, il se mit resolument au travail et se prepara par de fortes, études à 
l'avenir brillant que son intelligence précoce permettait d'entrevoir”.   
10 Calmon, (n. 2), p. 11.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 G. de la Thaumassière, Histoire du Berry (Bourges, 1689), p. 81.  
14 Charles D’Aigrefeuille, Histoire de la ville de Montpellier depuis son origine jusqu'à a notre temps, 
Volume 1, (Montpellier, 1737), p. 368. 
15 Testament of Nicolas Bohier, written 20th May, 1538.  A copy of Bohier’s will is available at: 
Archives départementales de la Gironde, registres d’enregistrement du parlement de Bordeaux (1538), 
B/12 fol. 87 to 93. 
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Bohier is often referred to as Vicomte de Pommiers.16  This title does not seem to 
have been hereditary; there is no evidence that any of Bohier’s family or close 
associates held this title before him.17  Georges Calmon has stated that the title came 
with land bought by Bohier after his growing success as an avocat in Bourges, and 
shortly before his appointment to the Grand Conseil in 1508.18  It is also possible that 
the title was given to Bohier as a token of royal favour.  The King himself sought 
Bohier out for the position of conseillier, and so he was clearly held in high regard by 
the Royal Court, but there is no clear proof of a title being bestowed on him.19 He 
remained in Bordeaux until his death.  His will revealed the charitable nature of his 
character, where he, as a god-fearing Catholic, left substantial provision for the 
L'hôpital Saint-André, and his many books to the parlement of Bordeaux.20  
 
3. Bohier’s education at Montpellier  
 
 Bohier’s education would have informed his understanding of the law and its 
institutions. It has been argued that universities’ emphasis on Roman and Canon law 
in their teaching meant that students were “hardly prepared to begin practicing on 
graduation.”21 This, together with the perception that Codes and Digest are “useless to 
the lawyer because they bear no relation to modern society”22 suggests that the 
education received would be academic and removed from legal practice. This is 
perhaps an overstatement. However, it is likely that further education would have 
been needed to develop a command of customary laws, parlementary arrêts and royal 
ordinances.23 The extent to which university education was pragmatic and would have 
translated into legal practice will be shown in the main part of this thesis through an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 He refers to himself as such in his will: Archives départementales de la Gironde, Registres 
d’enregistrement du parlement de Bordeaux (1538), B.12 fol. 87 to 93.  See also P. Renouard, 
Imprimeurs et Libraires Parisiens du Seizieme siècle ouvrage publié d'après les manuscrits de Philippe 
Renouard, Volume 5, (Paris, 1991), p. 270.  
17 In the Archives Nationales, Paris, there are references to “Vicomte de Pommiers”, but the holder of 
the title was not Bohier.  
18 Calmon, (n. 2), p. 18.  
19 On this topic more generally see: F. Bluche, L'Ancien Régime: Institutions et Société (Paris, 1993).   
20 Testament of Nicolas Bohier, (n. 15). See also: C. Boscheron des Portes, Histoire du parlement de 
Bordeaux, depuis sa création jusqu'à sa suppression (1451-1790), Tome Premier (1462-1640), 
(Bordeaux, 1877).  
21 M. Breen, Law, city and king: legal culture, municipal politics and state formation in early modern 
Dijon, (Rochester, 2007), p. 39.  
22 J. Pocock, The ancient constitution and the feudal Law: a study of English historical thought in the 
seventeenth century, (Cambridge, U.K., 1987), p. 12.  
23 Breen, (n. 21).  
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examination of Bohier’s Consilia and Decisiones.24 For now, Bohier’s role as a 
student at Montpellier will be considered as well as his position as Professeur at 
Bourges. 
 
3.1   Montpellier 
 
 During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when state building in France 
depended on the government’s ability to staff administrative and judicial offices, 
prime candidates emerged from famous law schools.25  The confidence of the legal 
profession was intensified by connections with a parallel, and in some ways, 
overlapping institution: the university, which provided academic apprenticeship and 
licensing for the vocation of jurisprudence. 26  Renaissance Europe would see a 
succession of universities being created: twenty-eight new ones in the fifteenth 
century, with a further eighteen between the years in 1500 and 1625.27  The reasons 
for their creation and expansion stem from an awareness of royal leaders and city 
governments of the benefit of scholarly expertise and analysis to resolve difficult 
situations, create solutions and the creation and maintenance of a community from 
which they could draw educated men to form an elite workforce for the future.28  
France, in particular, shared in this spirit of expansion, creating nine new universities 
between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries.29   
Bohier studied law at Montpellier.30  The late fifteenth century saw Montpellier 
emerge as a major centre of royal administration and as an administrative capital of 
Languedoc.31  This was considered earlier in greater detail. 32  Bohier’s particular 
reasons for studying law are not known, but it is possible to make some assumptions 
as to his motivations. A legal education was a pre-requisite for some of the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis in particular.  
25 S. Hanley, “The jurisprudence of the arrêts: marital union, civil society, and state formation in 
France, 1550-1650”, (2003) 21 Law and History Review 1.  
26 D. Kelley, The beginning of ideology: consciousness and society in the French reformation, 
(Cambridge, U.K., 1981), p. 180.  
27 P. Grendler (ed.), Renaissance education between religion and politics, (Aldershot, 2006), p. 2. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
30 R. Frères, Cartulaire de l'Université de Montpellier publié sous les auspices du conseil général des 
faculties de Montpellier, (Montpellier, 1890), p.84. The dates of his attendance at the university are not 
known, but given the dates of his professional appointments it is likely that he would have been in 
attendance in the 1480/90s.  
31  F. Irvine, “From renaissance city to ancient regime capital: Montpellier, c.1500 – c.1600”, in P. 
Benedict (ed.), Cities and social change in early modern France (London, 1989), p.105.  
32 See chapter 1, “4. Pays de droit écrit”.  
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prestigious positions; indeed, the chief credential in Ancien Régime France for 
admission and promotion to the highest ranks of royal service was a law degree.33  
University courses were lengthy, in particular that of Law, Medicine and Theology, 
and the cost of living in university towns was high.34  Substantial financial resources 
were required, and this accounts for the disproportionately large numbers of law 
students who came from wealthy and well-placed families or those who enjoyed 
revenues from ecclesiastical benefices.35 
Bohier’s early legal education would have had a formative impact on him, and his 
choice of university would have determined the nature of his education. By the time 
he started his studies there, at the end of the fifteenth century, the university at 
Montpellier had fallen in its position as one of the greatest centres of study in Europe. 
This has been attributed to a number of factors, but it is important to note that this 
apparent decline would not have lowered Montpellier Law School into absolute 
obscurity, although it seems that by this stage students were drawn mainly locally 
from Montpellier and other towns of Bas-Languedoc.36  Bohier would have received 
his professional legal training in an environment rather removed from legal practice, 
and instead his initiation into the field of law would have been through the intensive 
study of the texts on the civil and canon law.37 This theoretical legal environment 
appealed to many students who would remain to pursue the work of a jurist.   
 
3.2  Professeur at Bourges  
 
Bohier taught at the University of Bourges, serving as a Professeur in the 
faculty of law.38  The university “represented a sort of training ground not only for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 J. Goldstone, Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world, (Berkeley, 1991), p. 248.  
34 J. Brundage, The origins of the legal profession: canonists, civilians and courts, (Chicago, 2008), p. 
271.  
35 Ibid.  Compare the similar situation in Scotland. See J. Cairns, “Rhetoric, language, and Roman law: 
legal education and improvement in eighteenth-century Scotland”, (1991) 9 Law and History Review 
31.  
36 Irvine, (n. 31), at p.108.  The Medical School continued to enjoy an international reputation.  For an 
interesting first-hand account of the student experience at Montpellier see: F. Platter, Beloved son 
Felix: The journal of Felix Platter, a medical student in Montpellier in the sixteenth century, (London, 
1961).  
37 R. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to private law, (Cambridge, U.K., 1996), p.80.  
38 Frères, (n.30).  He is referred to as holding a “Chaire de Professeur” at Bourges in D’Aigrefeuille, 
(n. 14). See also Boscheron des Portes, (n. 20), p. 40.  J. Ford makes reference to Bohier’s position at 
Bourges in his Law and opinion in Scotland during the seventeenth Century, (Oxford, 2007), p. 193. 
The dates of Bohier’s appointment to the position of Professeur are uncertain due to a lack of archival 
records on his role at the university.  
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humanist jurists but also for the professional ideologists of the next generation.”39  As 
a renowned centre for legal humanism it has many famous members, including the 
likes of Andrea Alciato (1492-1550);40 Jacques Cujas (1520-1590); Hugo Doneau 
(1527-1591) and François Hotman (1524-1590).41  Bohier’s position there would 
have pre-dated these well-known figures of the Humanist school.42 This may account 
for the relative obscurity surrounding Bohier’s role there. The majority of Bohier’s 
written works were related to the law in practice, and arguably, humanist discussions 
would not have been relevant to practical legal debates. Instead, these would have 
rested on the writings of Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400) and Bartolus de Saxoferrato 
(1313-1357).43  
His role as Professeur is significant in terms of its influence on his later 
publications.  His Decisiones and Consilia, in particular show his “aim in writing as a 
judge… to provide retrospectively the sort of reasoning on the questions raised by 
cases that he had provided prospectively when writing as a Professeur.”44  
   
4. Patronage   
 
Nicolas Bohier benefited from informal patronage networks, most notably his 
link with Antoine Duprat (1463-1535), a French Cardinal from the Auvergne 
province (like Nicolas’s father, Vincent), President of the parlement of Paris and 
Chancellor of France. Duprat was a cousin of the family,45 and has been called “one 
of the most important men of old France.”46 Another powerful association can be 
found through this Cardinal’s cousin, Antoine Bohier Duprat, (1460-1519) who was 
Archbishop of Bourges and President of the parlement de Normandie.47  Chancellor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Kelley, (n. 26), at p. 162. Here, it seems “ideologists” can be taken to mean jurists.  
40 See M. Ducos, “Legal science in France in the 16-17th centuries”, in G. Sandy (ed.), The classical 
heritage in France, (Leiden, 2002), pp. 297-314 at pp. 300-303.  
41 See W. Ruegg, “Themes”, in H. De Ridder-Symoens (ed.), A History of the university in Europe, 
Volume II: Universities in early modern Europe (1500-1800), (Cambridge, U.K., 2003), pp.  3-42, at p. 
34.   
42 P. Stein, Roman law in European history, (Cambridge, U.K., 1999), p. 77. 
43 This thesis will show that Bohier made considerable use of the likes of Baldus and Bartolus, among 
others.  
44 Ford, (n. 38).  
45 Roelker, (n. 6).  
46 G. Hanotaux, Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministers de France: depuis les 
traites de Westphalie jusqu'à la Revolution Française, (Paris, 1888), p. 61.  
47 This association means that Nicolas Bohier is related to Thomas Bohier, Secretaire du Roi to King 
Charles VIII, and creator of the Château Chenonceaux.  Thomas was Antoine Bohier Duprat’s brother.  
See F. Blanchard, Histoire généalogique, par ordre alphabétique, des présidens et conseillers du 
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Duprat’s influence extended beyond those departments of finance and administration 
that had been placed under his control. Duprat also strengthened royal absolutism by 
introducing a system of royal nomination to replace the traditional canonical elections 
in the Church.48 The parlement of Paris was hostile to Duprat, resentful of his high-
handed manner in dealing with matters of the court, further exacerbated by their 
disappointment in what was perceived as Duprat’s disloyalty to his former place of 
office, having served as President there for a period.  Furthermore, he had placed 
many protégés in royal offices and this served to add a further bitterness between 
parlement and Duprat.  It is therefore likely that Nicolas Bohier’s powerful, although 
not hugely popular ally could have aided his appointments.49   
Bohier’s career in legal practice began in Bourges.50  His hometown of 
Montpellier would have offered much in the way of opportunities for the young 
Bohier if he had wanted a career in finance and royal administration.  However, if set 
on a legal path, the city’s local tribunals were more limited in their potential career 
prospects.  Most cases came before the cours ordinaire, with appeal taken to the Siège 
présidial,51 and while these courts would have provided a perfectly adequate legal 
career for Bohier, he left for Bourges. In the majority of the histories dealing with 
Bohier, he is referred to as an avocat, practicing at Bourges.52  The legal profession of 
the early modern period was a diverse body, including scholars, practicing lawyers 
and notaries.53  Known as the noblesse de la robe, the profession would be identified 
with the middle class or some rank above it, but given the varying types of occupation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
parlement de Paris jusqu'en 1712, Volume 5, in F. Blanchard, Catalogue général des manuscrits des 
bibliothèques publiques de France. Départements (Paris, 1855).  
48 On Duprat’s influence on ecclesiastical elections, see J. Jager, Histoire de l'église catholique en 
France: d'après les documents les plus authentiques : depuis son origine jusqu'au concordat de Pie VII, 
(Paris, 1867), pp.334-336. On Duprat more generally, see A. Buisson, Le chancelier Antoine Duprat, 
(Paris, 1935).   
49 It is known that Bohier’s appointment to the office of Grand Conseil was by Jean De Ganay.  
However, Antoine Duprat succeeded him and so it seems likely that Duprat was involved in Bohier’s 
later post at the Bordeaux parlement. E. Armstrong, Before copyright: the French book-privilege 
system 1498-1526, (Cambridge, U.K., 1990), p. 76.  
50 Frères, (n. 30), p. 84. The date of Bohier’s entry to the legal profession cannot be known for certain. 
Information on his role as an avocat has largely dependent on the secondary literature of Calmon, (n. 
2).  
51 Irvine, (n. 31), p. 110.  
52 In particular see A. Cumas (eds.), Lettres sur la profession d’avocat par Cumas, enrichies de pièces 
concernant l’exercice de cette profession, (Brussels, 1833), p. 98.  (However, note the erroneous date 
of death given as 1538, instead of the accepted 1539).   
53 W. Bouwsma, “Lawyers and early modern Culture”, (1973) 2 The American Historical Review 303 
at 305.  
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a man qualified in the law could enter into it is difficult to offer a precise account.54  
By the end of the sixteenth century, a clear division had formed between the avocat 
and the procureur, and it is likely that this distinction had also started to emerge 
earlier in the century.  The procureur tended not to have academic credentials, and 
instead learned their profession through periods of apprenticeship.55  Until the end of 
the fifteenth century, no official qualifications were necessary for the profession of 
avocat.56  However, a university education at a faculty of arts, and then law, became a 
pre-requisite at the close of the century.57  They enjoyed a superior social status.58  In 
his biography, Calmon makes reference to Bohier’s character as an avocat:  
 
Bohier s’appliqua a réagir contre les tendances des avocats de son temps.  
L’office de conciliateur était, son sens, l’exercice le plus noble et le plus élevé 
de cette profession, et, loin de chercher à animer ceux qui venaient le 
consulter, il s’attachait a calmer leurs esprits et à accommoder leurs 
differends; lorsque le proces devenait inevitable, il leur indiquait les moyens 
de le reduire aux moindres frais possible.  Il ne se livrait pas, commes les 
autres avocats, a une declamation creuse; il fuyait la recherché et l’emphase 
pour ne s’attacher qu’a la precision.  Son esprit, vigoreux et méthodique, était 
marvelleusement apte à la discussion; aussi se renfermait-il toujours dans le 
moyens tires du fond même de la cause qu’il défendait.  Était-il attaque avec 
violence par son adversaire?  Il répondait avec calme et convenance, 
persuade que jamais la moderation du langage n’a compromis le success 
d’une bonne cause.59  
 
It is unclear where this nineteenth-century assessment of Bohier’s character 
stems from: whether contained in the accounts of the time by the avocat’s 
contemporaries of his style and approach, or if it is simply Calmon’s own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid, at 304.   
55 In comparison to the role of the avocat in early modern France, the procureur has received little 
scholarly attention.  However, there has been a recent move towards rectifying this oversight.  See C. 
Dolan, Les procureurs du midi sous l’ancien régime, (Rennes, 2012).  
56 M. Bubenicek and R. Partington, “Justice, law and lawyers”, in C. Fletcher, et al. (eds.), Government 
and political life in England and France, c. 1300-1500, (Cambridge, U.K., 2015), pp. 150-182, at p. 
159. 
57 Ibid.   
58 H. Baade, “The education and qualification of civil lawyers”, in J. Cairns and O. Robinson (eds.), 
Critical studies in ancient Law, comparative law and ancient history: essays in honour of Alan Watson, 
(Oxford, U.K., 2001), pp. 213-234, at p. 223. 
59 Calmon, (n. 2), p. 17.  Own translation: “Bohier strove to react against trends of lawyers of his time.  
The office was, in his view, the most noble and important of his profession, and far from seeking to 
aggravate those he came to visit, he tried to calm their minds and accommodate their disputes, when 
the process became inevitable he showed them the means to reduce their costs as much as possible.  He 
did not, like other lawyers, make a hollow declamation; shun research and lacked precision.  His mind, 
vigorous and methodical, was wonderfully suited to argument.  What if it was a violent attack by his 
opponent?  He responded calmly, convinced that words should not undermine the success of a good 
cause.” 
	   45	  
interpretation taken from reviewing Bohier’s written accounts of cases presented at 
the parlement. Whatever the source, it is nonetheless revealing of Bohier’s personal 
legacy and the way in which his image is received, or even constructed, in later 
accounts.   
As a practising avocat in Bourges, the clergy would have constituted a 
considerable part of Bohier’s client base. Certainly, the court reports contained in his 
Decisiones Burdegalenses demonstrate the prevalence of ecclesiastical issues before 
the parlement of Bordeaux: they rank first along with familial matters, which were 
themselves intimately linked to the church.60 A significant proportion of ecclesiastical 
administration was largely based on procedure rather than a scientific body of law.61  
As a result of this a very high proportion of cases were settled by agreement between 
the parties at some stage in the action. Given that the Canon law, in developing its 
own procedure in the twelfth century, had borrowed from the Corpus iuris civilis, the 
successful practitioner needed to be well versed in both systems.62   
The stylus curiae was important in the French courts.63  Familiarity with it was 
a formal requirement that led in practice to the concept of the “l’avocat écoutant” 
indicating a form of apprenticeship.  In his early years as avocat, Bohier would 
therefore have needed to be in constant attendance and observation in court to gain 
experience and command and style of the court.  Without this an avocat “could say 
nothing and act for no one.”64  The connection between the development of a 
distinctive legal profession and the evolution of supreme jurisdiction is clear.  The 
parlement in Paris encouraged the monopolisation of representation by inaugurated 
accredited avocats, and therefore a need for those who were familiar with the stylus 
curiae and modus advocandi.  
In an eighteenth-century publication entitled ‘Table alphabétique des choses 
remarquables continues dans les registres du parlement’, Bohier is listed as: 
“president en la chambre des Enquisiteur, 12 Septemb[re]. [sic] 1502…”65  This 
curious entry does not contain any other information making it difficult to state with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Decisiones Burdegalenses (Lyon, 1547). This is especially true of those cases that contain a mention 
of the term ius commune.  Examples include: Decisio II, 46; IX, 1; LXIX, 22; CXIX, 3; CXXXIII, 8.   
61 P. Stein, “Vacarius and the civil law”, in C. Brooke, et al. (eds.), Church and government in the 
middle ages, (Cambridge, U.K., 2008), pp. 119-138, at p. 134.  
62 Ibid, p. 135.   
63 J. Finlay, “Lawyers and the early modern state: regulation, exclusion, and numerus clausus, (2009) 
44 The Canadian Journal of History 383 at 402.  
64 Ibid.     
65 Archives Nationales, Paris. U/492, p. 131 under “Bohier”.   
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any certainty that this is the same Bohier that is under discussion.  The date for the 
appointment, 1502, makes it possible; indeed, at this time in Bohier’s history there are 
no other accounts of his position and place of residence, although it is generally 
believed that he was working as an avocat at Bourges around this time.  It is possible 
that the “chambre des Enquisiteur” noted in this work was in fact a reference to the 
better-known Chambre des Enquêtes, and perhaps was the result of an eighteenth-
century error.  This Chambre formed part of the parlement of Paris, and was 
responsible for conducting investigations that were ordered by the Grand Chambre.  
Although initially it was not an independent decision-making body, in the sixteenth 
century it became semi-autonomous, without the need to issue its decisions via the 
Grand Chambre.  It seems likely that it is to this Chambre that the publication refers.  
As a so-called immigrant to the Paris robe, Bohier’s role in the Chambre des Enquêtes 
would have marked his first official entry to the robe hierarchy.  Nancy Lyman 
Roelker has recognised the many different avenues of access for career advancement, 
which included being the beneficiary of royal favour or, in some cases, plain luck.66 
In the case of Bohier, his appointment as President of the Chambre des Enquêtes is 
evidence of his early parlamentaire mentalité, and what has been termed as “a keener 
eye for political patronage” which was distinct from straightforward professional 
considerations or wealth.67   
 
5. Conseiller  
 
Bohier would eventually become a member of the Grand Conseil du Roi in 
1508. A superior court of Justice, based in Paris and established by royal ordinance in 
1497, the Grand Conseil had jurisdiction over the entire Kingdom.68  It was presided 
over by the Chancellor of France, who at the time of Bohier’s appointment was Jean 
de Ganay (d.1512). 69  Patrick Arabeyre has recognised that the influence of 
Chancellors was considerable and would have been responsible for the nomination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Roelker, (n. 6), at p. 45.   
67 C. Stocker, “The politics of the parlement of Paris in 1525”, (1973) 8 French Historical Studies 191. 
68 This was considered in greater detail in chapter 1.  D. Bjai, “Trois fois par mois? Dix fois par jour?: 
Montaigne et la réglementation du marriage dans sur des vers de virigile”, (2011) 38 Studia Romanica 
Pos Naniensia 23, at 26.  See also J. Laurent, “Le Grand Conseil”, Guide des recherchés dans les fonds 
judicaires de l’ancien régime, (Paris, 1958), pp. 27-64.  
69 On Jean de Ganay, see: F. Aubert, Dictionnaire de la noblesse, Volume 8, (Paris, 1774).  
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conseillers.70  In the case of Bohier, it seems that he was sought out by the Chancellor 
himself and was asked to accept the position of membre du Grand Conseil, but was 
initially met by rejection based on Bohier’s poor health.71  On 17th March 1508, 
Bohier’s reluctance was defeated by the intervention of the King and he was 
appointed to the Grand Conseil.72 Bohier’s position in the Grand Conseil is rarely 
mentioned in any of the existing accounts; the only known reference in secondary 
literature is in Calmon’s work.  The Grand Conseil’s reports for Bohier’s lifetime do 
mention a “Monsieur Bohier” on a number of occasions, and thus do seem to 
corroborate Calmon’s account.73   
In 1508, Guillaume Budé (1467-1540) published his Annotationes.  Therein he 
set out an ideal method with which to study and practice the law.74  This publication 
would have coincided with Bohier’s appointment to the Grand Conseil. The extent to 
which this work represented common opinion is not known, but it is certain that 
Bohier would have been familiar with its content.  The work instructed students and 
lawyers to abandon abstraction and strict alliances to authorities, such as Franciscus 
Accursius (1225-1293), Bartolus and Baldus, as well as their own interests.  Budé 
proposed that instead attention ought to be paid to the original sources of Roman law 
such as the Digest, but also recourse to the likes of Cicero, Aristotle and Homer.75  
For Budé, if lawyers could understand that Roman law was imperfect in its own age, 
then they would no longer treat it as “normative, sacrosanct, and uniform on the one 
hand, and cease to place themselves above it by means of their interpretations on the 
other.”76  Once lawyers understood the original meaning of the words of the law, 
“they would be able to emulate and even achieve the wisdom and virtue of the 
ancients, and as a result administer law justly.”77     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 P. Arabeyre, “Aux Racine de l’absolutisme: grand conseil et parlement à la fin du moyen âge d'après 
le tractatus celebris de auctoritate et preeminentias sacri magni concilii et parlamentorum regni 
Francie de Jean Montaigne, (1512)”, (2000) 7 Cahiers de Recherchés Medievales et Humanistes, p. 7.  
71 Calmon, (n. 2), p. 19.  There is no other evidence suggesting Bohier suffered from ill health at this 
time.  It is possible that this is evidence of his reluctance to take office.  
72 M. Pelletier Le grand conseil de Charles VIII à François I, (1483-1547), (Doctoral thesis, l'École 
nationale des chartes, Paris, 1960), pp. 213-214.  See also: Boscheron des Portes, (n. 20), p.40.   
73 Archives Nationales, Paris. V/5/1043 marks the only set of records that contains Bohier’s name as an 
active member of the Grand Conseil.  This particular record spans his lifetime so this is expected.  
74 S. Longfield-Karr, Nature, self, and history in the works of Guillaume Budé, Andrea Alciati, and 
Ulrich Zasius: a study of the role of legal humanism in western natural law, (Doctoral thesis, 
University of Chicago, 2008), p. 65.  
75 Ibid.   
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  
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The intellectual mood at the time was changing, and it demonstrates the 
intellectual climate within which Bohier would have been appointed and then 
working.  Bohier was certainly aware of Budé’s publication.  In his commentary on 
Jean Montaigne’s Tractatus celebris de auctoritate, he mentions Budé’s thinking in 
relation to the disparity, created by the civilistes of the medieval period, between the 
“sénats et les centumvirs”, and agrees with his reasoning.78  
Jean Montaigne (d.1540), a professeur of civil and canon law at the 
universities of Toulouse (1506) and Bourges (1507-8), served as legal counsel to 
Cardinal Louis d’Amboise, and authored several legal treatises. In the preface to his 
Tractatus universi iuris, Montaigne cites Bohier as one of his closest friends.79  It is 
known that Bohier contributed to his work, Tractatus celebris de auctoritate et 
preeminentia sacri magni concilii et parlamentorum regnie Francie (Paris, 1512), 
providing annotations.  This publication offers a real insight into how Bohier viewed 
the Grand Conseil, its relationship with the parlements, in particular that of Paris, and 
the King.80  Patrick Arabeyre has stated that Montaigne represented the prevailing 
opinion on the matter of judges, royal officials and state absolutism.81 All editions of 
the work were accompanied by Bohier’s annotated commentary, leading some in the 
eighteenth-century to entertain the possibility that Bohier was in fact writing under 
the guise of the Montaigne name:  
 
c’est Boïer [Bohier] lui-même, qui avait été conseiller au Grand Conseil, qui 
est le véritable auteur du texte de ce traité, où il s’est déguisé sous le nom de 
Jean de Montaigne.82 
 
 
This seems highly unlikely.  In Barthélemy Chasseneuz’s (1480-1541) work, 
Catalogus Gloriae mundi (Lyon, 1529), Montaigne and Bohier are mentioned as two 
separate authors.83  Further, Jean Montaigne was related to the humanist Jean de 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Arabeyre, (n. 70), p. 8. 
79 Like Bohier, Montaigne left his possessions to the church.  Montaigne’s estate was given to the Saint 
Cecile Monastery (which he represented as a lawyer in a legal dispute against municipal authorities 
between 1510 and 1516). See A. Vidal, L’Ancien Diocèse d’Albi d'après les registres de notaires 
(Paris, 1913), p. 291.  
80 Patrick Arabeyre has written a detailed analysis of this work. See Arabeyre, (n. 70), 189-200.  
81 Arabeyre, (n. 70), 190: “Jean Montaigne, qui representent l’opinion dominante des magistrats et des 
fonctionnaires royaux et affirment l’absolutisme monarchique.” 
82 P. Lelong, Bibliothèque historique de la France, (Paris, 1745), pp. 54-79.  
83 See C. Dugas de La Boissonny, Barthélemy de Chasseneuz (1480-1541), (University of Bourgogne, 
1984), pp. 215-216.   
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Toulouse Boyssone (1505-1559), and is mentioned by him in one of his letters.84  
Therefore, while this view is easily disproved, it does still stand as a reminder of the 
contradictory accounts that have come to mark Bohier’s professional life and 
publications in legal historical study.     
In one of the annotations Bohier made to the Tractatus, he examined the 
Grand Conseil, and ultimately defended its superior position to the parlements.   He 
stated: 
Oui, le Grand Conseil procède du prince; de même que la lune est d’avantage éclairée par le 
soleil que les autres planètes, le Grand Conseil reçoit la lumière du prince sans aucun 
intermédiaire, contrairement aux parlements, qui ne font qu’entendre la voix de celui au nom 
de qui ils parlent. Non, la stabilité des parlements ne leur fait pas un plus grand mérite, car 
les conseillers au Grand Conseil mènent une vie plus laborieuse: quand les uns vivent avec 
leurs femmes et meurent dans leur lit, les autres, qui suivent la Cour, meurent le plus souvent  
‘sur la paille’…85  
 
The relationship between the parlement and the Grand Conseil was often 
characterised by tension. parlement’s right of remonstrance demonstrated that it was a 
body that had political interests and ambitions of its own.86 As was considered earlier, 
it is generally accepted that, by this stage many magistrates sought equilibrium within 
the government. This would allow for the King’s authority to be tempered by the 
knowledge and counsel of the parlement so that it would not be exercised arbitrarily. 
This defence of the Grand Conseil’s superior position is therefore certainly a tactical 
manoeuvre by Bohier, who, showing such political awareness, would have remained 




 A combination of allegiance to the King and defence of the Grand Conseil, 
goes some way towards explaining Bohier’s obscurity in legal-historical scholarship: 
Bohier was not a revolutionary as his professional appointments and his works show a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 H. Jacoubet, Les trois centuries de maistre Jehan de Boyssoné, régent à Tholoze, (Paris, 1923), 
pp. 69-71, 106 and 112.  There is also a mention of a letter sent from near Avignon, August 4, 1527, 
addressed to Boniface Amerbach in which Montaigne speaks of the excesses committed by the 
Lutherans after taking the town in May of that year. Moreover, Montaigne seems to have also met with 
André Alciat during his first professorship in 1518-1522 in Avignon.   
85 Citation from Tractatus celebris, fol. 28, 39-40. Own translation: “Yes, the Grand Conseil is closest 
to the Prince, just as the moon is illuminated by the sun more than the other planets, the Grand 
Council of the Prince receives light without any intermediary, unlike parlements, who only hear the 
voice of those on whose behalf they speak… No, the stability of parlements does not make them more 
worthy because advisors to the Grand Conseil lead a life more laborious: when some live with their 
wives and die in their beds, others, following the Court often die penniless.” 
86 Stocker, (n. 67).   
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figure that was loyal to the existing regime.  Bohier was a practising Catholic,87 and 
so his Catholicism precludes him from any speculative persecution at this time.  
Instead, he is a figure who enjoyed royal favour, was well connected and loyal to the 
status quo.  History can often neglect such individuals, despite their value as 
representatives of the norm and therefore accurate reflections of the period and its 
regimes, legal practice and ideas.  There are, of course, notable exceptions to this.88  
  Following a period of monarchic hostility and persecution by lower 
authorities in the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies, French Protestantism 
experienced a period of rapid advancement from the 1540s.89  Leading up to this, in 
the period spanning Bohier’s lifetime, the expansion of religious reform movements 
attracted Catholic authorities, which in turn made efforts to suppress them.90  These 
authorities, such as the Sorbonne and the Paris parlement, recognised that ideas of 
reform began to transcend the elites and as a result they made a systematic effort to 
persecute alleged seditious activity.91  Protestantism’s links with legal humanism are 
well known.92  The notion of the “narrow Catholic” and the “productive Protestant” 
are present to a considerable extent in many legal historical narratives. The 
preoccupation with Humanist-Protestantism in contemporary works have ignored the 
contribution of pre-Reformation figures who were “perhaps too old and settled in the 
establishment to come over to the Reformation in the 1520s and 30s and who 
published their legal works before 1517.”93  Bohier is such a figure, and the time of 
his appointments and his professional affiliations at this time meant that he was very 
much ensconced within the old French Catholic establishment.  It is worth noting that 
a number of his publications were published from the 1540s, following his death, with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Out of the extensive literature on the history Catholicism in France, see: R. Gibson, A social history 
of French catholicism, 1789-1914, (London, 1989); D. Bell, Cult of the nation in France: inventing 
nationalism, 1680-1800, (London, 2001); J. Byrnes, Catholic and French forever: religious and 
national identity in modern France (Philadelphia, 2005); J. Hitchcock, History of the catholic church: 
from the apostolic age to the third millennium, (San Francisco, 2012).   
88A notable example is Robert Joseph Pothier (1699-1772), a French jurist and judge in Orléans. He 
excelled as a jurist, producing significant treatises throughout his life, as well as experiencing success 
in professional practice.  See J. de Montmorency, “Robert Joseph Pothier and French law”, 13 (1913) 
Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 265.   
89 G. Sunshine, Reforming French protestantism: the development of Huguenot ecclesiastical 
institutions, 1557-1572, (Kirksville, 2003), p. 16. 
90 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
91 Ibid, p. 14. 
92 See for example H. Berman, Law and revolution, II: the impact of the protestant reformations on the 
western legal tradition, (London, 2003), pp. 110-111. 
93 D. McNeil, Guillaume Budé & humanism in the reign of Francis I, (Geneva, 1971), p. 17. 
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continued demand for them in the seventeenth century.94  The motivations for this 
will be considered in detail later,95 but for now it seems legitimate to suggest that it is 
perhaps the combination of being a practising lawyer, parlementaire and Catholic 
living in pre-Reformation France, that has meant that Bohier and his works have 
historically been overlooked.   
 
7. President of the Bordeaux Parlement  
 
Bohier’s career culminated in his appointment as President of the Bordeaux 
parlement in 1518.96  The records of the Bordeaux parlement list Bohier as Président 
à mortier as well as tiers President.97  The President à mortier was arguably one of 
the highest-ranking judicial posts in France at this time, with the office holder serving 
as a principal magistrate in the most important chamber in the parlement.  Bohier 
would have worn the official black gown with gold braided ribbons to symbolise his 
superior standing.98 The parlement of Bordeaux was established in 1462.99  Born out 
of the two parlements of Paris and Toulouse, its jurisdiction extended over a large 
proportion of Southern France and was created to rule in the name of the King as an 
instrument of royal justice, enforcing whatever ordinances had been registered, but 
with the right of remonstrance.100  However, it was to have its own role in the politics 
of the region and so, together with its royal relationship, it was a complex force of 
monarchic defender and critic of royal policy.   
Judicial posts were sold in Renaissance France, and were regularly the fruit of 
nepotism, but early sixteenth-century parlements did require entrance examinations 
and so promotions were often based on merit.101  The practice of appointments based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The last known edition of Bohier’s Decisiones, for example, to be published is 1665.   
95 See below in this chapter at 9, “Publications”.   
96 “Nicolaus Bohier”, Archives historique du departement de la Gironde, liste generale at alphabetique 
des membres du parlement de Bordeaux depuis la fondation de cette cour souveraine en 1462 jusqu'à 
sa suppression en 1790, available at http://archives.gironde.fr/actu/fiche.asp?id_actu=60 (last accessed 
10th February 2016).  
97 J. Dast le Vacher de Boisville, Archives Historiques du département de la Gironde, Liste Generale et 
Alphabetique Des Membres du parlement de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1896), p. 6.  
98 J. Davidson, (ed.), Persian letters, (1899) [translated from the French original version] [1882], p. 3.  
Interestingly, Montesquieu was also président à mortier at the Bordeaux parlement.   
99 A fuller history of Bordeaux and the parlement was offered in chapter 1 of this thesis. Also in that 
chapter, see figure 2 for an impression of the disparate regions of France and the geography of the 
regional parlements.  
100 R. Kingston, Montesquieu and the parlement of Bordeaux, (Geneva, 1996), p. 59. 
101 E. Monter, Judging the French reformation: heresy trials by sixteenth-century parlements, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999), p. 8.  
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on heredity is believed to be a largely post-1543 trend and so it is possible that 
Bohier’s appointment was based on merit and not solely through associated patronage 
networks.102  By 1540, every new judgeship appears to have involved a payment to 
the King, described as a “loan” to help the Monarch with his urgent necessities; a 
practice the parlement of Paris was particularly known for in the 1520s.103  The 
fiction of repayment was at first maintained in order to demonstrate the purchase of 
office was not a market transaction but a friendly loan.104  The judicial nomination 
was also backed by important legal figures whose recommendations were essential 
but who would often anticipate later services from this newly appointed judge.  
Professional reputation, however, largely determined judicial careers.  The career of 
André Tiraqueau (1488-1558) furnishes an example of this; having acquired fame 
through his juristic publications he was able to refuse a seat in the parlement of 
Bordeaux, choosing to wait for a call to Paris that came six years later.105 Bohier’s 
professional reputation as an avocat was highly favourable106 and by the time Bohier 
was appointed President of the parlement, he had also already edited a work by Dynus 
de Mugello (1254-1300) (Lyon, 1500)107 and published his Consuetudines Biturigium 
(Paris, 1508), and so will have been a man of some repute.     
 
8. Bohier as judge 
 
In the juristic works of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there is the 
perception of a judge removed from the social rule of a court, where judges are 
characterised by power and competence, not politics.108 However, the post-glossators 
increasingly emphasised judicial privileges, titles and rank.109  It became increasingly 
common to write about “courts” instead of “judges”: the latter becoming synonymous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Boscheron des Portes, (n. 20), p. 98.  See also Stocker, (n. 67), at 202.  However, Bohier’s 
connection to influential figures such as Antoine Du Prat should not be discounted.     
103 N. Davis, The gift in sixteenth-century France, (Oxford, 2000), p. 163.  
104 Ibid.   
105 On André Tiraqueau see J. Brejon, André Tiraqueau (1488-1558): un jurisconsulte de la 
Renaissance, (Paris, 1937).  
106 Calmon, (n. 2), p. 18.  
107 This is the earliest edition found, held by the Bibliothèque Municipale de Lyon.  Note that Calmon 
in his biography of Bohier cites the date of 1501.   
108 J. Given, Inquisition and medieval society: power, discipline, and resistance in Languedoc, 
(London, 1997), p. 21. 
109 A. Gouron, Juristes et droits savants: Bologne et la France médiévale, (Aldershot, 2000), p. 30.  
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with public service.110  There was a definite detachment from the idea of the 
individual lawmaker, and it became part of the greater change between the French 
towns and the role and nature of the judge.  Only after 1400, and then only in royal 
courts, was there a tendency to appoint permanent offices of justice.111  The rise of the 
social standing of judges became more apparent at the start of the fifteenth-century in 
particular.  Fees rose and so litigation and access to justice changed with it.  Perhaps 
more important to this rise in social stature was the role of legal theory: the juristic 
rule of quod facit iudex, populus videbitur facere.112  
An efficient and fair-minded royal justice provided a fundamental prop 
supporting any sixteenth-century government.  The level of skill required of a judge 
in one of the parlements was high.  In his work on customary law, Consuetudines 
Biturigium, Bohier set out what he deemed to be essential judicial qualities.  Calmon 
summarised it thus:  
 
Les fonctions du juge, dit-il, exigent des connaissances et des aptitudes 
particulieres, et il convient, en consequence, de laisser a des hommes experts 
et spécialement instruits la decision des matières de droit; de même que pour 
les choses de l’agriculture, on s’en rapporte aux cultivateurs; pour l’art de la 
guerre, aux militaires; pour l’art de guérir, aux médecins.113   
 
As a President of a regional parlement, Bohier’s decisions served not only to 
settle disputes or provide remedial action, but also to offer a definitive guide as to the 
tone of the region on contentious matters.114 His power was therefore just as much 
one of governance as it was one of justice.  Ulrike Müßig has stressed the intimate 
link between the sixteenth-century concepts of justice with that of sovereignty.115 An 
excerpt from the registers of the Paris parlement suggest this to be the case: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 R. Descimon, “La haute noblesse parlamentaire parisienne: la production d’une aristocratie d’Etat 
aux XVI e XVIIe siècles”, in P. Contamine, (ed.), L’état et les aristocracties (France, Angleterre, 
Ecosse), XIIe-XVIIe siècles, (Paris, 1988), pp. 357-384.  
111 Gouron, (n. 109), p. 41.  
112 Ibid, p. 43.  On the birth of a “jurdicial ideology” see M. Sbriccoli, “Politique et interprétation 
juridique dans les villes italiennes du Moyen Age”, (1972) 17 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 99.   
113 (1531), folio 25.   Own translation: “The functions of the judge, he said, require knowledge and 
outstanding merits, and should be left to experts who are specially trained men and decide with the 
right materials, the same as for matters of agriculture, where we refer to the farmers; to the art of war, 
the military; the art of curing, the doctors.”   
114 I will address this point in chapter 3, where I consider the Consilia. There, consilium 8 will be 
examined and the role of the judge considered.   
115 Ulrike Müßig, “Superior courts in early modern France, England and the Holy Roman Empire”, in 
J. Getzler and P. Brand (eds.), Judges and judging in the history of the common law and civil law: from 
antiquity to modern times, (Cambridge, 2012), p. 209.  
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…la souveraineté est si étroitement conjointe avec la justice que séparée elle 
perdrait son nom et serait un corps sans âme.116 
 
The ability of the parlement to control town matters depended largely upon 
two factors: the distance between it and the place in question, and the proximity of the 
town to alternative forms of political alliance.117  In the latter case, the parlement 
would strive to emphasise the theoretical prerogatives of the sovereign. Bohier’s time 
in office was not marked by the same difficulties as those that had affected his 
predecessors.  Instead, he inherited a position that had grown from those tensions and 
risen as a powerful and determined judicial and political machine. Élise Frêlon states 
that at this time, the role of the magistrate was effectively to police, control public 
finances and administer justice.118  In 1523, Bohier was commissioned by the King to 
reform the monastic brothers in the L’Ordre de Saint François.119  Bohier performed 
this task to such a standard that the King himself was moved to write a letter of praise 
for his work in quashing the so-called “grandes rebellions, désobéyssances, injures et 
menasses [sic]”.120  Such actions demonstrate two things: firstly, Bohier’s close 
proximity to the King; and secondly, it offers a glimpse into the relationship between 
parlement and religious orders.121    
 
8.1 Judging citizenship 
 
It was not until the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, that the state 
“developed an extensive, complex administration monopolizing the exercise of 
power, and that it gained immediate control of its citizens: before, central domination 
had typically been mediated by independent powers.”122  On the related topic of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Archives Nationales, X/IA, 1583, 5 Decembre, 1556.  This is quoted by Müßig, ibid, p. 209.  
Müßig’s translation: “Sovereignty is so closely joined up with justice that, if separated, it would be like 
a body without a soul”.   
117 R. Little, The parlement of Poitiers: war, government and politics in France (1418-1436), (London, 
1984), p. 154.  
118 É. Frêlon, Le parlement de Bordeaux et la loi (1451-1547), (Paris, 2011), p. 559.  
119 Catalogue, t. I, n. 1801, 20 Avril 1523.   
120 Cited by Frêlon, (n. 118).  
121 Cases of a religious nature seem to form the basis of many of the cases that came before the 
parlement.  In the case of the Paris parlement, many were instances of appeals.  See:  Arrêts notables 
du parlement de Paris, notes de jurisprudence, consultations, principalement en matiere 
ecclesiastique.  Archives Nationales, Paris, U/419.   
122 N. Jansen, The making of legal authority: non-legislative codifications in historical and 
comparative perspective, (Oxford, 2010), p. 13.  
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ius commune, Nils Jansen argues that it was distant from the political process, but that 
the law’s validity was based on the sovereign’s will; a sentiment found in the Corpus 
iuris.123 While this is true to an extent, when applied to the case of the sixteenth 
century, this account is too simplistic: it fails to appreciate the role of the French 
judiciary, as well as the complexity that marked the relationship between it and the 
King.   
François Hotman’s Francogallia offers an interesting perspective into such 
matters.  Here, Hotman mentions Bohier in favourable terms when discussing the 
relationship between law and sovereignty.  He states: 
 
…we must acknowledge that kings were not granted a free and unlimited 
power over all things in antiquity, which is also what Aufrier, Bohier, 
Montaigne, Chasseneuz and other practising lawyers of the highest authority 
in France attest with a single voice and without any variation.124 
 
Admittedly, Hotman’s work was in the late sixteenth-century and had 
underlying political motivations; both of which should be kept in mind when relying 
upon his writings.  However, it is mentioned here to demonstrate that practising 
lawyers during Bohier’s time were working in an environment where the King did not 
necessarily possess unfettered power over the law courts.125  In terms of sovereignty 
and the practice of law then, this movement away from absolutism in terms of royal 
authority had already begun, albeit on a very small scale, in Bohier’s time.126  Bohier 
had considerable power as an individual member of the judiciary and was involved in 
the very early stages of the autonomy of the parlement.  
Bohier’s involvement in an early sixteenth-century case dealing with a matter 
of inheritance gave him an opportunity to declare his, and the position of the 
parlement, on the contentious matter of French citizenship. The case concerned a 
French native who had lived in Spain for forty years and who had expressly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Jansen further contends that private law is conceptually and normatively independent from the 
political and social discourse.  While he admits that it is influenced by politics and social 
developments, he believes that “the law’s historical development is to a large extent determined by an 
inter-systemic order of its own.” Jansen argues that professional lawyers and judges determined 
sources of law, with the legal elites deciding which texts are to be applied.  
124 F. Hotman, Francogallia, in Salmon, J. and Giesey, R., (eds.), (Cambridge, U.K., 1972) [translated 
from the original French version] [1573].   
125 Hotman is referring to Bohier’s Decisiones here, in particular Decisio 126.   
126 However, see Jean Bodin (1530-1596) who believed that Kings do not discover the law but make 
the law and deliver it to their subjects.  See A. Edward, “Jean Bodin on Sovereignty”, (2011) 2 
Republics of letters: a journal for the study of knowledge, politics, and the arts 84.  
	   56	  
renounced his allegiance to the French state, being formally naturalised in Spain.  The 
son of his marriage to a Frenchwoman had moved to France and petitioned to be 
allowed to make the retrait lignager127 for property that had been alienated by his 
paternal grandfather.  The retrait was normally not permitted for foreigners.  The 
parlement therefore had to answer the question of whether this man was a French 
citizen.  By the standard of jus soli the man was not and therefore had no right to 
inherit.  However, Bohier put forward an argument rooted in the jus sanguinis and 
admitted the man to the retrait lignager.  Bohier contended that he ought to be 
considered a citizen by birth as “no one can reject his domicile of origin simply by an 
act of will…because no one can change his nature, as the laws say…”128  
The Bordeaux position can be contrasted with that of the parlement of Paris 
which had tended to think in terms of the jus soli, as seen in a later case of 1554, 
although it did not display an outright endorsement.129  This demonstrates the 
independence of the Bordeaux parlement from other institutions such as that of Paris, 
the judicial reasoning employed, as well as the fragmented nature of the law.130  
 
9.  Publications 
 
 
Bohier published extensively.  Those works he compiled are included here for 
consideration and to offer a comprehensive, although not exhaustive, account of the 
lawyer’s printing practices.  The works that form the basis of the case study at the 
centre of this thesis, namely the Consilia, Decisiones and Consuetudines, are 
accounted for, but this is also an effort to provide for other works by Bohier that point 
towards his character and interests.  Such works include not only those he wrote 
himself, but also works that he edited or annotated.  
This thesis considers the extent to which there was a sense of routine, or equally 
whether it is possible to detect an assertion of national sovereignty through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See chapter 5 of this thesis, where I consider the retrait lignager.  
128 Cited in C. Wells, Law and citizenship in early modern France, (Baltimore, 1995), p. 37.  
129 Known as the Cenamy case.  This also concerned the citizenship of the son of an expatriate father.   
130 There is a link between the emergence of international private law as a subject and this idea of 
citizenship.  It is possible to relate it to the broader issues of municipal citizenship, such as the intention 
of parties being of such significance that it goes beyond territorial considerations.  On this point, see:  
Voet, P., “De statutis eorumque concursu singularis”, in A. Edwards, et al., (eds.), The selective 
Paulus Voet: being a translation of those sections regarded as relevant to modern conflict of laws, of 
the De statutis eorumque concursu singularis (1661) by Paulus Voet (1619-1667) as a single book on 
statutes and their concurrence: an abridgement, (Pretoria, 2007). This work identifies a link between 
the likes of Dumoulin, Bartolism and French international private law, p. 40.   
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decisions of the parlements.   The possibility that sixteenth-century judicial decision-
making was influenced by a growing sense of nationalism was considered earlier in 
this work.  It has been argued that cases were increasingly decided away from the ius 
commune,131where it “might be received or it might not, depending on the suitability 
of the rule in question to the needs of the state; and this decision was the courts.’”132   
At this stage the nature of judicial decision-making became less predictable, with 
a professional judiciary in a so-called “national” court reacting without a set rationale 
to cases.133 The stylus of the court was itself a tool of procedure; written and subject 
to interpretation.134 As a reaction to this perceived change in judicial reasoning, there 
grew an increased desire for written collections of court decisions, with the dual 
purpose of providing practitioners with “a guide to the practice of their particular 
court”135 and for judges as they “needed to show that their judgments were based not 
on whims but on accepted principles.”136     
It is certain that Bohier’s reputation amongst those in high office, such as 
Chancellor Jean de Ganay, would have been bolstered by his juristic work, as well as 
by his successful career as an avocat.  Making oneself known through publications 
was often best achieved through the request of printing privilege.  Dedications came 
to be used as expediting factors in the privilege process; an acceptance meant that the 
request for privilege would be looked more favourably upon and supported by the 
recipient dedicatee.  Jean de Ganay was a popular recipient of such dedicated offers 
by lawyers and royal officials, with the likes of Guillaume Budé also dedicating work 
in his name.137  In the case of Budé, he chose to dedicate his text in this way because 
he thought that his commentaries “were going to be insufficiently believable coming 
from me as the author”, and so he attach to them “some great and august name when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 P. Stein, “Judge and jurist in the civil law: a historical interpretation”, (1985) 46 Louisiana Law 
Review 241 at 248.   
132 Ibid.   
133 André Gouron has considered the issue of whether there was a birth of a juridical “ideology”.  See 
Gouron, (n. 109), p. 44.  Further on this topic see: M. Sbriccoli, (n. 112), 99.  
134 Indeed, in his Consilia, Bohier does approach the Stylus Curie in a critical fashion, reminiscent of 
juristic analysis, rather than a routine adherence to procedure.  This is examined in considerable detail 
later in this work.  See: Phillippe Paschel, “Les Sources du Stylus Curie Parlamenti de Guillaume du 
Breuil”, (1999) 49 Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger 311.  
135 Stein, (n. 131), p. 249.  
136 Ibid.  
137 Longfield-Karr, (n. 74), p. 72. Budé’s Annotationes were first published in 1508. See G. Budé, 
Praefatio, Annotationes Gulielmi Budaei parisiensis secretarii regii in quatuor et viginti pandectarum 
libros ad Ioannem Deganaium cancellarium Franciae (Lyon, 1562) for the dedication to Jean de 
Ganay.  
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they went out to the public.”138  Bohier’s Consuetudines of Bourges was dedicated to 
the Chancellor, and was duly issued privilege at Lyon in June 1509. 
In 1515, Bohier was granted a three-year privilege, “Par le roy, a la relation 
du conseil”, which was a grant to which agreement had already been given or was 
assumed.139  Not long before this particular grant, in the same year, Bohier obtained 
royal privilege for his treatise, De seditiosis.  The work was prompted by a trial at 
Agen in 1513, in which he had taken part, and was discussed earlier in this work.140  
The trial dealt with a riot staged in the said town, where it was seized for several days, 
and the full judgment including the whole account of the proceedings was added to 
his treatise.141  From this we know that Bohier was a trusted servant of the crown in 
1513, as was called upon by Louis XII as a commissioner for this case.142  The 
dedication in De seditiosis is also revealing: it is offered in the name of Antoine 
Duprat.143  Following Chancellor Jean de Ganay’s death in 1512, Louis XII (1462-
1515) did not appoint a replacement.  However, the succession of Francis I (1494-
1547), in January 1515 saw the role filled by Duprat.144 Bohier was already in royal 
favour as he had been appointed to the Grand Conseil in 1508, and appears to have 
been well acquainted with this new Chancellor.  His haste in securing privilege 
therefore followed the trend of the elite authors of the time, and he was clearly highly 
motivated to secure it and ensure that he stayed in touch with royal favour.   
Looking to printing practices in Paris at this time, between 1505-1526, 7,719 
books were published, and of these, just over 5 per cent were covered by printing 
privileges.145  This process was therefore very much atypical from the routine 
behaviour of authors and publishers of the time generally. Applications for privileges 
were sometimes accompanied by supporting arguments from the author or printer. 
Bohier edited three legal works for which he attained printing privilege in favour of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Praefatio.  Guillielmi Budei parisiensis regii secretarii in annotationes ad libros pandectarum 
praefatio. ad illustrissimum virum Ioannem De Ganeium cancellarium Franciae, in Annotationes, fo. 
a.ii-a.iii; “Quae res mihi imprimis exoptanda fuit: vir illustrissime Ioannes Deganai: ea mihi hoc 
tempore forte (ut spero) fortuna evenit.  Nam cum abhinc septem plusminus menses: Paulo postquam 
tum ad principem istum magistratum assumptus es: annotationes quasdam in pandectas scribere 
coepissem…” (Lyon, 1562). Cited in Longfield-Karr, (n. 74), p. 71.  
139 E. Armstrong, Before copyright: the French book-privilege system 1498-1526, (Cambridge, U.K., 
1990), p. 30.  
140  See in this thesis, chapter 1, 4.2 “Sedition: a political offence”. 
141 Preclarus et elegans tractatus de seditiosis noviter editus, (Lyon, 1515).    
142 Armstrong, (n. 139).   
143 Tractatus de seditiosis (n. 141).   
144 Buisson, (n. 48).   
145 Armstrong, (n. 139), p. 82.  
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his printer Simon Vincent (d.1532), in 1515, where he stated:  “pour le bien, prouffit 
et utilité de la chose publique”.146 He also stressed the time and difficulty taken by 
himself and others working for him in the compilation of these works and the expense 
Vincent would incur to print them.147  
Simon Vincent acted as Bohier’s printer for the great majority of his works.148  
Born sometime between 1470 and 1480, Vincent lived in Lyon from 1499 through to 
his death in 1532.149   
 
9.1  Bohier as author 
 
9.1.1 Consuetudines Biturigium (1509)  
 
 
Bohier’s Coutumes Biturigium was first published in 1509.150 It was noted 
above that this work was produced with a dedication to Chancellor Jean de Ganay.  
Given the nature of the work this dedication takes on greater importance.  The 
Chancellor was responsible for administering justice and reforming the laws 
throughout the kingdom.  Because of the continual process in France at this time of 
transforming the unwritten and customary law into an official written form, it was 
important for Bohier to ensure his own commentary was issued amidst this time of 
reform. This work was a statement setting out the customs of Bourges for the 
purposes of homologation.  They were purposively compiled so as to form a new 
“written law” of sorts.  
By the middle of the sixteenth century, the majority of customs in the 
kingdom (including Paris) had been published.151  In recording custom, Bohier helped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ibid.   
147 Ibid.  
148 A summary of some of Bohier’s best known works and their publisher can be found in A. Pettegree, 
and M. Valsby (eds.), French books III & IV: books published in France before 1601 in Latin and in 
languages other than French (Leiden, 2011), p. 285.  Note the incidence of Vincent as Bohier’s 
publisher: almost every book in their respective lifetimes.  Notable exceptions include those such as 
Jacques Mareschal, who acted on behalf of Simon Vincent in the 1512 edition of Quaestio de custodia 
clavium portarum civitatum. Following Bohier and Simon Vincent’s deaths, the publishing mantel 
seems to have passed to Antoine Vincent, who was involved in posthumous publications of Bohier’s 
works on a number of occasions. 
149 “Simon Vincent”, in World Biographical Information System (WBIS).   
150 Printing privilege for this work was issued in 1509. See Armstrong, (n. 139), p. 75.  However, 
Calmon states the year of first publication as 1508, (n. 2), p. 14. The date of 1508 is given elsewhere, 
including in the Universal Short Title Catalogue.  
151 M. Kim, “Custom, community, and the crown: lawyers and the reordering of French customary 
law”, in C. Parker, J. Bentley, (eds.), Between the middle ages and modernity: individual and 
community in the early modern European world, (Lanham, 2007). p. 170.  This is discussed in greater 
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to create a symbiotic relationship between the state and community: providing the 
means for the king to reform provincial customs while avoiding the appearance of an 
open interference with the private law. The jurist and Parisian lawyer, Charles 
Loyseau (1564-1627) alludes to the practical motivations behind homologation:  
Our customary laws… are so different and so confused that it is very difficult 
to extract from them a general and certain answer… the law must be married 
with the practice, usage with reason: in short, Roman law must be linked with 
our own.152 
 
 Reordering customary law and linking it to statutory laws was an integral part 
of a state-building process in early modern France.  The direct role of jurists and 
lawyers in politics and government has been overlooked, and instead the image of the 
humanist has been promoted to one of the great contributors to the eventual 
emergence of the nation state.  Most studies of early modern Europe, the sixteenth 
century especially, have tended to downplay the law’s role in understanding a nation’s 
operations, with a focus on patronage networks and personal ties as enabling power 
and authority among the many regional and local authorities that made up a state.153  
 
9.1.2 Decisiones Burdegalenses (1544) 
 
Bohier’s Decisiones Burdegalenses is a typical French law report from the first 
half of the sixteenth-century.154  It contains a collection of decisions from the 
parlement of Bordeaux, where Bohier himself was President. It has been argued that 
the sixteenth-century saw those legal authors already steeped in the Italian method 
further develop other genres of legal literature.155  The Decisiones was one of the 
more popular genres to emerge.  Although initiated during the last centuries of the 
middle ages, the Decisiones, rose to prominence in the sixteenth-century and survived 
the decline of the Italian method.156 The publication’s importance was two-fold.  
Firstly, the Decisiones fulfilled a need for consistency in the court by providing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
detail in chapter 1 of this thesis at 3.3 “Reordering of Customary Law”, and most fully at chapter 5, 
“Consuetudines Biturigium”.   
152 Charles Loyseau, Traité du déquerpissement et délaissement par hypothéque in ouevres (Paris, 
1640).  
153 See J. Salmon, Renaissance and revolt: essays in the intellectual & social history of early modern 
France, (Cambridge, U.K., 1987), pp. 54-72.  
154 First published 1544. Edition used here is 1547.   
155 A. Wijffels, “Early modern scholarship on international law”, in A. Orakhelashvilli, (ed.), Research 
handbook on the theory and history of international law, (Cheltenham, 2011), pp. 23-60, at p. 32. 
156 Ibid.  
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record of authoritative decisions: a “locus”: informing the reader of relevant 
authorities and opinions.157  It is worth noting here, however, that this take on early 
modern court reporting is not uniformly accepted: it has been argued that the 
Decisiones ought to be thought of more as general case law, than as a binding 
source.158  
While demand for court reports did increase from the sixteenth century, this 
was not necessarily rooted in any judicial desire to reassure. Bohier’s Decisiones were 
published posthumously, with many successive editions being produced into the 
seventeenth century, and so its value evidently remained.159  If its purpose was to 
serve purely as a definitive statement as to the rationale behind judicial decision-
making, it would suggest that there was not a great deal of change between the 
centuries, which seems unlikely. Instead, it is likely that this enabled practitioners to 
refer back to different statements on matters of interpretation, in particular the 
relationships between different sources of law.160  
 
9.1.3 Consilia (1554) 
 
The earliest known edition of Bohier’s Consilia is a posthumous publication in 
1554. As sources, the consilia have been overlooked in legal-historical scholarship. In 
his work on Baldus’s consilia, Jacques Pluss referred to the consilia as “untapped 
sources of inquiry for two disciplines, legal history and social history.”161  This is 
partly owing to the tendency of many legal historians to look more to doctrine than to 
the law as practised in the courts.162  The gradual systematisation of the court 
structure between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries was just one example of 
the tendency towards centralisation and the idea of the state.  The law, however, could 
not be so controlled, and so the consilia offered a tangible link between the regulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Ibid, p. 30.  
158 D. Freda, “‘Law reporting’ in Europe in the early-modern period: two experiences in comparison”, 
(2009) 30 Journal of Legal History 263.   
159 The last known edition of the Decisiones Burdegalenses was published is 1665.   
160 Stein, (n. 131), p. 249.  Stein warns not to confuse this reliance on authoritative judicial statements 
by practitioners with the contemporary notion of “precedent”.  However, there is not yet a consensus 
on this.  For an interesting take on the nature of precedent, see:  V. Fon and F. Parisi, “Judicial 
precedents in civil law systems: a dynamic analysis”, (2006) 26 International Review of Law and 
Economics 519.  
161 J. Pluss, “Reading case law historically: a consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis on widows and dowries”, 
(1986) 30 The American Journal of Legal History, 241 at 243.   
162 J. Baron, “Interdisciplinary legal scholarship as guilty pleasure: the case of law and literature”, in 
Freeman, D. and Lewis, A. (eds.), Law and literature, (Oxford, 1999), p. 21 at p. 33.   
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delivery of justice and the free opinion of a jurist; whose opinion although full of 
diverse sources of law, was thus contained within one document and so offered a 
single account of the law on a particular issue in that locality.  This offer of coherence 
was an attractive quality of the consilia, and as a physical representation of the law as 
it stood in the early modern period, its value as a legal-historical source is 
considerable.  
Since it, like the Decisiones, was published outwith Bohier’s own lifetime, 
one might assume that he did not intend it to be published. However, despite their 
relative obscurity in contemporary scholarship, the Consilia were prized publications 
in their day.  Working a century before, but with his work still in demand in Bohier’s 
time, Alexander de Imola (1424-1477) achieved considerable success with his 
Consilia, producing a work that was allegedly “better than those of other lawyers and 
superior to his Commentaries; and it was probably on these he founded his 
reputation.”163  Keen to release his other works for public consumption, it seems 
strange that Bohier did not attempt this.  However, it is likely that the opinions 
contained within his Consilia were written during his role as President of the 
parlement at Bordeaux, and so perhaps they were withheld so as to protect the 
sanctity of his position.  Those other Consilia that have been published were often 
those of professional jurists, firmly ensconced within their universities, and not the 
practising lawyer or judge. Yet, given the absence of any declaration prohibiting the 
publication of the Consilia, together with Bohier’s prolific printing practices, it seems 
likely that this was something he may have intended to publish during his lifetime.164   
 
 
9.2  Bohier as annotator and editor  
 
 
To better understand Bohier’s legal thought through his writings, his role as 
editor is as revealing as the content of his original scholarship.  Bohier’s best-known 
publications, the Consuetudines, Decisiones and Consilia, are compilations, and, it 
seems, written with a practice-oriented purpose in mind.  Their contents do reveal a 
great deal, especially by way of informing us of citation practices, and ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 P. de Colquhoun, A summary of the Roman civil law: illustrated by commentaries on and parallels 
from the Mosaic, Canon, Mohammedan, English, and foreign law, (London, 1849), p. 206.   
164 No firm conclusions can be drawn on this, however. Examination of the archival holdings of the 
Archives Nationales, Paris and Archives Départementales de Gironde, did not reveal any evidence of 
the text having circulated among the legal community in manuscript form.  
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form the basis of this thesis.  However, it is worth mentioning Bohier’s involvement 
with the publications of others that he selected as noteworthy, to see what this 
selection can tell us about his legal thought as well as any intellectual and 
philosophical allegiances he may have had.  
It is not possible to examine each of those publications that Bohier was 
involved with here.  Instead, his most popular work will be considered in order to 
identify any intellectual allegiances or professional allegiances Bohier may have had 
in his role as editor.  Achieving success with a great number of editions, were 
Bohier’s edited publications of Dynus de Mugello’s (1254-1300) works: 
Commentaria in regulae iuris pontificii165 and Commentarius mirabilis super titulo de 
regulis iuris.166  
Many of Bohier’s other publishing practices also deal with the canon law, 
such as his edition of Johannes Andreae’s work.  Celse-Hugues Descousu (1480-
1540) was also associated with Bohier in a range of publications.167  The former 
edited Bohier’s work on Dynus de Mugello, and a gloss by Etienne Aufreri (1458-
1511) accompanied it.168  Etienne Aufreri was a conseiller at the Toulouse parlement 
and Professeur at the University of the same town.169  Descousu was a docteur in 
utroque jure, and Professeur at the University of Montpellier.170  He assumed the role 
of editor on a number of occasions, working together with Bohier on an edition of 
Dynus de Mugello’s work,171 but he also wrote extensively and published a number of 
other books. His most notable works include the Consilia (posthumously published in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Earliest edition of this work I have found is 1551.  However, Bohier is listed as an editor on this 
work and subsequent editions.   
166 Appended to a number of editions of the De regulis iuris compilation, reportedly first published in 
1500, are two of Bohier’s Consilia, (Lyon, 1530). Bohier’s involvement with these works suggests that 
he was interested in principles of interpretation.   
167 In terms of co-edited works and also those editions dedicated to Bohier, such as an edition of the 
Stylus Curie Parlamenti, (Paris, 1513), which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.   
168 This edition is now very rare and can be found at the Bibliotheque municipale de Lyon (no. 126613)  
169 P. Arabeyre, et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire historique des juristes français (XIIe-XXe siècle) (Oxford, 
2007).  
170 F. Aubert, Collection de Textes pour server à l'étude et a l’enseignement de l’histoire, Guillaume du 
Breuil: Stylus Curiae Parlamenti, Nouvelle Edition Critique Publiée avec une introduction et des notes 
par Felix Aubert (Paris, 1909), p. 56.  A work discussing the writings of Johann Amberbach mentions 
Celse-Hugues Descousu in unfavourable terms.  In the early sixteenth-century it seems that an 
individual bearing that name was responsible for the theft of some valuable books belonging to the 
Amberbach family, who had welcomed Descousu into their household for food and discussion.  
Correspondence charging Descousu with theft and deception offer accounts of this incident.  It is not 
known if this is the same Descousu that is under discussion here, but the dates make it possible and it is 
therefore an interesting note if it is the same individual.  See B. Halporn (ed.), The correspondence of 
Johann Amberbach: early printing in its social context, (Michigan, 2000), pp.106-110.   
171 Dynus, De regulis Iuris (Lyon, 1530), (Lyon, 1533), (Lyon, 1535), (Lyon, 1537), (Lyon, 1551), 
(Lyon, 1578), (Lyon, 1583), (Lyon, 1585), (Lyon, 1590).  
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Lyon, 1570),172 and the Coutumes de Bourgogne (Lyon, 1513, 1516).173  Guillaume 
du Breuil’s Stylus Curie Parlamenti was first published in 1330.  In 1513, Simon 
Vincent published the most popular edition of this work in Lyon that was edited by 
Celse-Hugues Descousu.  Descousu dedicated the work to Bohier.   
Another of Bohier’s edited works, Dynus’s Commentaria, saw the 
involvement of Charles Dumoulin (1500-1566). Dumoulin studied at Orléans, before 
becoming an avocat before the Paris parlement.  He then moved to Germany to teach 
following the French persecution of Protestants, and later was imprisoned in Paris for 
writing against the Council of Trent.174  Dumoulin has been described as: “the most 
important exponent of the customs”.175  His main work was the Commentaria in 
consuetudines Parisienses published in 1538, but his Annotationes ad jus canonicum 
(Lyon, 1550) are perhaps most noteworthy here.  Dumoulin’s position on the canon 
law was a complex one. His own religious affiliations changed throughout his life, 
and it was: “one of his points of departure as well as one of his primary targets.  He 
attacked to plunder it as well as to demolish it.  His basic objection was that the 
canonist standard of judgment was provided not by scripture but by the papal 
chancery.”176  His involvement in the Commentaria was of course to provide an 
annotated critique of the contents.   
The precise nature of Dumoulin’s affiliation with Bohier is not known, and it 
is only those editions that appear post-1539 (after Bohier’s death) that bear his name. 
It is then highly probable then that Dumoulin himself used Bohier’s publication to 
provide his own commentary. There are also those editions containing notes that were 
attributed to Dumoulin in publications printed in Lyon have not been appropriately 
cited in other copies.177  A 1533 edition of this work contains the words “doctorem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Bohier’s Consilia, (Lyon, 1554) was also published posthumously.  This is notable and the notion 
whether this is something of a trend in consilia publications will be considered later in the chapter 
dealing with Bohier’s Consilia. 
173 Interestingly, one of the most complete accounts of Descousu’s life can be found in a publication by 
a “President Bouhier”: Histoire des commentateurs de la coutume de Bourgogne, (Dijon, 1742).  Of 
course, the date reveals that this was not the work of Nicolas Bohier, but it is still worth noting this so 
as to avoid initial confusion.  The author was in fact Jean Bouhier (1673-1746), a President à mortier 
of the parlement de Bourgogne.   
174 On the Council of Trent and Dumoulin, see J. Kainulainen, “Libertas ecclesiae in post-tridentine 
debates on church and state”, in Q. Skinner and M. Van Gelderen, (eds.), Freedom and the 
construction of Europe: religious freedom and civil liberty, (Cambridge, U.K., 2013), pp. 38-56, at pp. 
41-44.  
175 Stein, (n. 42), p. 84.   
176 D. Kelley, Foundations of modern historical scholarship: language, law and history in the French 
renaissance, (New York, 1970), p. 174.   
177 For instance, the Library of Congress collections contain a number of editions of this nature.   
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anonymum” in its title.  This could be a reference to Dumoulin.  When his name first 
appears in 1549 those notes that belonged to the anonymous writer were now 
expressly attributed to Dumoulin, with a noted absence of the anonymous contributor 
left out from the title page.178   
Bohier had an editorial role in other publications such as Joannes Andreae’s 
Mercuriales domini (1510). Joannes Andreae (1275-1348) took his doctorate in canon 
law between 1296 and 1300 at Bologna, and also taught at the University by 1303.179 
Andreae had finished his Apparatus to the Liber Sextus by 1305 and it was almost 
automatically accepted as the authoritative gloss on the text.  Andreae was received 
well by contemporary canonists.  Subsequent commentators on the Liber Sextus 
would use this gloss as a model, and it served as a reference book for lawyers.180 
Bohier’s editorship of the 1510 edition181 of Andreae’s Mercuriales domini also saw 
the involvement of Joannes Gradibus and Charles Dumoulin. Joannes Gradibus 
received his legibus baccalaureus from Orléans (1477) and was responsible for a 
large range of publications including the works of Jason de Mayno, Baldus and 
Angelus Aretinus.182 Robert Feenstra has recognised Gradibus’s influence as an 
author of marginal notes and various annotations to the works he was associated with.  
His name from 1496 onwards often bears the title of utriusque iuris professeur or 
even consiliarius regis.183  
Bohier served as editor for other canon law works: Juan Torquemada’s (1388-
1468) Commentaria reverendi in Christo Petris (1519)184 and Commentaria super 
toto decreto (1519),185 and Benedetto Barzi’s (1350-1410) Lectura (1517).186  His 
only editorial work that is not of a canon law nature is his publication of the Leges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 With thanks to Nathan Dorn, Curator of Rare Books at the Library of Congress Law Library for 
help with this, in particular the linking of the “doctorem anonymum” to Dumoulin.   
179 E. Makowski, Canon law and cloistered women: periculoso and its commentators (1298-1545),  
(Washington, D.C., 1997), p. 57.  
180 Ibid, p. 49. Also, R. Helmholz, “The bible in the service of the canon law” (1994) 70 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 557.  
181 (Lyon), published by Simon Vincent.  
182 Gradibus’s involvement can also be seen in many works of jurists at this time, including many of 
whom Bohier cited: Jason de Mayno, Baldus, Angelus de Aretinus, Alexander Tartagnus, Filippo 
Decio, to name a few.  For a comprehensive list of juristic works where Gradibus was involved, see R. 
Feenstra, “Editions lyonnaises des lecturae de droit civil de Balde par Jean de Grandibus, avec un 
aperçu des autres éditions du XVIe siècle”, (2000) 27 Ius Commune 345. See works noted here at pp. 
348-350. 
183 Ibid, p. 347.  
184 (Lyon), published by Simon Vincent. 
185 Ibid.   
186 (Lyon), co-editor Jean Thierry, published by Simon Vincent.   
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Longobardorum (1512).187  The fact that nearly all of his editorial works deal with the 
canon law goes beyond any anecdotal curiosity he may have in relation to Dynus de 
Mugello.  Instead, this is a clear indication that Bohier was acutely interested in the 
canon law as something worthy of editing and of contemporary commentary, and it 
may also go some way towards explaining the selection of cases included in his 
Consilia and Decisiones.  The publication of these works falls within a twenty-year 
period: the first being in 1500 and the last in 1519.  For much of this time, Bohier was 
a member of the Grand Conseil.  His original works come later when he is President 
of the Bordeaux parlement, with the exception of the Consuetudines Biturigium 
(Paris, 1508).  It is possible that his position as conseiller meant he felt it more 
appropriate to edit rather than create works that reflected on the practice and operation 
of the parlement.  His later works, the Decisiones and Consilia were most likely 
compiled while President of the parlement, and are practical works that relate to the 
decisions of that institution.  A notable exception is his collaborative work with Jean 
Montaigne, Tractatus Celebris de Auctoritate (Lyon, 1512).  However, it was shown 
earlier that this work saw Bohier promote and defend the unique position of power 
that the Grand Conseil and its conseillers had, and so this is likely to have been 
tactical.188   
In terms of his preference for those works of canon law, it is possible that this 
preference was rooted in a desire to reflect the reality of legal practice.  The Paris 
parlement, for example, saw a high number of appeals to its chambers.  A sample of 
appeals heard at the parlement demonstrates that a significant number of these were 
of an ecclesiastical nature.189  It is possible that Bohier was simply wishing to 
recognise this and provide contemporary editions for reference.  The prominence of 
the canon law in his original works will be examined later when the content of his 
publications are considered in detail in order to understand his legal reasoning and 
approach to different sources of law.  It is important, however, to recognise this trend 
now so that this be kept in mind when carrying out these later analyses.     
 
10.  Conclusion  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 (Lyon), published by Simon Vincent.   
188 Tractatus celebris, (n. 85), fol. 28, 39-40.  
189 U/419, Arrêts notables du parlement de Paris, notes de jurisprudence, consultations, 
principalement en matière ecclésiastique, Archives Nationales, Paris.   
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 In the previous chapter, I set out the larger context of early modern France, to 
foreground Bohier, and offer a better understanding of the environment in which he 
lived. He was an individual with an illustrious career in the law, an avocat, 
professeur, conseiller, president at the Bordeaux parlement and author, as well as an 
editor.  His role as author and editor goes some way towards suggesting that the 
traditional firm division between the practising lawyer and the jurist should be 
reconsidered. Living between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Bohier offered an 
insight into the legal profession at a time that has not traditionally benefited from the 
same scrutiny as the mid-to-late sixteenth century, for example.  
 His range of professional associations with notable figures of the time 
demonstrates that he achieved success in his various roles. It has been made clear that 
although predominantly a practising lawyer, Bohier enjoyed notoriety owing to his 
many publications, which included editorial works on the likes of Dynus de Mugello. 
His time as a professeur at Bourges reveals that he was also a jurist, and so the 
sources he relied on in legal practice will have been informed by this earlier role. 
Bohier’s own works documenting the law in action are especially valuable in this 
regard.  
Given that the greater aim of this thesis is to assess the meaning of the term 
ius commune in sixteenth-century practice, understanding the mind-set of the author 
behind the works is of pivotal importance.  Further, appreciating the nature of the 
written works themselves and the contextual histories behind the publications is 
equally vital. It is hoped that a portrait of Nicolas Bohier has been created here and 
enables a fuller understanding of the relationship between the individual and printed 












1. By what authority?  
 
To understand the use of the term ius commune in Bohier’s works, some 
context is required. The first two chapters of this thesis have examined the man 
himself and the context in which his written works existed. This provides a backdrop 
against which his works can be assessed. The remainder of this thesis will focus on 
the occurrence of the term ius commune in these works. However, it is first necessary 
to look at the authority of the term in sixteenth-century France. This involves asking 
what authoritative underpinning it would have had and why Bohier would have cared 
about it to the extent that he did. Admittedly, an answer to this question is of itself an 
aim of this thesis, but for the purposes of this case study it is helpful to ask what 
authority any source of law had at this time.  
The way in which the ius commune operated in individual cases will be 
examined to better grasp the meaning of the term itself. The term is so loosely used in 
legal historical literature and has been taken to mean an array of things, as shown in 
detail earlier in this work.1 Understanding its role as a concept at the time of Bohier’s 
writing relies on a degree of generalisation. With that said, this work does not seek to 
reveal whether the ius commune was truly a common law, applied equally throughout 
France. This is outwith the scope of a microhistory and the parameters of this work. 
Instead, it looks at the term as a tool of one practitioner and assesses where and how 
the term was used. Looking to the authorities Bohier cited, if any, alongside the term 
itself, will provide a better indication of what he had in mind when writing the term: a 
set group of authorities that to him, and those who relied on his works, would deem a 
recurrent set of citations. It is not possible to know precisely which editions of works 
Bohier referred to.2 Further, it cannot be known whether or not he directly referred to 
a specific work, or borrowed the citation, especially given that the availability of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See “Introduction” of this thesis.  
2 On this point, see M. van Ittersum, “The working methods of Hugo Grotius: which sources did he use 
and how did he use them in his early writings on natural law theory?” in P. du Plessis and J. Cairns 
(eds.), Reassessing legal humanism and its claims: petere fontes?, (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 154-193.  
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books of citations in the early modern period. Every instance therefore has to be 
assessed on its own merits. However, whatever sources he does cite will still offer a 
general insight into what the ius commune may have represented to Bohier, and 
together with his textual treatment of the term itself, will offer a new insight into what 
it actually and practically meant to him and his peers. 
While the nature of this case study will seek to identify the kinds of cases the 
ius commune appeared in, how it was used, and the authoritative sources of the ius 
commune, by way of the citation practices of Bohier, it will not fully answer the 
question of “why” he referred to the term, the extent to which he felt compelled to or 
could freely do so, nor the history behind the primacy of Roman legal principles and 
methods. This question links in with the bigger narrative of the “reception”3 of 
Roman law and falls outside of the historical remit of this thesis. Yet, better 
understanding of the term’s meaning and relationship with other sources of law will 
go some way towards a fuller explanation of its practical use and its benefit as a 
source used in legal reasoning.  
 
2. The sources: where the ius commune is mentioned  
 
Three of Bohier’s books have been selected for this study. Each of them has 
been examined and the incidence of the term ius commune noted and studied. These 
are presented below in order of appearance within the work, with brief details on it 
provided so as to offer an initial overview of the kinds of cases the term ius commune 
appears in. The relevant table will be reproduced at the beginning of each chapter, but 
are all presented here together to offer a general overview.  
 
Fig. 1: Cases where the ius commune is used in Consilia  
 
SOURCE CASUS 
Cons. 8  Ecclesiastical appeal.  
Cons. 24* Land/lake use. 
Cons. 27 Procedural matter (expenses).  
Cons. 26 Canon law dispensations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 F. Wieacker, A history of private law with particular reference to Germany, (Oxford, 1995) 
[translated from the original German]. 
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Cons. 40 Marriage contract. 
Cons. 46 Usufruct/hereditary rights in marriage. 
*Indicates a case where ius commune is less significant in the ratio decidendi of the case.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Cases where the ius commune is used in Decisiones 
 
SOURCE CASUS 
Dec. 2 Elections (ecclesiastical). 
Dec. 9 Jurisdiction (rights of Barons to punish 
offenders). 
Dec. 42 Possession.  
Dec. 46 Jurisdiction (divided jurisdiction).  
Dec. 68 Procedural (sentencing). 
Dec. 69 Evictions (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 82  Papal benefits (ecclesiastical). 
Dec. 113 Marriage and dowry.  
Dec. 133 Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 141* Procedural (proclamations).  
Dec. 186 Heritable rights. 
Dec. 188 Heritable rights.  
Dec. 199 Usufruct.  
Dec. 203 Marriage and property rights of children. 
Dec. 221* Father giving surety on behalf of a son. 
Dec. 225 Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 228 Testamentary provision. 
Dec. 230 Moveables and heritable property. 
Dec. 236 Prescription.  
Dec. 238 Ownership and possession. 
Dec. 239 Possession.  
Dec. 240 Testamentary provision.  
Dec. 244 Marriage and testamentary provision. 
Dec. 262 Punishment and clerical privilege.  
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Dec. 263 Feudal law. 
Dec. 284 Arbitration. 
Dec. 295* Oath and confession. 
Dec. 297 Procedural (cleric before a secular judge – 
ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 300 Taxation.  
Dec. 322* Rights of neighbour/access rights.  
Dec. 328* Prescription.  
Dec. 346  Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
*Indicates a case where ius commune is less significant in the ratio decidendi of the case.  
 
 
Fig. 3: Cases where the ius commune is used in Consuetudines 
 
SOURCE CASUS 
Consuet. 4 Power of married women to purchase 
property. 
Consuet. 9 Property between noblemen. 
Consuet. 11 Retrait lignager. 
Consuet. 21 Judges and jurisdiction. 
Consuet. 33 Prescription. 
Consuet. 56 Retrait lignager. 
Consuet. 61 Marriage. 
Consuet. 65*  Dowry on death. 
Consuet. 68 Seigneurial system. 
Consuet. 69  Clergy/secular judge/procedural. 
*Indicates a case where ius commune is less significant in the ratio decidendi of the case.  
 
 
2.1 Selection of significant examples 
 
There are two types of references to the ius commune in Bohier’s works. The 
first type are relatively insignificant, in the sense that the term’s role is cursory or 
fleeting, and has no real impact on the eventual decision. Where the ius commune 
	   72	  
plays a minor role like this, it has been identified in the tables above, but will not be 
studied further. The second type of reference is more substantial. This is where it is 
clear from the overall decision that the term had an impact on the ratio decidendi of 
the case. These references are the most significant and form the basis of the remaining 
chapters of this thesis, where a selection of the most interesting examples are analysed 
in detail. The exposition of juristic thought and legal reasoning varies from case to 
case and so the extent to which the ius commune features is therefore dependent on 
the individual case. The first of the three works that will be examined is Bohier’s 




3.1 The source  
 
 
The Consilia has a “scientific quality” to its format, as is evident from the fact 
that Consilia were also prevalent in the study of medicine in this period.4 This form 
lends itself favourably to Bohier’s methodology, where he forensically examines a 
range of topics. The approach to the cases before him is carried out in a set fashion; 
presenting the summae of the matter; proceeding to outline the divergent opinions and 
corresponding authorities on the matter; and the decision reached. To understand the 
purpose of this type of work, a brief outline of its history is required.  
The period between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the consilia 
take on a more detailed form, moving from a formal and routine opinion to a complex 
model with an elaborate layout and a multitude of citations, with arguments from 
Roman law, canon law, local statutes, customary law, and the works of other jurists. 
Such a variety of sources at the lawyer’s disposal suggest coexistence, rather than a 
rivalry or fixed order of authority. The presence of other juristic opinions had the 
effect of creating a miniature history of legal thought on a particular issue, all 
contained within the one document. Yet, beneath its verbosity, the consilia followed a 
certain predictable formula, and this common form linked all three kinds of written 
responses. In this later period of the life of the consilia, the courts were typically 
characterised by an increased professionalism and specialisation, with a movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 W. Turner and S. Butler (eds.), Medicine and the law in the middle ages (Leiden, 2014), p. 141. 
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from oral to written procedure.5 Moreover, perhaps the greatest value of the consilia 
at this time was its ability to clarify local law, and provide a means to deal with “the 
difficult mixture of local statutes and customs…tackled through the techniques of 
interpretation and argumentation of the Roman lawyers.”6 Bohier’s aim when writing 
was to “provide retrospectively the sort of reasoning on the questions raised by cases 
that he had provided prospectively when writing as a professor.”7 His Consilia offers 
us many examples of the type of legal reasoning he employed, in particular his 
handling of competing sources of law. It is also possible to identify those authorities 
that Bohier attributed individual points to, or indeed against, and to compare the 
approach in the Consilia with the Decisiones, and further with that of the 
Consuetudines.  
Bohier’s Consilia contains six cases that deal specifically with the ius 
commune and four of these cases have been selected for the purposes of this chapter. 
Two relate to canon law matters, including an ecclesiastical appeal,8 and the age of 
subdeacons;9 and the remaining pair deal with marriage10 and usufruct.11 Consilium 8 
has recently been the subject of a short study by Paul du Plessis, who recognised the 
importance of the case and referred to it as “a rather important record of the ius 
commune in action.”12 He stressed the need for further study into the relationship 
between the ius commune and ius proprium.13 The cases are considered in order of 
their appearance in the Consilia. Given the findings from the first case, in consilium 8, 
this is helpful as a starting point for discussion in any case. As set out in chapter 2, the 
earliest known edition of the Consilia is 1554, some five years after Bohier’s death, 
and this edition is being used here.14  
 
3.2 Cons. 8: Ecclesiastical appeal 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 P. Pazzaglini and C. Hawks, Consilia: a bibliography of holdings in the Library of Congress and 
certain other collections in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1990), p. xvi.  
6 T. Wallinga, “The common history of European legal scholarship”, (2011) 4 Erasmus Law Review 5, 
10.  
7 J. Ford, Law and opinion in Scotland during the seventeenth century, (Oxford, 2007), p. 193.  
8 Cons. 8. 
9 Cons. 26. 
10 Cons. 40. 
11 Cons. 46. 
12 P. du Plessis, “A dialogue between legal theory and legal practice: thoughts from the ius commune”, 
(2013) 2 Rabels Zeitschrift 279, 386.  
13 Ibid, 387.  
14 Lyon, 1554.  
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The facts of the case relate to an issue emanating from the canon law; where a 
judge has condemned an individual in expenses contrary to the stylus of the court, and 
the question of an ecclesiastical appeal is raised. The case ended up before the 
parlement in Bordeaux. This particular case considers the authority of and 
relationship between stylus, custom and ius commune. Twenty-one sections make up 
this consilium. The most noteworthy, in terms of understanding the use of the term ius 
commune, include: a definition of both stylus and custom; the essential differences 
between stylus and custom; and the relationship between stylus, custom and the ius 
commune.15  
Bohier begins his consilium by referring to the opinion of some learned jurists 
that stylus, consuetudo, mos and communis observantia are thought to be of the same 
meaning.16 However, he challenges this and cites a range of authorities. The selection 
could be termed a conventional one, including late-medieval jurists: Pierre de 
Belleperche (1230-1308), Cinus de Pistoia (1270-1336), Joannes Faure (1478-1541), 
Angelus de Perusio (1328-1407), Angelus de Aretinus (d.1451) and Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato.  
 
3.2.1 Defining stylus and custom 
 
Bohier’s introduction to stylus and consuetudo rest on provisions in the Codex 
and Digest: C.8.52.1-2 (a. 319) and D.1.3.32 respectively. It will be helpful for the 
discussion to briefly consider the content of these provisions first. C.8.52.1 (a. 224) 
states that: 
nam et consuetudo praecedens et ratio quae consuetudinem suasit custodienda 
est, et ne quid contra longam consuetudinem fiat, ad sollicitudinem suam 
revocabit praeses provinciae.17   
 
This is followed at C.8.52.2 (a. 319) by a statement establishing limits to legal 
arguments from custom; essentially that the authority of custom and long-standing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In consilium 27, Bohier considers stylus, together with its relationship with statute. There, it is also a 
case centred on a procedural issue, including the amount of expenses to be awarded by the court. See 
consilium 27, para 28 and 29 in particular.  
16 Cons. 8, pr 1. 
17 Translation by C. Humfress, “Law and custom under Rome”, in A. Rio (ed.), Law, custom and 
justice in late antiquity and the early middle ages, (London, 2011), pp. 23-47 at p. 31: “since both the 
existing custom and the ratio which backed it must be conserved, and the provincial governor must 
make it his business to see that nothing is done contrary to such ancient custom.”	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usage cannot prevail over reason or statute (lex).18 D.1.3.32pr. states that in those 
cases where written statute (lex) is lacking, custom (consuetudines) and usage (mos) 
ought to prevail; but that if what is established by these customs is deficient, then one 
ought to reason out analogously from these customs. If this reasoning fails then the 
ius that is used in the City of Rome should be applied.19 The text of D.1.3.32 tries to 
justify the recourse to custom where statute is lacking on the grounds that the two can 
be considered analogous: 
 
For since statutes themselves are only binding because they have been 
accepted by the judgment of the people, those things which the people have 
approved without any writing at all will be rightly considered as binding on 
everyone; what difference does it make whether the people declares its will by 
vote, or by acts or conducts themselves?20 
 
It is widely known that the glossators and commentators looked to D.1.3.32 in 
particular as representing an authoritative and potentially definitive account of the 
concept of custom.21 It has been suggested that the second-century context of the 
provision ought to be approached as a “dynamic, problem-solving text – oriented 
ultimately towards resolving specific difficulties of legal interpretation that arose 
during Roman law’s expansion from city-state to empire.”22  
 
3.2.2 Stylus quid  
 
From the outset of the case, Bohier offers this description of stylus:23  
 
est ius non scriptum, ab uno iudice 
saepius circa sententias & acta iudiciaria 
it is unwritten law, more often introduced 
or styled by one judge in relation to [his] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 (Constantine to Proculus (proconsul Africae)): Consuetudinis ususque longaevi non vilis auctoritas 
est, verum non usque adeo sui valitura momento, ut aut rationem vincat aut legem (a. 319).  
19 (Julian, Digest Book 84): De quibus causis scriptis legibus non utimur, id custodiri oporet, quod 
moribus et consuetudine inductum est: et si qua in re hoc deficeret, tunc quod proximum et consequens 
ei est: si nec id quidem appaereat, tunc ius, quo urbs Roma utitur, servari oportet. See Caroline 
Humfress, (n. 17), p. 27.  
20 Translation from Humfress, (n. 17), p. 28.  
21 M. Ryan, “Bartolus of Sassoferrato and free cities”, (2000) 10 Transactions of the royal historical 
society 65.  
22 Humfress, (n. 17), p. 29. Humfress continues by considering that the very inclusion of ten juristic 
extracts relating to custom by the Justinianic Digest commissioners perhaps suggests that they too 
understood how certain juristic arguments “from custom” related specifically to the interpretation (and 
supplementation) of Roman statute.  
23 Cons. 8, para 2.  
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introductum sive stylatum… 
 
decisions and judicial acts… 
 
Since the case at hand originated from the canon law, and had been sent to the 
Bordeaux parlement as a matter of appeal, the stylus referred to would be that of the 
ecclesiastical court. It is possible that the particular stylus Biturice that Bohier 
mentions is one recorded in the Stilus Ecclesiasticae jurisdictionis archiepiscopalis, 
Primatalis atque patriarchalis Bituricencis, by Franciscus de Turnone,24 Archbishop 
of Bordeaux from 1525 until 1537.25 It cannot be stated with any accuracy, however, 
as more details would be required. Further, although Bohier was president of the 
Bordeaux parlement at this time, the first known edition of his Consilia was the 
posthumous date of 1554, meaning the date of the legal opinions contain within it are 
approximated. 
Bohier offers an interesting insight into the role of the stylus and the 
relationship between canon and civil judges and the authority of their judgments. 
 
3.2.3 Consuetudo quid 
 
Bohier continues at cons. 8, para 3 by stating that the defining quality of 
consuetudo lies in the nature of its introduction:26 
 
Sicut est consuetudo quae tacita 
voluntate et usu plurium inducitur, [quia] 
populi vel maioris partis eiusdem. 
 
Thus custom is that which has been 
introduced through tacit consent and the 
frequent use of the populace or the larger 
part of the populace. 
 
Later in the same part of his consilium, he continues:27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 (Bourges, 1529). Better known examples (but later) include Jean Chenu, Stylus jurisdictionis 
ecclesiasticae archiepiscopalis primatalis et concilio provinciali in metropolitana Biturigum civitate 
habito, (Paris, 1603). See reference to both Turnone and Chenu: Catalogue des livres composant la 
Bibliothèque de la ville de Bordeaux, (Paris, 1834), p. 316, at “Chenu” and “Turnone” respectively. 
Chenu’s other notable works include: Recueil de règlemens notables, (Lyon, 1614).  
25 Jean Chenu documented the successive Archbishops of Bordeaux in his Archiepiscoporum et 
episcoporum Galliae Chronologica historia (Paris, 1621); Turnone is listed at p. 324. It was considered 
earlier that the Stylus curiae was important in French courts and that familiarity with it was a formal 
requirement that led to the “l’avocat l’écoutant” which was a form of apprenticeship (see the 
discussion in chapter 2, at 9.2, “Bohier as annotator and editor”). An edition of other stylus, Guillaume 
de Breuil’s Stylus curie parlamenti was published in 1513, [1330], edited by Celse Hugues Descousu, 
and was dedicated to Bohier. While neither of these relate to this particular Stilus ecclesiasticae, it is 
mentioned to demonstrate the prominence of stylus as a source in France at this time.  
26 Translation from Du Plessis, (n. 12), at 383. 
27 Cons. 8, para 3. Ibid, at 384.  
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consuetudo tam ex actibus iudicariis, 
quam extra iudiciariis interveniente 
populi consensu, et sic est usus 
communis… 
custom is introduced both through 
judicial acts and through extra-judicial 
acts is the consent of the people, and thus 
it is common usage… 
 
This distinction between introduction through popular consent for custom and 
usage and that of the one-man equivalent of stylus rests at the heart of Bohier’s attack 
on a shared definition for these sources of law.  
In providing a definition of custom and stylus, Bohier refers to Joannes Faber, 
Angelus de Perusio and Angelus de Aretinus on Inst.1.2.9, De iure naturali, gentium 
et civili. Bohier also makes reference to Bartolus’ commentary on D.1.3.32. He begins 
with a reference to Pierre de Belleperche and Cinus de Pistoia. Bohier cited Cinus 
often in his Consilia: four times alongside Belleperche, and separately in two other 
instances.28 Bohier cites Cinus’ (together with Pierre de Belleperche) commentary on 
C.8.52.2 (a. 319).29 When compared to the argument, the citation appears to be 
accurate with the passage cited in the commentary discussing the origins of custom 
belonging to popular tacit consent. Most importantly, perhaps, is the express mention 
and discussion on the topic of stylus and how it differs from custom.30 Clearly, Bohier 
relied on this part of Cinus’ commentary. In the first half of this discussion, Cinus 
refers to the relationship between a secular court and an ecclesiastical stylus,31 very 
similar to the case in Bohier’s consilium.  
Angelus de Perusio is also cited alongside Faure and Aretinus, with reference 
to Inst.1.2.9. However, no commentary on the Institutes appears to have been written 
by Angelus, or at least not one that has survived.32 It must be referring to the 
commentary of another jurist who has cited Angelus as authority for the issue at hand, 
that of the nature of stylus and custom. Aretinus’ commentary on the Institutes does 
reveal a discussion of “Stylus quid sit, & in quo differat a consuetudine.33 Aretinus 
himself cites Cinus and Belleperche’s commentary on C.8.52.2 (a. 319) as to the 
nature of stylus and custom and their differences rooted in the issue of consent.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Cited solo in Cons. 8, paras 12 and 21.  
29 Cinus de Pistoia, Lectura super codice, (1493, Venice).  
30 Ibid, para 4.  
31 Ibid, para 3: “in curia seculari…in ecclesiastica consuetudine usum stilu…nec sunt iura scriptu 
qualiter ista differat inter se.”  
32 J. Canning, The political thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, (Cambridge, U.K., 1987), p. 272. The 
absence of any record of such a work on the Universal Short Title Catalogue suggests this is the case.  
33 Angelus de Aretinus, In quattuor institutionum Justiniani libros commentarii, (Lyon, 1532). 
34 Aretinus: “Pet.&Cy. in l.2 C.q. sit lon.Consue.” 
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When discussing an earlier question, “consuetudo quid sit”, Aretinus can be seen 
referring to Bartolus’ commentary on de quibus (D.1.3.32), and Angelus de Perusio is 
also mentioned.   
One of Bohier’s non-Italian authorities,35 Jean Faure, is a prominent figure in 
this Consilia. Bohier cites Faure on some five occasions in his consilium.36 Since 
Faure taught at Montpellier, where Bohier himself studied, he was no doubt more 
familiar with his works.37 At one point in his consilium, it is made especially clear 
that Bohier holds this jurist in high regard, referring to him as the representative voice 
on a point of law “in Francia”.38 As a jurist of the Ultramontani, Faure tried to 
“impart to the customary institutions and political organisations of the time a new 
vigour and vitality by engrafting therein principles of Roman law”.39 Because of an 
earlier citation to Faure’s work, it is known that Bohier is referring to his super 
Instituta40 in this part of the consilium.41 Faure deals with custom in considerable 
detail here, offering a structured commentary on the matter, divided into six parts:  
 
Primo, circa nomen Secundo, circa 
diffinitionem. Tertio, circa introducendi 
modum. Quarto, circa modum agendi. 
Quinto, circa modum probandi. Sexto, 
circo vires. 
 
First, about the name. Second, about the 
definition. Third, about the nature of the 
introduction. Fourth, about the nature of 
the operation. Fifth, about the way of 
proving. Sixth, about strength. 
 
If Bohier directly consulted Faure, it is likely that he would have paid the most 
attention to Faure’s first two points. While the second part of Faure’s discussion is 
specifically on defining custom, it is in the first part of the commentary on “ex non 
scripto” that we find a statement on stylus and on statute. It is worth noting Faure’s 
provision of two different descriptions for stylus and statute, something mirrored in 
his commentary on the Codex 8.52.1 (a. 319) in his super Codice.42 In the annotations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The other being Petrus de Bellapertica; born in Paris and later Professor at Orléans.  
36 Bohier, Cons. 8, paras. 1, 2, 12, 13 and 18.  
37 Du Plessis, (n. 12), at 383. 
38 Cons 8, para 18. 
39 C. Phillipson, “The great jurists of the world: XVI. Jacques Cujas”, (1912) 13 Journal of the Society 
of Comparative Legislation 87 at 88.  
40 (Venice, 1497).  
41 At Cons. 8, para 1: “Ioa. Fab. in ex non scripto. & Ang. Are. ibi Instit. de iure natu. gen. & civi.”  
42 Bohier uses Faure’s definition of stylus as evidence of its origins and form: a product of judicial 
proceedings. In his commentary on C.8.52.1, Faure provides this definition of stylus: “stylus proprie et 
usus circa modum scribendi in iudicio acta, sententias & caetera que possunt modum ordinandi”. 
(“Properly speaking, stylus is the manner of writing used in court decisions, sentences and other things 
that can be ordered”.) He goes on to mention statuta, and makes a point of differentiating between it 
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to Faure’s work, there is reference to Aretinus, Angelus de Perusio, Cinus and 
Belleperche. The summary contained in the annotations to Faure’s work is in fact 
very similar to that offered by Bohier on the difference between stylus and custom. 
This is also seen in Aretinus’ commentary, but in the body of the text.  
Bohier refers to Bartolus as authority for the nature of stylus and its 
introduction through judicial acts. It is possible to interpret this citation as a bid by 
Bohier to demarcate stylus and custom, by using the issue of consent. Bartolus saw 
that in law making, consent was paramount and could override the will of a superior 
force. He argued that customary law and statute shared a consensual under-pinning 
that was rooted in the consent of the people, the former tacit and the latter express, 
and so did not require superior consent for their authority.43 Perhaps Bohier is 
referring to Bartolus to demonstrate the difference between a law introduced by a 
single judge and a statute, the latter being expressly approved by the people. In using 
this opinion, Bohier would have been drawing a distinction between stylus and 
statute, echoing Faure’s view, as outlined above. Bohier is stating that stylus is neither 
statute nor custom; referring to Bartolus’ legal reasoning to try and demonstrate that 
the nature of stylus is not rooted in the same sense of consent, although Bartolus 
himself does not make an authoritative statement as to the nature of custom 
generally.44 Given that he found a definition akin to his own in Belleperche and 
Cinus,45 Bartolus’ direct and lengthy consideration of custom and popular consent 
would have served well as a powerful definition of custom as a source of law. 
Aretinus also relied on Bartolus’ commentary on D.1.3.32 as recognised above.46 
Perhaps Bohier was citing Bartolus in a routine sense, one rooted in an awareness of 
the citation practices of other jurists he deemed authoritative. It is not clear whether 
Bohier directly consulted Bartolus. It is likely that there will have been a significant 
awareness of the jurist’s works, and his influence would have meant that Bartolus 
would have informed Bohier’s understanding in any case. The value of Bartolus as a 
source is considered below.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and stylus, and their differences with custom. For statuta, it is introduced by express consent and 
custom is introduced tacitly. He is keen to demarcate stylus and statuta here. As authority for this 
statement, Faure only makes reference to other parts of the Codex and Digest, but generally, the 
commentary on quae sit longa consuetudo cites Azo and the Italian canonist, Hostiensis. 
43 Canning, (n. 32), p. 96. 
44	  Bohier	  cites	  Bartolus’	  commentary	  on	  D.1.3.32:	  "secundum	  Bar.	  in	  d.l.de	  quibus..."	  	  
45 Cinus, (n. 29): Commentary on C.8.52.2.  
46 Aretinus, (n. 33): Ad D.1.3.32.  
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In terms of law, the sixteenth century has long been characterised in 
contemporary accounts by its detachment from the preceding centuries’ methods and 
intellectual approaches to legal sources, namely through the influence of legal 
humanism.47 It has been considered that so-called devotees of pure Roman law 
displaced the ‘Bartolists’ in the sixteenth century:  
 
“purity” involved the rejection of such concessions to contemporary practice, 
whether contrary or complementary, as had been operated by the more 
practical Bartolists. ‘Pure’ Roman law, however, knows nothing directly of the 
Conflict of Laws; and since this conflict is a fact of life which will not go 
away by dint of not being thought about, the structure of the rules founded on 
Bartolo continued to fill the gap.48  
 
 
The so-called gap-filling quality of Bartolus is not convincing when applied to 
the case of Bohier’s consilium. If Bohier is referring to Bartolus in order to deal with 
the competition of laws and to remedy their conflicts, then the reference suggests 
reliance and it is in this interaction that we see the true definitions of stylus, custom 
and ultimately the ius commune. While legal humanism as a movement is so closely 
tied to the sixteenth century and may have altered the way in which jurists approached 
Roman law sources, this is not being debated here. Rather, it is the idea that the value 
of those sources that had characterised the law prior to the sixteenth century, such as 
Bartolus, were still being recognised and referred to in relation to the law in action, as 
embodied in Bohier’s Consilia.49 Indeed, many legal humanists of the age still 
referred to the likes of Bartolus, and would still adopt, however unconsciously, the 
commentator stance on certain topics.50 This should not be seen as an attempt to 
categorise Bohier in this way, but rather that Bartolus’ influence transcended 
ideological and philosophical barriers that tend to (sometimes superficially) define 
jurists and their works. The role of the ius commune in Bartolus’ commentary on lex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For a new approach to legal humanism that challenges the traditional narrative, see Du Plessis and 
Cairns, (n. 2).  
48 J. Clarence Smith, “Bartolo on the conflict of laws”, (1970) 14 The American Journal of Legal 
History 157 at 159.  
49 See X. Prévost, “Reassessing the influence of medieval jurisprudence on Jacques Cujas’ (1522-1590) 
method”, in Du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 2), pp. 88-107.  
50 C. Wells, Law and citizenship in early modern France, (Baltimore, 1995), p. 37. This is true in 
particular of the practice of citizenship and the issue of legal precedent in France in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth century, which Wells sets out generally here at pp. 31-57. Reliance on fourteenth-century 
jurists, such as Baldus, Bartolus, Albericus de Rosate, is mirrored in the works of renowned humanist, 
Jacques Cujas. Ibid, at pp. 100-102.  
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de quibus51 is of fundamental importance to the role of this jurist in Bohier’s 
consilium. Bartolus’ own conception of the ius commune can offer an insight into the 
value of his work for Bohier’s own case problem.  
 
3.2.4  The Bartolan world system 
 
Bohier’s conception of the ius commune was certainly linked to that of 
Bartolus’. To better understand this, something needs to be said about what Nikitas 
Hatzimihail has termed the “Bartolan world system.”52 The Bartolan world focused 
on a world empire – the Roman Empire – constituted by the populus Romanus under a 
secular Emperor and Pope. Bartolus’ chief aim appears to have been the defence of 
the nominal authority of the Emperor and the unity of Western Christianity under him 
and the Pope. Woolf has argued that it is the ius commune Bartolus is thinking of in 
his effort to keep Western Christianity together as populus Romanus or when he 
speaks of the Emperor.53 Bartolus used the ius commune in two main ways: in both an 
instrumental and conceptual sense. Bohier mirrors this approach to the ius commune. 
First, his use of it in an instrumental sense: the term acts as an interface needed to 
enable his theory of statute and custom to work. Here, he uses the ius commune not as 
a positive system of rules to restrict local law, but as an apparatus to mediate between 
them.54  Secondly, the conceptual use of it is especially evocative of Bartolus’ 
approach, in particular that of Bartolus’ use of “canon additions from the previous 
century…the distinction of prohibitive statutes into statuta favorabilia and statuta 
odiosa.”55 There, he sought to reduce the scope of statutes derogating from the ius 
commune; an aim shared with the original gloss on cunctos populos in its bid to 
protect the Bolognese from the statutes of Modena.56  
In Bohier’s case, he made attempts to provide robust definitions of statute and 
custom and in turn, categorise their role and application to the facts of this consilium. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Bartolus de Saxoferrato, Commentaria in primam digesti veteris partem, (Lyon, 1525).  
52 N. Hatzimihail, “Bartolus and the conflict of laws”, (2007) 60 Revue hellénique de droit 
international 63.  
53 C. Woolf, Bartolo of Sassoferrato: 1313-1357, (Cambridge, U.K., 1913), p. 198.  
54 Not only similar to Bartolus’ approach, but also that of Baldus’; where he sees the ius commune as a 
supplementary source for the provisions of local customs and statutes. Joseph Canning has referred to it 
as providing a suitable standard of law for their interpretation. See Canning, (n. 32), p. 149. Further, 
see Canning, Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages: 1296-1417, (2011), p. 147.  
55 Hatzimihail, (n. 52), at 70.  
56 Ibid.  
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His aim to restrict their application meant that the value of the ius commune was laid 
bare. The meaning of the term ius commune ultimately rests in its relationship with 
other sources, and in this sense then, this part of consilium 8 ought to be held in high 
regard.  
Bohier’s handling of the competing sources of law in his consilium, and 
others, bears certain similarities to that of the Italian predecessors. Their similarity 
rests in both jurists’ writing structure. Before putting forward his own position on the 
matter at hand, Bohier summarises the views of others on the topic in pursuit of 
comprehensiveness.57 He makes reference to sources not only immediately containing 
specific support to the point he is trying to prove, but also that he is using it to 
distinguish issues and offer the parameters of the topic he is discussing. This “art of 
typology” is recognised in Bartolus’ writing.58 Although the very nature of the 
Consilia meant that lines of argument and style were more restricted in terms of 
length, and so we are not offered anywhere near as much as in the case of Bartolus’ 
own writings, Bohier still succeeds in offering the enquirer a comprehensive 
background to the topic, being sure to account for divergent legal opinions.  
 
3.2.5 Introduction through court decisions 
 
In cons. 8, para 4, Bohier continues the case by asking whether stylus and 
custom could be introduced through court decisions.59 He starts this next part of the 
argument recognising that there is divergent opinion on this matter:60  
 
secus videtur in arbitr[i]o, per cuius 
sententias et acta iudiciaria non 
introducatur consuetudo aut stylus… 
 
but it appears different in the judgment 
according to which court decisions and 
judicial acts do not introduce consuetudo 
or stylus… 
Et in hoc different, quoniam stylus ex 
actibus iudicariis solum introducitur…  
Et consuetudo tam ex actibus iudicariis, 
quam extra iudiciariis interveniente 
populi consensus, et sic est usus 
communis, et stylus est usus unius 
And they differ in this respect, since 
stylus can only be introduced through 
judicial acts… whereas consuetudo can 
be introduced both through judicial acts 
and through extra judicial acts as a result 
of the consent of the people, and thus it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This approach is present throughout the consilia. More specifically, in this particular consilium, it is 
notable also at Cons. 8, paras 4-5. 
58 Hatzimihail, (n. 52), at 63.  
59 Cons. 8, para 3. Translation by Du Plessis, (n. 12), at 384. 
60 Citing Baldus’ De Feudalis and his commentary on the Digest, on D.1.3.32.  
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hominis… 
 
common usage while stylus is the usage 
of a single man… 
 
Here, Bohier cites X.5.40.25, as well as Baldus,61 Antonius de Butrio62 and 
Jason de Mayno.63 Bohier referred back to an earlier statement that claimed stylus and 
consuetudo could be introduced through judicial acts (the latter also through extra-
judicial acts).64 On this particular point he had cited Bartolus and his commentary on 
lex de quibus.65 Here, he acted with purpose. A similar pattern of behaviour has been 
recognised in Baldus’ Consilia.66 It is an example of the medieval “sic et non” 
approach, taken from Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) work on dialectical method of 
reflection: “in the heyday of medieval universities, a favourite teaching method was 
the disputation... Abelard's Sic et Non is the ancestor of these medieval 
disputations.”67 The placing of opposing and contrasting statements side by side is 
something Bohier does regularly and is evidence of the continued adoption of this 
medieval method.  
It was in a jurist’s best interests to criticise an opposing view to the one they 
endorsed: it gave them an opportunity to pre-emptively attack it and eliminated the 
risk of another undermining them with this argument and his authority being called 
into question.68 It also suggests Bohier’s intention to present an accurate survey of the 
legal landscape within his consilium, keen to demonstrate not only his view, but also a 
range of views.  
For Bohier, it seems that the main reason for reducing court decisions to 
writing is to provide instruction for a judge and that it is possible for such judgments 
to lay to rest stylus and consuetudo.69 This also reveals Bohier’s concern with consent, 
and how it informs his understanding of consuetudo. The value of this is threefold. 
First, Bohier has made a powerful statement as to the power of the court decisions in 
sixteenth-century France; namely that they can determine stylus and custom, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Citing Baldus’ De Feudalis and his commentary on the Digest, on D.1.3.32.  
62 This citation might also be referring to Baldus’ mention of Antonio de Butrio (Antonius de Butrio),  
Super prima parte primi decretalium commentarii, (Venice, 1578) through Baldus’ commentary on 
D.1.3.32.  
63 Jason de Mayno, In primam Digesti novum partem commentaria, (Venice, 1568).  
64 Cons. 8, para 3.  
65 Ibid, para 3.  
66 J. Pluss, “Reading case law historically: a consilium of Baldus de Ubaldis on widows and dowries”, 
(1986) 30 The American Journal of Legal History 241.  
67 A. Kenny, A new history of Western philosophy, (Oxford, 2010), p. 47.   
68 Ibid, at 256.  
69 Cons. 8, para 4-5. See Du Plessis, (n. 12), at 384.  
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as offer instruction to a judge. Secondly, his reasoning offers an insight into how he 
dealt with competing juristic opinion, including Canonic and civilian; suggesting that 
he approached the sources, for the purposes of his consilia, in an effort to provide the 
complete picture, and not only that which supported his own view. Finally, it is a 
statement on the general instruction between legal doctrine and case law that goes 
beyond the specifics of this lawsuit. His concluding statement on this matter shows 
that he cited Angelus de Aretinus and Jason de Mayno again, although relied on 
different works.70  
 
3.2.6 Conflict and competing sources: stylus, custom and ius 
commune 
 
Towards the end of the consilium, at paras. 18-20, we see the very essence of 
Bohier’s argument. The rest of the consilium has been to set out the position regarding 
stylus and consuetudo and the role of the two in legal practice and procedure. Here, 
Bohier shows the product of this study, and the relationship between the competing 
sources of law is revealed:  
 
[1] Exemplum, lege cautum est, quod in 
causis iudicialibus non producatur 
libellus in scriptis, nisi in causis 
summariis et brevoribus. Et non reperitur 
expresse determinatum, quae sint causae 
breviores, nisi secundum quod iudex 
arbitrare fuerit, modo in curia iudicis est 
stylus quod in causis 20 solidarum non 
detur libellus in scriptis, certe hic stylus 
curiae est in posterum servandus, quia 
non est contra legem, sed tendit ad 
declarandum. Secus ubi esset contra 
legem, quia magistratus et iudices 
deputati ad ius reddendum, non habent 
potestatem derogandi legi, seu condendi 
statutum contra ius commune… 
[1] For example, it is stated by law that in 
legal proceedings a written petition is not 
to be produced unless in summary or 
shorter cases. What counts as shorter 
cases is not found to be expressly 
determined, unless in accordance with 
what a judge has decided, namely that in 
the court of the judge the stylus is that in 
cases to the value of 20 solidi a written 
petition will not be given, then certainly 
this stylus of the court should be observed 
in future, since it is not contrary to the 
law, since a magistrate and judges are 
deputed to provide the law and they do 
not have the power to derogate from the 
law or to claim that a statute is contrary 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Angelus de Aretinus, In quattuor Institutionem Iustiniani libros commentaria, (1532, Lyon); Jason 
de Mayno, De actionibus titulus Institutionum Iustiniani tertiam iuris ciuilis, (Venice, 1574). 
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[2] Et non possunt inducere per stylum 
aliquid contra ius commune…  
 
[2] And they cannot introduce by way of 




[3] Et sic in hoc videtur differentia inter 
consuetudinem et stylum, quia 
consuetudo potest esse contraria iuri 
communi… 
 
[3] And thus it appears that in this respect 
there is a distinction between consuetudo 
and stylus since custom can be contrary 
to the ius commune… 
 
Bohier makes a direct reference to the Codex here: C.1.26.2 (a. 235).  
Essentially, C.1.26.2 attests to the qualified authority of the praetorian praefect, 
whose rules and regulations could not be contrary to the law. The value of this 
citation is twofold. First, it offers an insight into the way in which Bohier interacted 
with his sources. It is not clear yet whether this reference was taken from a juristic 
commentary, but, without such a citation, we can assume that he was seeing this 
reference to the Codex as directly relevant to his argument; namely that a magistrate  
or a judge cannot derogate from the law or to claim that statute is contrary to the ius 
commune. The point he was making was an important one, and it is notable that his 
reference was to the Roman provision. Secondly, it is interesting as it offers an insight 
into how Bohier views the magistrate and the judge in the sixteenth-century 
parlement.   
 In a sense, this citation’s authority rests on the ability of Bohier, and the 
reader, to equate the Roman praetorian praefect with the French magistrate or judge, 
even in the most abstract sense. The praetorian praefect of the East was the second 
most powerful man in the East, second only to the Emperor.71 This observation can be 
linked to the greater context of sovereignty and authority in early modern France, and 
perhaps revealing of Bohier’s views on this. The praefect was considered as the 
prototype of the judge in early modern France. It could also be attributed to a need by 
Bohier to associate these individuals to provide a necessary ordering to the discussion.  
This practice of equating individuals and procedures of the Imperial Court 
with those of the then contemporary institutions were not unusual between those 
marked as belonging to both the humanist school and in terms of Scholastic practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 T. Mommsen, History of Rome under the Emperors, B. Dernandt & A. Dernandt, (eds.), (London, 
1992), [translated from the original German version, Munich, 1992], p. 339. In 1980, Dernandt 
discovered a transcript of lectures on the Roman Empire given by Mommsen in the late 1800s. The 
transcript was then edited and reconstructed. Therefore, while a nineteenth-century work, its earliest 
publication is 1992, as is listed here.  
	   86	  
However, the sources referred to in extracting this information varied according to the 
interpreter. Michael L. Monheit spoke of this in respect of Guillaume Budé, Andrea 
Alciato and Pierre de l’Estoile (1546-1611), in his comparative work on their 
relationship and interpretation of passages cited from the Corpus iuris civilis.72 He 
recognised the differences between humanist and Scholastic treatment and 
interpretation, as well as internal conflicts between the former in their approach. 
Budé, for example, displayed a disdain for the Corpus iuris civilis in his treatment of 
a passage from the Imperial jurist Ulpian (contained in D.1.16.9.1) and on the duties 
of Proconsul and Legate. Here he expended little effort on the passages of the Corpus 
iuris civilis (although he did cite them), and instead made reference mainly to sources 
that were representative of the institutional context within which Ulpian worked, 
using extra-legal sources.73 Most importantly for the purposes of understanding 
Bohier’s citation practices, it is Budé’s equation of procedures at the Imperial Court 
with those of the French royal courts.74 This method of interpretation was twofold. 
First, it was deemed to be more effective to refer to Ulpian in terms of the non-juristic 
classical sources than to work through the various uses of a particular term in the 
Corpus iuris civilis. Secondly, it furthered his own ambitions in terms of Royal 
approval and appointment to a position at Court.75  
 This is compared to his well-known humanist peer, Alciato, who, in his 
interpretation of this same passage of Ulpian’s, displayed a degree of faith in the 
medieval jurists and the Corpus iuris civilis; a more harmonious reading than 
Budé’s.76 This may well be attributable to the difference in educational background of 
the two jurists. Alciato, for example, was a jurist who had studied at Pavia, and so, as 
Monheit recognises, could not have displayed disdain for legal thought in the way in 
which Budé, who has not completed his formal legal education, did.77   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72G. Budé, Annotationes priores et posteriores, (Lyon, 1565), fol. LXIIIr, LXIIIv-LXIIIIr. See M. 
Monheit, “Guillaume Budé, Andre Alciato, Pierre de l’Estoile: renaissance interpreters of Roman law”, 
The Journal of the History of Ideas (1997) 26.  
73 Ibid, pp. 24-25. 
74 Ibid, p. 26. Budé, Annotationes fol. LXIIIr, LXIIIv-LXIIIIr.  
75 Ibid, 25-26. Budé dedicated his Annotationes to Jean de Ganay, (Chancellor of France) and was 
appointed as Master of Requests to François I in 1522. See D. McNeil, Guillaume Budé and Humanism 
in the Reign of Francis I, (1975), pp. 12-14 and 30-31.  
76 Monheit, (n. 72), p. 21. Note here that we see frequent reference to Bartolus and Accursius, despite 
his attacks on them. A common humanist approach, it seems. See D. Osler, “Humanist philology and 
the text of Justinian’s Digest”, in Du Plessis and Cairns, (n. 2), pp. 41-58.  
77 Monheit, (n. 72), p. 27.  
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 This has been mentioned here to demonstrate the existence of other equations 
made by jurists of the time between their own reality and that of the Romans. 
Whether Bohier was citing this passage from the Digest directly, or through the work 
of another, it is still notable and deserves to be mentioned in terms of understanding 
his citation practices and with regard to the greater aim of this chapter. 
 
3.2.6.1 Alexander de Imola 
 
Alexander de Imola also played a key role in this part of Bohier’s consilium. 
His Consilia, at consilium 36, is cited in support of his statement on the inability of a 
judge to introduce by way of stylus something contrary to the ius commune. However, 
reference to this volume does not offer a consilium with relevant content. Instead, it is 
believed that here Bohier was referring to the second volume of Imola’s work. Here, 
we find a consilium that expressly deals with a statute, stylus and ius commune, 
outlined at the beginning as: “statutum recipit interpretationem a iure communi”;78 
“stilus unius curie quid inducere possit”;79 and “magistratus deputati ad ius reddendi 
non habent potestatem derogandi legi vel condendi statutum contra ius commune”.80  
 It is likely that Bohier had this third part of Imola’s consilium in mind when 
citing this source. This discussion reads:  
 
Sed ubi esset contra legem quia magistratus deputati ad ius reddendum non 
habet potestatem derogandi legi seu condendi statuta contra ius commune. 
[l.formam. C. de offi. Prefec. Preto., l. omnes populi, c. de offi. arcbi.] non 
possunt ipsi magistratus per stilum inducere aliquid contra ius commune ita in 
specie declarant [Belleperche and Cinus in l. ii. In iii col. in versi iii] circa 
hoc queritur cum nos habemus [C. quae sit longa consuetudo, Antonius de 
Butrio in c. si de conseu.] pro hoc datur differentia inter consuetudine [et] 
stilum.81  
 
The similarity between this excerpt and Bohier’s own statement in his 
consilium is striking. This is true in terms of both the sources cited and the wording of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Alexander de Imola, Consilia (1537, Lyon), Cons. 36, pr. 8: statute receives interpretation through 
the iure commune.  
79 Cons. 36, pr. 11: what stilus the court can introduce. 
80 Cons. 36, pr. 12: magistrate assigned not to derogate from the law or to enforce statute against the 
ius commune. 
81 Own translation: “But where magistrate assigned not to derogate from the law or to enforce statute 
against the ius commune…the magistrates themselves are not able to do anything contrary to the ius 
commune...” The citations by Imola here demonstrate his reliance on the Codex, Pierre de Belleperche, 
Cinus de Pistoia and Antonius de Butrio.  
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the passage itself; they are in fact identical and so it is fair to assume that Bohier has 
reproduced this part of Imola’s own consilium on the matter. Bohier’s statement 
reads: “Secus ubi esset contra legem, quia magistratus et iudices deputati ad ius 
reddendum, non habent potestatem derogandi legi, seu condendi statutum contra ius 
commune”.  
Looking back to Bohier’s preceding statement on the matter of non-derogation 
from the ius commune and the inability to declare a statute contrary to it, it is clear 
that Bohier copied, almost verbatim, the wording from Imola also. This includes his 
discussion of the “causis summariis et brevoribus” and “in curia iudicis est stylus 
quod in causis 20 solidarum non detur libellus in scriptis”. So it seems this “crux of 
Bohier’s entire exposition”82, namely that from consilium 8, para 18 to 20, was based 
on Imola’s consilium.83 Of course, it is possible that Imola himself has copied this 
from another source, and so it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that it is Imola 
that Bohier has himself copied.  
Now let us turn to the citations. Immediately after this passage reproduced by 
Bohier, Imola refers to C.1.26.2 (a. 235). Reference is also made to D.1.1.9 (omnes 
populi), and D.2.2 (Quod quisque iuris in alterum statuerit, ut ipse eodem iure utatur) 
and from the Decretals, ad X.5.7.6 (de haereticis) 84  and X.1.23 (de officio 
archdiaconi). Bohier appears only to have cited, and most likely borrowed, C.1.26.2 
here in his own consilium. There is another familiar citation, however, that follows on 
from this. Imola cites Belleperche and Cinus, and their commentary on C.8.52 (quae 
sit longa consuetudo).85 We know that Bohier has relied considerably upon this 
commentary in his consilia, and he cites it again at this part of it. Bohier’s citation is 
abbreviated and so appears different from Imola’s. It is likely, however, that Bohier 
was borrowing this citation from the latter; a proposition made all the more likely 
from his practice with other parts of Imola’s consilium.86  
It is worth mentioning some of the other sources Imola cited in this consilium, 
of which Bohier seems to have deemed so authoritative. The jurist relied considerably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Du Plessis, (n. 12), at 386.  
83 This part of Bohier’s consilium dealt with the method of proving stylus: “consuetudo probari debet 
per turbam, in Francia”. Conventionally, a turba was made up of ten men. See the Glossa Ordinaria, 
at D.47.10.7.5: “Turba. quae sit ex decem". Cited in E. Kadens, "The myth of the customary law 
merchant", (2012) 90 Texas Law Review 1153 at 1186, n. 115.    
84 J. Hogan discusses this in his Judicial advocates and procurators: an historical synopsis & 
commentary, (Washington, D.C., 1941), pp. 38.  
85 “Pe. & Cy. in l.ii.in iiii. col. iii”. 
86 Consilia (1537, Lyon).  
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on Antonius de Butrio (1338-1408). The particular parts reproduced by Bohier did not 
miss out any of the citations to individuals (although some parts of the Digest and 
Decretal references were not reproduced) and so no conclusions can be drawn here as 
to whether Bohier did not agree with Imola’s choice of juristic sources, but although 
he does himself cite Antonius de Butrio, he is not a dominant authority.87 However, 
his reproduction of Imola’s text and his sources demonstrates that he deemed the 
jurist authoritative enough for this key part of his consilium, and did not feel it 
important to pay homage to the greater sense of Imola’s argument or his citation 
practices, and reproduced it without editing. It seems that Imola was enough. Of 
course, the very nature of the consilia as a source does limit the opportunity for such 
things, and cannot be read in the same way as a commentary can, for example.  
Is it possible that legal practice altered the way in which an individual used a 
juristic source; and was one rooted more in necessity, brevity and pragmatism than to 
any emotive standpoint? In this particular part of his consilium, it is fair to assume 
that he only directly consulted the consilia of Imola and Decio, and not necessarily to 
the sources cited therein. Of course, this is not true for the rest of his consilium. Yet, it 
is worthy of mention here, given that he is outlining his general position at this point 
and even knowingly selecting sources that he feels are most capable of demonstrating 
his position in an authoritative sense. Moreover, it is possible that those who would 
refer to Bohier’s consilia, in an effort to identify the crux of his argument, would look 
to this end stage of discussion.  
 
3.2.6.2 Filippo Decio 
 
 Bohier cites Filippo Decio’s (1454-1535) Consilia 88  in conjunction with 
Belleperche and Cinus. His citation does not include reference to a specific part of 
this consilium, but a survey of its contents demonstrates that this source held much for 
him.89 Let us first consider the issue at hand, namely that a judge may not introduce 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Antonius de Butrio was cited in those parts of Imola’s consilium that I suspect were most relevant to 
Bohier. They were cited at para 8 and para 11 by Imola, so whilst not from para 12, which was 
reproduced by Bohier, they were mentioned in parts that Bohier was likely to have looked at given 
their content. Of course, the usual caveat about movable text applies: we cannot know that Bohier 
referred to this edition.  
88 Philippus Decius, Consilia elegantissima d. Philippi Decii sive de Decio iuris utriusque interpretis 
clarissimi nuperrime impressioni tradita cum apostillis, (Venice, 1523).  
89 Decio, Cons. 11, para 17. 
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by way of stylus something contrary to the ius commune. There does not seem to be 
specific mention of the role of a judge or magistrate90 and so no direct treatment like 
we saw in the case of Imola (although this was, as it was shown, copied from there). 
Instead, there are a number of different parts to this consilium that could have been 
used by Bohier in a general sense. Some of these provisions shall be considered, and 
although not all of them can be classed as strictly related to the specific part of 
Bohier’s consilium under discussion, they are nonetheless important to the overall 
understanding of the role of the ius commune, and to the mind-set of the jurist that 
Bohier has deemed authoritative.  
At the beginning of his consilium, Decio addresses the issue of “statutum quod 
non possit probari per testes, valet”.91 The discussion focuses around the Statuta 
Mediolani, and although it is unlikely that Bohier relied specifically on this part of the 
work, it is worth mentioning here for a statement made on the ius commune. On the 
question of interpreting statutes, Decio makes this point:  
 
…quia verba statuti debent intelligi, & interpretari secundum quod alia 
statuta loquuntur… ideo potius statutum ab alio statuto recipit 
interpretationem, quam a iure communi.92  
 
The final part of this excerpt is the most important. Decio seems to state that 
statutory interpretation, on this occasion, is done by reference to another statute rather 
than from the ius commune. Of course, this does not strictly mean that such an 
interpretation can be contrary to the ius commune, and indeed this would be contrary 
to a later statement by Decio in this consilium that shall be examined shortly.93 
Rather, it offers an insight into the interpretation practices of the time and the way in 
which the ius commune interacted with these other sources of law; moreover, how 
individuals would use these sources, and how this sometimes led to creative 
interpretative practices. Finally, it shows how one of the roles of the ius commune, as 
a so-called interpretative guide, would not always benefit from primacy, even to 
statute. Alexander de Imola is cited here, by Decio, with reference to his consiilium 
36; a citation shared by Bohier.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The role of the judge is only briefly discussed at cons. 11, para 2.  
91 Decio, Cons. 11, para 2. 
92 Ibid. Translation: because the words of the statute ought to be understood according to what the other 
statutes say, therefore a statute is to be interpreted more after another statute than the ius commune.  
93 Cons. 11, para 17. 
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Decio’s treatment of “statuta quod contra iura scripta, non possit allegari 
consuetudo, qualiter intelligendum” offers a valuable insight into the way in which 
Decio viewed statute and consuetudo. He states: “Confirmatur hoc, quia statutum 
loquitur de consuetudine, unde cum sit contra ius commune, debet intelligi de 
consuetudine propria, quae debet esse praescripta [c.fi.de consue.] in ista in 
consutudine interpretativa, in qua interpretatio non requirit”. 94  Essentially, this 
passage seems to state that since the statute in question speaks of the custom, and that 
its content is contrary to the ius commune, it ought to be understood according to 
custom itself. This creative method of interpretation demonstrates the value of custom 
and the ways in which such approaches to sources of law at this time could overcome 
the authority of the ius commune. It should be stressed that this seems to have been 
only in those cases where a statute’s provisions could be traced to a customary rule, 
but it is nonetheless an undermining of the authority of the ius commune.  
Decio deals with the issue of: “Statutum derogans iuri commune, debet 
quantum potest reduci ad ius commune”:95 discussing when a statute derogates from 
the ius commune and how it ought to be reduced insomuch as possible so as to be in 
line with the ius commune. Under this heading, Decio states:  
 
“Cum statutum deroget iuri communi, 
debet quantum potest reduci ad terminos 
iuris communis.” 
 
When statute derogates from the ius 
commune, it should be reduced as much 
as possible to [be in line with] the ius 
commune.” 
 
This particular point is most relevant to the first part of Bohier’s statement on 
the inability of a judge to declare a statute contrary to the ius commune, as considered 
earlier. Although this is not the point which Bohier is addressing, it is nonetheless 
worthy of note. It provided a clear statement for this first part of his argument, and so 
he either deemed it unnecessary to cite specifically in relation to the first point (where 
he only cited C.1.26.2 and relied wholly on Imola) or this reference to Decio’s 
consilium XI here is to be taken as authority for all matters under consideration, in 
this part of Bohier’s consilium.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Translation: This is confirmed by the fact that the statute refers to custom so when it is contrary to 
the ius commune it must be understood as referring to this specific custom, which ought to be provided 
for...[&] which does not require interpretation. 
95 Cons. 11, pr. 17. The earliest edition held by the Library of Congress is a 1523 edition (Venice) and 
this has been used here.  
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3.2.6.3 Decio on stylus and consuetudo  
 
Decio deals with the matter of stylus under the headings “Stylus & consuetudo 
quomodo differant”,96 and “Stylus pro forma habetur”.97 The second of these largely 
focuses on the problems arising from additions to a stylus that appear inconsistent 
with the rest of its content; it is more a consideration of the stylus and its associated 
problems of form and content. The first, however, discusses the ius commune, and it 
is used as a distinguishing feature between stylus and custom; the relationship of each 
to the ius commune differs. Decio’s choice of citations should be considered. Here, he 
cites Antonius de Butrio, Baldus, Bartolus, Angelus de Aretinus, Albericus de Rosate 
(1290-1360) and Alexander de Imola and his consilia.98 These are individuals who are 
seen throughout Bohier’s consilium.  
It seems that Bohier’s reference to Decio here was made for his general 
position on statutes, stylus and custom, and their relationship with the ius commune. It 
is not known whether Bohier referred directly to Decio’s consilia, but it is clear that 
the source offered much to his consilium beyond that to which it was specifically 
referred. Given the very nature of the consilia and its inherent restrictions in 
providing room for facts and indeed citations beyond that which was strictly needed 
for the case at hand, it may well have been that Bohier’s reference to Decio at this 
stage of his consilium was in fuller recognition of his relevance overall, especially as 
this point of the discussion was a general statement on the relationship between 
competing sources of law that had formed the basis of Bohier’s argument.  
This case arose as a matter of appeal because of an individual being 
condemned in expenses contrary to the stylus of the court. Therefore, the central 
debate and decision was predicated on the treatment of stylus. However, it is the 
relationship between different sources of law, in their conflict or cooperation, that we 
see the nature, role and limits of a source, and a true definition as a product. In the 
case of each stylus, custom, statute and ius commune, this was made clear in this 
consilium. It shows that a judge could not introduce something by way of stylus 
(which was equated with statute), something that was contrary to the ius commune. 
Even if much of the debate in the consilium was dedicated to stylus, this statement is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Decio, Cons.11, pr.11.  
97 Ibid, pr.16.  
98 Decio, Cons. 26 is cited.  
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important to the overall decision reached. The findings on the ius commune were not 
the central part of the ratio decidendi for this case, but Bohier’s statements on the 
matter are revealing in that they demonstrate how the ius commune has a certain role 
and place in the relationship with statute (stylus here) and custom.  
 
4. Cons. 26: Canon law and dispensations 
 
 
The Church and its customs and practices99 feature prominently in Bohier’s 
Consilia. Consilium 8, directly above, is a particular example of this, and consilium 
26 continues this trend, where it considers the issue of the minimum age of 
subdeacons.  
The main legal issue is the question of allowing dispensations in the case of 
subdeacons, with specific reference to the age of their appointment. Specifically, here 
Bohier considers the case where the Pope had first given beneficium curatum to a boy 
aged twelve years old, and now aged eighteen, the same boy wishes to be promoted to 
the subdiaconate despite being under twenty-five. According to the casus set out by 
Bohier, the ius commune provides that only those aged twenty-five can apply for such 
a position. The main query here is therefore whether a papal dispensation ought to be 
considered as generally applying to all such cases, or whether it is a specific condition 
to the case before the court in this instance. Bohier is effectively asking whether this 
creates a precedent.  
Earlier in the consilium, Bohier considers the notion of “dispensationes sunt 
stricti iuris”, and therein looks at the nature of dispensations more generally.100 Other 
points of interest range from the occasions where a monk may be absent from a 
monastery,101 through to more general statements on the nature of the law and its 
relation with the Church’s right of dispensation.102  
Most importantly, consilium 26 considers the matter of competing sources of 
authority, and specifically the relationship between canonical procedures and the ius 
commune. Since this case is, for the most part, concerned with a very specific set of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 On the complex history of the Church and its relation to law of this period, see R. Helmholz, The 
spirit of classical canon law, (Athens, G.A., 2000), and further K. Pennington, The prince and the law, 
1200-1600: sovereignty and rights in the western legal tradition, (Oxford, 1993).  
100 Cons. 26, para 7.  
101 Ibid, para 19.  
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canon law of the Church itself, the place of the ius commune in this context is 
noteworthy. There is one reference to the ius commune in consilium 26:  
 
simpliciter in dicta aetate xviii annorii ad 
subdiaconatum se facere promoveri intra 
annum: sed solum in dispensatis favore 
studii, & sic non facit ius commune in 
aliis… 
 
simply, at the stated age of eighteen years 
he can be promoted to the subdiaconate 
within that year: but the dispensation is 
only for the purpose of study, and does 
not make the ius commune in other cases 
 
Bohier’s account of the law on this matter is focused and suggests a strict 
application of the ius commune in the case of dispensations by the Church for the 
purpose of promotion to the subdiaconate at the age of eighteen years.103  
His statement: “sic non facit ius commune in aliis” is important. Here, it 
appears that the ius commune can be created in some way, by the Pope. Although 
Bohier provides that this does not happen in this case, it is nonetheless revealing of its 
nature and potential in other cases. It suggests a living law of sorts in the case of 
canon law; perhaps an equivalence of the two forms. Since the Canon law is the 
“common law” of the church, it is possible that the term ius commune is being used 
here so as to represent the canon law generally, which can be made and amended by 
the Pope. The idea of a precedent is being ruled out here by Bohier; preventing this 
particular example being relied on for future changes.  
Perhaps this is a case where “sic non facit ius commune in aliis” is simply 
another way of saying that “this dispensation” does not apply to other cases. No 
specific rule of the ius commune is cited here, and so it is not possible to identify 
which authority Bohier rests his statement on, and ultimately what he has in mind 
when using the term. In the absence of this, it is helpful to consider the role of the 
Church dispensation and its relationship with the ius commune in a more general 
sense.  
 
4.1 Defining dispensations 
 
The power of an ecclesiastical dispensation has been referred to as “a fairly 
limited legal device in that its focus was very specific.”104 This is probably from the 
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perspective of the beneficiary, and depended on the context of the dispensation, rather 
than an accurate statement of its juridical nature and authority. The complex orders of 
the Catholic Church meant that only certain individuals were vested with the power to 
grant dispensations, and the power lay, at the lowest level, with the Bishop.105 A 
Bishop was bound to obey a strict set of rules when exercising his legislative 
prerogative. He could not legislate contra ius commune; a rule vested in the principle 
that an inferior cannot act contrary to his superiors. He could, however, enact laws 
that are juxta ius commune and so can permit or forbid that which the ius commune 
neither permits nor forbids. It is also held that a Bishop had the power to enact laws 
praeter ius commune: effectively for those points on which the ius commune is silent 
and could not have foreseen.  
Bohier puts forward a series of arguments that clearly reveal the diagnostic 
quality of this consilium. It is evocative of the approach to the case that was discussed 
in consilium 8. Bohier dedicated a significant part of that to defining and 
distinguishing terms and sources of law, and this is replicated here where the focus is 
on establishing what a dispensation is and identifying its inherent characteristics. The 
main arguments demonstrating this reasoning will now be considered. 
In terms of defining the general or special quality of a dispensation, Bohier 
sets out how such a matter is measured in cons. 26, para 4: 
 
Lex quando possit casum specialem si 
adsignat rationem generalem, generaliter 
intelligenda est in omni casu, in quo 
potest eadem ratio reddi.  
 
The law sets out a special case, if [the 
same law] gives a general rationale [to 
that special case], [the law] is usually to 
be understood [as applicable] to any case, 
in which it is possible to retrieve the same 
rationale. 
 
Here, Bohier deals with the central question posed by this consilium: when 
does a dispensation become general in its application? He provides that the law, or a 
rule, is specific in nature but that a dispensation ought to be considered to have 
general validity when it appears to have characteristics that suggest it was issued with 
such an application in mind. Reference is made to a number of sources in support of 
this, including Bartolus, the Digest, Joannes Andreae (d.1348) and Philippus de 
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218. See also Helmholz, (n. 96), p. 349.  
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Franchis (d.1471). Bohier refers to the dispensation as “stricti iuris” at cons. 26, para 
7. On this point, Bohier makes reference to a number of works, including the Liber 
Sextus VI.1.11 and Decretals X.4.14.  
Shortly after, 106  Bohier states that dispensations are simply and strictly 
understood: “Dispensationes simpliciter & stricte accipienda sunt”. He continues this 
attempt to establish the perimeters of dispensations,107 where he states: “Causa 
limitata limitatum producit effectum”. The idea that a limited cause produces a limited 
effect is an important one in the overall question of this consilium. Here, Bohier is 
reiterating the same basic sentiment seen earlier; namely that a dispensation’s purpose 
and application are limited to that extent where the purpose of its issue is met. In one 
of his concluding statements, Bohier states:108  
 
Legis ratio ubicunque cessat, cessat & 
ipsa lex, nisi remaneret causa finalis. 
 
No matter where reason of the law 
ceases, the law itself ceases, unless it 
would remain the final cause. 
 
This is a well-known regula: “cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex”. It is 
likely that here Bohier is referring to the nature of a dispensation. He explains that it 
will not only exist to the extent that is needed: that the reason for granting the 
dispensation is still relevant and presumably the recipient is of the same class and 
circumstance as he was when it was originally issued. On this matter, reference is 
made to the relationship between different sources of law:  
 
Pet. de Anar. in [d. consilio ccclxiii.] 
quam dicit procedere quando inhabilitas 
causatur a iure communi, secus si a 
consuetudine, vel statuto… 
And Petrus de Ancharano narrows this 
common opinion in consilium 363 when 
he says that it applies when the inability 
derives from the ius commune but 
differently if from custom or statute… 
 
 
4.2 Distinguishing ius commune from custom and statute 
 
Depending on the manner of interpretation, namely the use of term “secus”, 
Bohier may be distinguishing ius commune from custom and statute. He refers to 
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Petrus Ancharano’s (1333-1416) Consilia.109 Here, Petrus de Ancharano cites Joannes 
Andreae, with both Bohier and Ancharano making reference to the Liber Sextus 
VI.1.2.1 as authority for their statement. If Bohier is distinguishing ius commune from 
statute and custom, this is notable. In consilium 26, para 17, Bohier’s explicit 
reference to the term ius commune shows its treatment has a distinguishable quality, 
albeit without accompanying citations. Similarly, in the current argument, we see that 
a reference to the term ius commune is perceived differently from other sources of 
law, and so is in line with Bohier’s earlier treatment.  
It seems that the decision is made against the holder of the dispensation, by 
ordering for the payment of a fine of “quinquaginta ducatis”.110 The role of the ius 
commune in this case is an important one. In establishing the extent and quality of the 
dispensation, Bohier needed to account for its nature and the relationship between it 
and other sources of law. At cons. 26, para 17, it is possible to interpret Bohier’s 
argument as an equation of canon law with ius commune. Later, the reference to the 
ius commune being distinguished from custom and statute is significant; a meaning 
expressed in consilium 8 also. It is not possible to establish the extent to which the ius 
commune itself determined the outcome of the case. The crux of the argument seemed 
to rest with the terms and conditions of the content of the dispensation itself, which 
was most fully summarised in cons. 26, para 21 above. The value of the ius commune 
in this case then depends on the interpretation of the term at cons. 26, para 17 and the 
possible equation with canon law generally.  
Unlike consilium 8, where a range of authorities were cited in support of 
Bohier’s arguments related to the mention of the term ius commune, no citations 
accompany this statement. It could follow, therefore, that the ius commune is being 
mentioned in a general sense; Bohier’s reference to it being an indication that the term 
had a looser meaning than that which was expressed in consilium 8, for example. The 
citation practices of Bohier are revealing of his legal thought and also his definition of 
the ius commune. The absence of citations here means it is unclear what guided his 
treatment of it in this instance. Instead, the value of this consilium rests in the role of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Reference to this work shows his citation to be erroneous. The passage he mentions is actually to be 
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given that texts were moveable, it is possible that the edition looked at by Bohier, if he consulted it, 
was a different one to those examined here.  
110 Cons. 26, para 22.  
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the ius commune played in reaching his decision. In the case of consilium 26, it 
appears to have played a central part in his decision-making.  
 
4.3 The Canon law and the ius commune  
 
Half of those cases in the Consilia that mention the term ius commune deal 
with Canon law issues. Bohier’s role as editor was considered earlier in this thesis,111 
and there it was revealed that the majority of those works he edited were of a Canon 
law nature; examples included Joannes Andreae’s Mercuriales domini (Lyon, 1510), 
Dynus de Mugello’s Commentarius mirabilis super titulo de regulis iuris (Lyon, 
1530) and Juan de Torquemada’s (1388-1468) Commentaria reverendi in Christo 
Petris (Lyon, 1519). Bohier was clearly interested in the Canon law and deemed it 
worthy of editing and of contemporary commentary. In this respect, we saw his 
professional interest in works that are more typically associated with the publishing 
pursuits of the university jurist, than the practitioner. There, those works edited by 
Bohier were examined so as to demonstrate his intellectual affiliations, or at the very 
least, his interests. These works were for the most part published within his lifetime 
and so his involvement in their compilation and release is certain.  
Were these works published so as to better reflect those cases he considered in 
his Consilia and Decisiones? Or, were they instead an indication of what he deemed 
to be important works in their own right? Given that the compilation of the Consilia 
and Decisiones were posthumous efforts, the selection of those cases used would have 
been outwith Bohier’s hands. 112  Either way, the Consilia, specifically here at 
consilium 26 and previously in consilium 8, has demonstrated that the Canon law was 
clearly important to Bohier as a practitioner, which is to be expected, and the fact that 
canon law cases represent half of those dealing with the ius commune in this source, 
mean that these cases cannot be excused as anomalies or exceptional. While the 
Canon law was such an important force in legal practice, those cases that dealt with 
matters pertaining to the church (whose power had a broad remit),113 had a central 
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113 On the particular history of Bordeaux religious orders and the prominence of the church see G. 
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role generally and so the appearance of the ius commune, which had a strong stance in 
those of consilium 8 and 26, is of considerable importance.  
 
 
5. Cons. 40: Marriage contract 
 
 
Bohier considers a matter of appeal relating to a decision made by Judges de 
Brollio and Gentilis who absolved Guichard de Thou from the petition made by Anne 
de Ganay, deciding against her in the first instance. From later discussions therein, it 
is made apparent that the case considers alleged adultery, on the part of Guichard de 
Thou, and its implications for the marriage contract between the couple.  
It is worth noting that Bohier would have been familiar with the family of 
Anne de Ganay, through her brother Jean de Ganay, First President of the Paris 
parlement and later Chancellor of France.114 He presided over the Grand Conseil du 
Roi, and personally appointed Bohier to the role of conseiller in 1508.115 Bohier’s 
Consuetudines Biturigium was dedicated to the Chancellor and was issued privilege at 
Lyon in June 1509.116 The extent to which this will have had an influence on Bohier’s 
reasoning is difficult to say. It is possible that Bohier’s judgment was requested on 
this issue because of his relationship to Anne de Ganay. However, with Jean de 
Ganay’s death in 1512, and no certain date for the composition of the Consilia (only 
posthumous publication dates are known), this cannot be stated with any certainty.  
This case is a complex one. It appears to consider an annulment or divorce on 
the grounds of the husband’s adultery but the specific details are difficult to establish. 
There are 134 points considered by Bohier, the majority of which deal with the 
formalities of marriage, including the rules surrounding its formation, in particular the 
provision of witnesses; as well as considering the defining qualities of the marital 
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union. An example of this can be seen where Bohier poses the question: 
“matrimonium quid”.117 He states:118  
 
quod matrimonium est maris & foeminae 
coniunctio, ut institutio… et ideo dicitur 
maris & foeminae in singularii, & non 
marium & foeminarum in plurali: quia 
unus masculus plures foeminas, nec 
econtra… 
 
that the union of marriage is a male and 
female, as is the institution… and 
therefore it is said in the singular as male 
and female, and not male female, in the 




Bohier states that the contractual formation of marriage is made when there is 
consensus by words and by facts – which could be taken to mean, an awareness of 
circumstances. In the case of adultery, the contract is null and void.  
 
5.1 Procedural matters  
 
Reference to the term ius commune is made at cons. 40, para 125. Here, 
Bohier states: 
 
Foeminae sunt ab omnibus tam privatis, 
quam communibus officiis reiecte. 
 
Women are rejected from all private and 
public proceedings. 
 
Effectively, Bohier considers the rule that women are unable to bring 
proceedings to a court. The treatment of this issue in the body of the consilium reads: 
 
quia est contra ius commune, quod 
presumitur contra allegantem: cum 
foeminae sint ab omnibus tam privatis, 
quam communibus officiis remotae. 
 
because it is against the ius commune, 
that it is a presumption against those who 
argue: with women all such private and 
public proceedings are removed. 
 
The position of cons. 40.125, sitting between a much larger discussion about 
witnesses and procedure, is noteworthy. The point containing a reference to the ius 
commune is not a stand-alone statement, but rather something more passive and 
rudimentary.  
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It is contended that the value of this reference to the ius commune for the 
purpose of understanding how it was understood at the time, rests in the citations used 
by Bohier. The substantive content does not seem to have the same quality as earlier 
uses in the Consilia do; namely that of an intermediary between competing sources. 
Bohier refers to Albericus de Rosate’s (1290-1354) commentary on de regulis iuris 
(D.50.17) and also to “l.foeminae” (D.50.17.2). When Bohier refers to the ius 
commune here, he therefore has a commentator and the Digest in mind. The decision 
is made in favour of the pursuer in this appeal case, Anne de Ganay. 
The extent to which the ius commune had a decisive role is difficult to 
estimate. Given that it is mentioned on one occasion out of a case with some 134 
points of contention, it is unlikely that it was the prominent part in the reasoning and 
decision-making process conducted by Bohier. There does not appear to be any real 
focus on the ius commune in a substantive sense here, and Bohier does not refer to it 
again in his concluding remarks. It seems reasonable to speculate that where there is 
no conflict between sources, the value of the ius commune’s role in decision making 
is less obvious. This appears to be one of those cases.  
 
6. Cons. 46: Usufruct  
 
Bohier considers the issue of usufruct, with a focus on the question of 
hereditary rights between a mother and father and the effect of iuramento and pactum. 
The initial issue, and the underlying one in this consilium reads: “Pactum de non 
succedendo patri & matri, interveniente iuramento.”119 In short, Bohier is establishing 
the legitimacy of a pactum de non succedendo (a waiver of succession) between a 
wife and husband was affected by an intervening oath; an agreement to forfeit one’s 
entitlement to an inheritance claim, for example. He states that it dies with the mother 
and father, in this instance, despite any intervening oath to the contrary.  
Bohier introduces the case by saying: “haec quaestio non videtur esse sine 
dubio”, and from the outset, it is made clear that this topic is a complex one. Of the 
ten arguments made by Bohier, two of them relate to the ius commune. Each reference 
to the term is important and underlies a crucial part of the case. Before its appearance, 
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however, there is another point made that deserves attention here. In considering both 
the role of custom, statute and the validity of pactum, Bohier states:  
 
etiam si esset consuetudo approbans tale 
pactum, quia ubi aliquid prohibetur fieri 
per pactum, quia contra bonos mores, ibi 
nihil potest consuetudo, aut statutum… 
 
even if it were the custom of approving 
such a pactum, because it is contrary to 
good morals, there can be no custom, or 
statute… 
 
The custom referred to is the practice of upholding the value of pactum. The 
circumstances of the case, however, mean that to do so would be contra bonos mores 
and so custom is not to be upheld in this instance. Bohier considered the nature of 
custom as a source of law earlier, at consilium 8. There, he saw its defining quality 
resting in its introduction through tacit consent and frequent use of the people.120 That 
custom’s validity is dependent on something other than this stands to qualify its 
authority further. The weight of this statement, and its implications for the role of the 
ius commune in this case, are only fully realised later. What is immediately clear, 
however, is that the authority of custom is qualified here.  
 
6.1 Customary law 
 
The customary law referred to is “Bituricensis consuetudo”. Bohier’s authority 
on this particular set of customs would have been unparalleled at this time, his work, 
Coutumes Biturigium was first published in 1508.121 Bohier’s statement on custom in 
this consilium can therefore be taken as highly authoritative, and in this sense, then 
his consideration of the ius commune in relation to customary law, equally so. Three 
references to the ius commune are made.122 The first mention of the ius commune is 
found in the introduction to the consilium:  
 
Consuetudo ita accipienda est, ut quam 
minimum laedatur ius commune. 
Custom should have been accepted in 
such a way that it cause as little injury as 
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 possible to the ius commune. 
 
In the main body of the text, Bohier considers this point in greater detail. He 
continues with this statement that relies on the opinion of Raphael Fulgosius:123  
 
Tum, quia licet consuetudo praedicta 
debeat stricte interpretari: tamen verba 
sunt & extendenda & intelligenda, ut 
minus laedatur ius commune, quam sit 
possibile: ut voluit in simili Raphael 
[Fulgosius], in consilio XXX incip. 
 
Then, because the custom should be 
strictly interpreted, but words should be 
interpreted and understood, where 
possible, so as to cause minimal harm to 
the ius commune, as suggested by 
Raphael Fulgosius in Consilium 30. 
 
Following this statement on the relationship between the ius commune and 
custom, Bohier then looks at the place of statute and how it fits in to what 
increasingly resembles an established source hierarchy:  
 
ut ibi per eum, quia hoc modo minus 
laedatur ius commune & eandem 
doctrinam tradidit Franciscus de Curte in 
consilio septimo... 
  
this means [statute] is to cause little harm 
to the ius commune and [this is] 
according to the teaching by Franciscus 
de Curte in his consilia 7… 
 
Other discussions of the ius commune and its relationship with other sources 
of law in this Consilia employed the same reasoning: where there is friction between 
a source and the ius commune, the interpretation of the former should be made so as 
to affect the operation of the latter as little as possible.  
 
6.2 Source hierarchy 
 
In considering the relationship between the ius commune and custom, Bohier 
sets out the need for interpretation of words or terms of a customary law to occur in 
the light of the ius commune as far as possible. He qualifies this statement here with 
“quam sit possibile”. Therefore, instead of an outright endorsement of the superiority 
of the ius commune as a source, Bohier recognises that custom can be contrary to the 
ius commune but that when it is possible to interpret the customary law so that it is in 
line with the ius commune position on an issue, that this approach be adopted. This 
could be an indication that Bohier saw the ius commune as a benchmark against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Ibid, para 8.  
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which custom should be held. Presenting the relationship between the ius commune 
and custom in this way ought to be understood as a form of interpretative guidance 
issued by Bohier, so as to ensure harmony between the two sources existed wherever 
possible. This is to be distinguished from his take on statute that followed on from 
this discussion.  
 
6.3 Authorities cited 
 
In the Consilia, Bohier first considered the issue of statutes and their 
relationship with the ius commune in consilium 8. There, he relied on Alexander de 
Imola’s Consilia and his statement therein that expressed the need to interpret statutes 
according to the ius commune. This is compatible with the treatment in consilium 46 
and it is therefore possible to identify a pattern of interpretation emerging in the 
Consilia as a source. The Consilia saw six cases mention the ius commune, and 
Bohier followed this mention of interpretation in at least two instances. Unlike the 
treatment of custom, Bohier does not qualify the value of the ius commune in its 
relationship to statute. Instead, he offers what seems to be an affirmation of the 
former’s superiority as a source of law. 
Bohier cites two authorities in his discussion of the ius commune: the works of 
Raphael Fulgosius (1367-1427) and Franciscus Curtius (c.1495). Reference to 
Fulgosius’ consilium 30 confirms that it does contain a discussion concerning usufruct 
and the term ius commune is mentioned on three occasions therein.124 However, 
Fulgosius does not directly consider the matter of custom here, but instead looks at 
statute. It is possible that Bohier chose to refer to Fulgosius as an example of how to 
handle conflicting legal rules. It is also possible that this citation was borrowed and 
Bohier himself was not aware that Fulgosius was referring to statute. Bohier also cites 
Curtius’ Consilia125 as authority for his approach to statute. Reference to this source, 
however, shows that this is an erroneous citation, or indeed the result of a printing 
error. The part of the consilium relevant to his discussion is to be found at consilium 6 
instead.  
 
7. Conclusion  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Raphael Fulgosius, Consilia, (Mainz, 1521), cons. 30, para 4. 
125 Franciscus de Curte, Consilia, (Milan, 1496).  
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Bohier’s Consilia reveals the treatment of competing legal orders of statute, 
custom and the ius commune. Consilium 8 is arguably the most valuable in this 
regard, and it has therefore enjoyed centre stage in this chapter. This chapter has 
sought to analyse the approach of Bohier, a practitioner, to legal texts and how the 
reading of such sources manifested into practice. The question whether there was a 
doctrinal meaning attached to the term ius commune remains unanswered for now, but 
the following chapters on the Decisiones, and further the Consuetudines, will bring us 
closer to an answer. However, there is a sense of continuity in his legal reasoning and 
it is possible to detect a pattern of approaches to the sources of law, as well as a 
preference for particular jurists and their works. Jurists from the School of Orléans 
feature prominently, as do the works of Alexander de Imola and Filippo Decio. The 
role of Bartolus is especially important. There is a tendency by Bohier to apply the ius 
commune in an interpretative sense, relying on it as a constructive aid, to manage 
competing sources of law such as statute and custom. The very nature of the Consilia 
as a source is an example of the meeting of legal practice with academic advice. 
University training in Roman law together with the demand for legal expertise in 
practice would have implications in the wider argument related to legal humanism. 
“Legal thinking along Roman lines” was in theory promoted by the Consilia; 
however, it is likely that the overwhelming motivation for the selection of a source 
was necessity of practical application, more than any overarching consideration to the 
juristic school to which the author belonged, or the desire to demonstrate an academic 
affiliation by the practising lawyer.  
 
	  







1. The Decisiones as a source  
 
Traces of Bohier’s activity as President of the Bordeaux parlement are scarce. A 
provision in his will reveals the fate of his written decisions:   
 
Item, je veux et ordonne que tous et chacuns mes livres et Decisions par moi faites, 
soient mises en une chambre du Palais, telle que ladite Cour sera ordonne, pour le 
perpetuel service de Messieurs le Presidents et Conseillers de la Cour.1 
 
Compare this testamentary provision with Charles Dumoulin’s statement that:  
 
Multa in dictis decisionibus ad augendum librum inserta sunt, quae non sunt e 
sententia Nicolai Boerii jam senio confecti, sed allegationes juvenum.2   
 
The authenticity and provenance of the Decisiones is of fundamental importance to 
the overall approach of this thesis. The Bordeaux magistrates were quick to publish the 
Decisiones, the first being printed in Lyon in 1547, some eight years after Bohier’s death.3 
While subsequent editions continued to be published until 1690, it is clear that the proximity 
of the first publication to Bohier’s death and his testamentary provision serves to challenge 
Dumoulin’s allegation as far as it is reasonably possible to do so.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Archives départementales de la Gironde, Bordeaux, H/2. 9-11. See discussion of this in G. Guyon, “Un 
arrêtiste bordelais: Nicolas Boerius: (1469-1539)”, Le droit Bordelais dans tous ses les états, (Limoges, 2012), 
p. 133.  Own translation: “I would like to see that all my books and decisions made by me, are put in the Palace 
chamber, and the said Court hereby orders that, for the perpetual service of the gentlemen, Presidents and 
Conseillers of the Court.” The notion of perpetual service suggests Bohier believed that his books would remain 
to be of practical use.  
2 “Many things in these Decisiones have been invented to increase their volume; [they] do not come from the 
opinions of Nicolas Boyer, already well advanced in years, but are the allegations of young people”. C. 
Dumoulin, Tractatus dividui et individui, cum nova et analytica declaratione, compilatore Gasparo Baballino, 
(Venice, 1576), p. 400. See also A. Boureau, The lord’s first night: the myth of the droit cuissage, (Chicago, 
1998), p. 99.  
3 Decisiones burdegalenses… Nicolaum Boerium, eiusdem curiae praesidem, summa diligentia, collectae, atque 
tractatae, (Lyon, 1547).  
4 Guyon recognises Dumoulin’s view on the Decisiones, and argues that the work is that of Bohier, (n. 1), pp. 
134-135.  
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Dumoulin’s remark represents an attack on the practitioner. He may be referring to 
the fact that the Decisiones were only printed posthumously, after Bohier’s death in 1539, 
and so the compilation was without Bohier’s involvement. His reference to the “opinions of 
young people” implies that the quality of those cases included is below the standard expected 
from an experienced lawyer and judge.  In the privilege at the beginning of the Decisiones, it 
is stated that the editor “dresser, corriger, et mettre…par l’advuis et meure deliberation de 
gens de grand sçavoir et experience.”5 This does indicate that the editor of the work was 
assisted in its compilation.  
 However, it is also possible to interpret Dumoulin’s allegation that the work is falsely 
attributed to Bohier and that they are invented as one motivated by a desire to undermine 
those works related to law in action.6 The under-representation of the likes of Decisiones and 
Consilia in the traditional narrative of European legal history is attributable, at least in part, to 
such attitudes.   
Bohier’s Decisiones were presented in a certain (and traditional) format: each 
individual quaestio is followed by the facts of the case, with a discussion of the points of law, 
and mentioning authorities in support and pointing out those Bohier finds controversial.7 The 
authorities are succinctly cited. This standard format is where a sense of order ends, however.  
The Decisiones are not systematically grouped according to any shared topic or point of law, 
like the convention of the Digest or Institutes. They are characterised by inconsistency in 
terms of the length of each decision and also the depth of analysis.  
There are 357 decisions considered by Bohier in the book, and their themes vary.  
They have been grouped by Gerard Guyon in a conventional form as: succession (55 
decisions), law of obligations (29), procedural matters (35), property law (20), retrait 
lignager (17), evidence (14), matrimonial law (22), and those concerning penal law and penal 
procedure (50).8   
Bohier does not mention the specific reasons or grounds behind an individual decision 
in express terms. Instead, he often indicates that the court agrees with a particular common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Decisiones Burdegalenses (Lyon, 1544), "Privilege du Roy pour six ans". Translation: “[to] draw, correct, and 
put right…[the text] with the advice and deliberation of those with great knowledge and experience.” 
6 It is also worth recognising that this might have been a reflection of increased criticism of sources more 
generally rather than an attempt to undermine this specific genre of literature. A Scottish example can be seen in 
the case of Thomas Craig’s rejection of Regiam Majestatem as fake. See C. Kidd, Subverting Scotland's past: 
Scottish whig historians and the creation of an Anglo-British identity, 1689 - c.1830, (Cambridge, 1993), p. 149.  
7 G. Guyon, “Les decisionnaires Bordelais, practiciens des deux droits”, in S. Dauchy & V. Demars-Sion (eds.), 
Les recueils d'arrêts et dictionnaires de jurisprudence (XVIe-XVIIIe Siecles), (Lille, 2005), pp. 105-138 at p. 
126.   
8 Ibid, p. 127.    
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opinion of the “Doctores”. This distancing of the individual decision-maker from the 
outcome of the case further reinforces the portrayal of the judge as part of a greater 
institutional systematic application of law. It is equally possible that this represented a 
continuation of the medieval approach towards authority with a consensual underpinning; one 
rooted in the consent of the many.9 While the “Doctores” were not representatives of the 
populus, they still represented combined opinion, and consent to a particular stance, rather 
than the opinion of one individual.  
 It is worth considering whether Bohier would have been driven by a need to strike the 
right balance between unity and diversity in applying competing sources of law, or whether a 
casuistic approach to the sources prevailed. Patterns detected in this current examination of 
the Decisiones in the use of the term ius commune will serve as a starting point from which 
other comparative works could stem, and broader conclusions drawn.  
 
1.1 Legal practice and political tensions   
 
In a recent work on the “law in action” in the Low Countries, Alain Wijffels 
considered the importance of the Decisiones as a source for understanding the political 
tensions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.10 He considers the change in the later half 
of this period as representing a “structural shift in thinking”,11 where the Italian legal methods 
were eventually replaced by the usus modernus. In terms of the legal practice in the courts, he 
states, the authorities relied on were predominantly those of late-medieval and early 
sixteenth-century literature of the Italian method (mos italicus). The eventual demise of the 
mos italicus, Wijffels argues, takes place in the latter half of the sixteenth century, and thus 
after Bohier’s lifetime. It was related to increased tension between the balance of “the 
medieval legal concepts of ‘absolute’ supreme political power… and the ‘ordinary’ exercise 
of supreme political power”.12 The century between 1550 and 1650 marks a so-called “fault 
line” in European legal history, where the old tradition and new political tendencies struggled 
to co-exist in terms of the law.13 Put simply, the old political environment was represented by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Earlier in this thesis, it has been recognised that the understanding of popular consent would have been with 
reference to what Ford has called learned opinion. See J. Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland During the 
Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2007), p. 268.  
10 A. Wijffels, “Early modern consilia and decisiones in the low countries: the lost legacy of the mos italicus”, 
in P. Maffei and G. Varanini (eds.), Honos alit artes. Studi per il settantesimo compleanno di Mario Ascheri La 
formazione del diritto comune, (Florence, 2014), p. 127.  
11 Ibid, p. 127.  
12 Ibid, p. 134.  
13 Ibid, p. 127.  
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the mos italicus and a culture based on the rule of law. This was in contrast with an emerging 
absolutist power that came to mark the early modern period.14  
Wijffels contends that the concept of “utilitas publica”, commonly recognised in mos 
italicus doctrines, was regularly adopted by legal practitioners “whenever it was in their 
clients’ interest to put forward a statute, grant or decision of the prince in order to override 
the private or particular interest of their opponent.”15 Elsewhere, Wijffels has also considered 
the role of the mos italicus in legal practice, and argued that its presence is found in the 
arguments made by practitioners during legal proceedings, and in fact, dominates court 
records.16 He argues “those political developments, the impact of which can be followed in 
contemporary legal practice of the higher courts, contributed to undermine, and eventually to 
discard, direct reliance on the mos italicus learning.”17 He concedes, however that “the legacy 
of the mos italicus was not entirely lost”.18   
Bohier’s Decisiones Burdegalenses dates from the first half of the sixteenth century. 
Since Wijffels focused on the latter half of the century, this work will offer an insight into 
whether the effects of this political shift towards absolutist power that came to dominate the 
later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, could be felt earlier on in the century. 
Understanding Bohier’s citation practices will serve to establish whether he still relied 
on those sources that fell within the mos italicus tradition. Wijffels has recognised that a 
number of jurists at this time “were trying to hold a middle ground between the more radical 
agenda of legal humanism or the determinedly conservative positions of the ‘Bartolists.’”19 
The ius commune, as a symbol of the old order, has a central role in this matter. On this issue, 
specifically the interpretative technique of the ius commune in relation to the ius proprium, 
Wijffels states: “the ability to restrict an enactment of the sovereign could no longer rely 
exclusively on ius commune authorities, but had to be underpinned by an argumentation 
which looked at the sovereign's statute in its own right.”20 Bohier’s approach to the ius 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid, p. 134.  
15 Ibid, p. 135. Traces of this approach are visible as late as the nineteenth century. In a publication from 1836, 
after the Code Civil des Français (1804) was passed, there is mention of rules of legal interpretation. There is 
mention of “interpretatio utilitati publicae” in that work. See A. de Chassat, Traité de l'interprétation des lois, 
(Paris, 1836) [1822], p. 300.  This is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter at 4.3.2.1, “Legacy of 
interpretation”.  
16 A. Wijffels, “Antiqui et recentiores: Alberico Gentili – beyond mos italicus and legal humanism”, in P. Du 
Plessis and J. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing legal humanism and its claims: petere fontes?, (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 
11-40, at pp. 13-14.  
17 Wijffels, (n. 10), p. 139.  
18 Ibid.   
19 Wijffels, (n. 16), p. 13.  
20 Wijffels, (n. 10), p. 138.  
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commune is therefore central to identifying and understanding the extent to which such 
practices can be seen in the first half of the early modern period.  
 
1.2 Jacques Cujas: a practical comparison   
 
Although written some time after Bohier’s Decisiones, the practice-oriented works of 
Jacques Cujas (1522-1590), and his well-known humanist status, form an interesting point of 
comparison with Bohier. Cujas was first and foremost theoretical in his approach to the law 
but recent studies have confirmed that he was not confined to this approach.21 His roles 
included that of a conseiller both at the Grenoble parlement and at the Presidial Court22 of 
Bourges. The function of the judiciary naturally complemented that of the Doctors of Civil 
and Canon law, with the many judicial offices in the sixteenth century offering ample 
opportunity to exert their art of theory into practice. His Consultations, for example, consider 
cases and the law in practice. Legal practice meant that Cujas needed to appeal to all 
applicable sources in the Kingdom of France, and beyond.23 The recent work of Xavier 
Prévost uses terms such as “hybrid”, “reconciliation” and “alternative” when discussing 
Cujas’ use of sources, suggesting a compromise and the idea that there is plurality and a 
general willingness, or necessity, to appeal to all applicable laws. On this point, Prévost 
states:  
L’humaniste toulousain continue naturellement à accorder une rôle prépondérant au 
droit romain, mais sa vision ne se résume pas à celle d’une romaniste. Dans l’espèce 
étudiée la coutume du Berry occupe une place centrale aux côtés du corpus juris 
civilis; au sein d’autres consultations, c’est la législation royale qui ajoute ses mailles 
à l’ordre juridique.24  
 
There are instances where there is competition between sources of law, in particular 
between customs and droit Romain (Roman law). Prévost has recently contended that in the 
case of conflict, Cujas often equates the two, and where the latter prevails it is because it is 
received by the customs of France.25 In this sense, by evoking the reception of Roman law by 
custom, it demonstrates the strength of custom itself. This can be seen in the case of customs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 X. Prévost, Jacques Cujas (1522-1590): jurisconsulte humaniste, (Geneva, 2015).  
22 Created in 1552, by King Henry II. See E. Monter, Judging the French reformation: heresy trials by 
sixteenth-century parlements, (London, 1999), p. 132.  
23 Cujas is consulted on foreign affairs too. See Prévost, (n. 21), p. 395.  
24 Ibid, p. 400. Own translation: “The Toulouse humanist naturally continues to give a prominent role to Roman 
law, but his vision is not limited to that of a Romanist. In the works studied the custom of Bourges plays a 
central role alongside the Corpus Juris Civilis; in other consultations is royal legislation that adds and is part of 
the legal system.”  
25 Ibid.  
	   111	  
on inheritance. There are those that are mandatory and do not bend even when faced with the 
will of the parties, who in one particular case which Prévost considers, would have liked to 
have used other provisions.26   
Interestingly, in what is arguably Cujas’ most practice-oriented work, his 
Consultations, there is only one reference to the term ius commune.27 There, Cujas considers 
the case of three brothers and the management of goods that had been received by the siblings 
through inheritance. Two of them sold their share of the property to a third party. The 
remaining brother wished to recover the family goods from the third party, on the belief that 
his brothers should have offered him first refusal. There was discussion of an appeal and one 
of the brothers is given a real action – the retrait lignager (considered a number of times by 
Bohier, and the ius commune features prominently in those cases also).28 Cujas considers this 
“institutional regime” and the ius commune plays an important role. Cujas uses the term “ius 
commune Biturigium”. A possible interpretation here is that Cujas’ conception of the ius 
commune is akin to custom, or that he is using the terminology interchangeably.29 He is 
limiting the term, which is assumed to be non-regional and supranational, by classing it as 
being “of Bourges”. It may also be the case, and this seems most likely that, as noted above, 
Cujas is referring to the origins of ius commune’s authority stemming from a “reception” 
through customary usage, and therefore holding the term to have a general and broad 
meaning.  
 
1.3 Legacy of interpretation  
 
 Traces of the ius commune and its relationship with statute and custom can be found 
as late as the nineteenth century in France. Published a short time after the Code Civil of 
1804, the Traité de l'interprétation des lois offers an insight into the interpretation of the law. 
Here, the author, de Chassat, outlines an extensive list of historical rules of interpretation, the 
second of which mentions the ius commune. He states: “Interpretatio illa capienda semper, 
per quam ad jus commune reducimur, quae juri communi convenit, et per quam juris 
communis correctio vitatur, et per quam jus commune minus offenditur, et per quam minime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid, p. 395. This approach can be seen in Bohier’s Consuetudines, in chapter 5, 4.2, “Guardianship: mother’s 
rights over children”.  
27 J. Cujas, Consultationes LX, consultatio VII, opera omnia, (Paris, 1658).    
28 A privilege awarded to kin (extended family) where they held the first rights to buy lineage property. Such 
lineage would include houses and land rents. For Bohier’s treatment of retrait lignager, see chapter 5, consilium 
11 and consilium 56, where he mentions the term.  
29 Prévost, (n. 21), p. 400.   
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receditur a jure communi…”30 There is mention of passive interpretation, with a citation to 
Alexander de Imola’s Consilia.31 On a related matter, he also states: “interpretatio sic 
facienda eo casu, de quo jus commune nihil disponit, ut de similibus ad similia procedatur”.32 
The concept of “utlitas publica” is also considered. Wijffels has acknowledged that this was 
commonly recognised in mos italicus doctrines, and regularly adopted by legal practitioners 
when wishing to put forward a statute.33 Here, de Chassat states that interpretation of law that 
is adverse to public utility should not be admitted.  
 This work is mentioned here as it demonstrates that the term ius commune was still 
present in the intellectual climate of the early nineteenth century. Further, and more 
importantly, these rules distilled from the ius commune are reflected on a number of 
occasions in this chapter. Many were consistent with Bohier’s sixteenth century position on 
the ius commune. The works cited by de Chassat include Bartolus,34 Andrea Alciato,35 and 
Baldus, 36  as representatives of these rules, are also familiar ones alongside the ius 
commune.37 De Chassat also mentions Nicolas Bohier.38 A significant number of citations 
made are to the genre of Consilia and Decisiones; so while underrepresented in contemporary 
works, they are still recognised in the nineteenth century as offering a valuable insight into 
the ius commune and its role in interpretation.  
  
2. Outline: where the ius commune is mentioned  
 
Fig. 1.  Cases in the Decisiones where the ius commune is mentioned  
 
DECISIO CASUS 
Dec. 2 Elections (ecclesiastical). 
Dec. 9 Jurisdiction (rights of Barons to punish 
offenders).  
Dec. 42 Possession.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid, p. 281, and citation: “Hermenop. Pist. l. 2, quaest. 41.” 
31 Ibid, p. 294. This text is also cited by Bohier, shown below in 4.3.3, “Citations”.  
32 Ibid, p. 296, and citation: “Innocent. in cap. si adversar. 4”.  
33 Wijffels, (n. 10), p. 135.  
34 De Chassat, (n. 12), p. 285. 	  
35 Ibid, p. 290.  
36 Ibid, p. 287.  
37 There are also later authors and works mentioned, such as Barthelemy de Chasseneuz, Charles Dumoulin and 
Jacques Cujas.  
38 De Chassat, (n. 15), p. 297, where reference to Bohier’s consilium 1, para 23 is made.  
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Dec. 46 Jurisdiction (divided jurisdiction).  
Dec. 68 Procedural (sentencing). 
Dec. 69 Evictions (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 82  Papal benefits (ecclesiastical) 
Dec. 113 Marriage and dowry.  
Dec. 133 Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 141* Procedural (proclamations).  
Dec. 186 Heritable rights. 
Dec. 188 Heritable rights.  
Dec. 199 Usufruct.  
Dec. 203 Marriage and property rights of children. 
Dec. 221* Father giving surety for son. 
Dec. 225 Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 228 Testamentary provision. 
Dec. 230 Moveables and heritable property. 
Dec. 236 Prescription.  
Dec. 238 Ownership and possession. 
Dec. 239  Possession.  
Dec. 240 Testamentary provision.  
Dec. 244 Marriage and testamentary provision. 
Dec. 262 Punishment and clerical privilege.  
Dec. 263 Feudal law. 
Dec. 284 Arbitration. 
Dec. 295* Oath and confession. 
Dec. 297 Procedural (cleric before a secular judge – 
ecclesiastical).  
Dec. 300 Taxation.  
Dec. 322* Rights of neighbour/access rights.  
Dec. 328* Prescription.  
Dec. 346  Procedural (ecclesiastical).  
*indicates a case where ius commune has less significant role in the ratio decidendi.   
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At first glance, it is possible to make some initial observations on the kinds of cases 
that the term ius commune appeared in the Decisiones. Cases dealing with matrimonial 
matters, Canon law, and property rights make up the bulk of the list. An unsurprising finding 
perhaps, given the prominent role of Roman law in such issues.  
It is not possible to examine in detail each of the above cases that were found to 
mention the ius commune. Instead, a select group of cases have been examined in the same 
manner as in the case of the Consilia. While general statements on the findings from each of 
the cases could be given in this chapter, this approach, where a single case is examined in 
detail, enables a more accurate analysis and ensures consistency with the Consilia and 
Consuetudines chapters.  
This chapter is divided according to the main themes of matrimonial matters and 
those cases handling procedure (predominantly of a Canonical nature). Of course, these two 
categories cross over often, but this division enables a better examination of the court 
decisions and enable comparative study throughout; identifying themes within the two 
groupings, but also outwith.  
 
3. Procedural matters  
 
Questions of procedure make up the bulk of those cases in the Decisiones where ius 
commune is mentioned. It seems plausible that this is a reflection of the growth and 
expansion of regional courts in this period, and a desire to establish rules and procedures for 
them, but more work is needed on this point. Procedural matters have been defined here as 
those cases where the central question relates to the rules and formalities of a court or a 
process, as contrasted with matters dealing with substantive law. Of those cases considered, 
the majority are centred on ecclesiastical procedure; that is those points of law that emanate 
from the Canon law and of administrative concerns of the church.  
The Decisiones Burdegalenses demonstrate the prevalence of ecclesiastical issues 
before the parlement of Bordeaux: they rank first along with matrimonial matters.39  It has 
been argued that the day-to-day work of ecclesiastical administration was largely based on 
procedure rather than a scientific body of law.40 The consideration of Canon law in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Decisiones Burdegalenses (1547). This is especially true of those cases including mention of the term ius 
commune.  Examples include: Decisio II, 46; IX, 1; LXIX, 22; CXIX, 3; CXXXIII, 8.   
40 P. Stein, “Vacarius and the civil law”, in C. Brooke, et al. (eds.), Church and government in the middle ages: 
essays presented to C.R. Cheney on his 70th birthday, (Cambridge, U.K., 2008), pp. 121-136, at p. 134.  
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parlement, however, would have brought it into the secular forum and although questions of 
procedure marked the basis of the disputes seen here, the application of the ius commune in 
these cases meant that there was a movement from strict procedure towards competition 
between sources of authority.  
 
3.1 Decisio 69: Eviction  
 
 
This case considers the rights of tenants on church land. At the centre of this decisio is 
the question of a real action whether authority should rest with a contemporary custom, or 
instead with an older, and more general rule. Bohier’s reasoning is marked by competition: 
both in terms of the sources of law that appear in Bohier’s reasoning, and also that of 
jurisdictional authority. In terms of the jurisdiction question, there is added contention 
between ecclesiastical and royal authority.   
 
Super quaestione, an Episcopus possit 
cognoscere de causa garentigii seu evictionis 
attenta maxime submissione, & prorogatione 
expressa in ipsum Episcopum, & eius curiam 
per clericos facta, vel iudex secularis 
cognoscere debeat… 
 
It was discussed / argued whether it is the 
Bishop or the secular judge who has 
jurisdiction on matters of guarantees and 
evictions, having paid most attention to the 
pleading and the extension made by the 
clerks to the same bishop and his court.	   
 
 
3.1.1 Competition between contemporary custom and older rules   
 
The ius commune is mentioned at the part of the Decisio that is marked by this sense of 
competition.41 This section is abbreviated thus: “clericus in reali actione respondere debet 
coram iudice seculari”.42 This is based on custom, and is to be followed in the case of real 
actions. Bohier states:   
 
Pro quo dicit Bald. in leg. 
[observare.proficisci colum 2 post princip. 
versic.] & quia hic congruem cadit [ff.de 
offic proconsu. respondendo ad iura supram, 
pro 1.] parte allegata, cognitionem & 
iurisdictionem Episcopis & praelatis 
concedentia, quod de generali consuetudine, 
For what says Baldus … the grant of 
jurisdiction to bishops and prelates, 
according to the general and reasonable 
custom, the jurisdiction of bishops was 
withdrawn from our courts [lit. from court 
before us] And it is surprising that I could not 
find anyone (from what I read) stating as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Decisio 69, para 20-22.  
42 Own translation: “a cleric should respond in a real action in front of a secular judge.”  
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& rationabili, iurisdictio Episcoporum apud 
nos recessit ab aula. & mirum quod hoc 
dictum non reperi aliquem (quod legerim) 
allegantem, [& pro dicto Ioan.Fab. Bal. & 
Offre. Allegavi gloss. in dicto cap. 1 de empt. 
& vend.] volentem quod hodie Episcopus de 
consuetudine non imponit precium rebus, 
prout vult [ibi text. & iura supram alleg.] 
Quamuis Host. Abb. Sicul. & Cardin. De 
Zaba. teneant ibi contrarium, & communiter 
Doctor. ut dixi tamen opi. gloss. in hoc regno 
servatur, quia per iudices, & reipubli. 
administratores hoc fieri solet, & pro maiori 
parte per Curias Supremas Parlamentorum 
Regni, & pro hac opi. Videtur[ bon. text. in 
cap. cum venissent. de eo qui mitt.in possess. 
causa rei servan. ubi Bal. colum.3. sic ait]: 
aliter tamen servatur in regno Franciae, 
quod in realibus actionibus respondere debet 
clericus coram iudice seculari, cum res sit de 
territorio Regis, iudicatur secundum 
constitutionem Regis. Tamen Guliel. de Cug. 
dicit ubi supram hodie esse ius commune, & 
pro eius dicto, dicit ibi Bal. videri quod casus 
illius c. loquitur in actione reali, dicens 
servandam esse consuetudinem populi, si 
talis consuetudo est laudabilis. 
 
much, and according to the said Joannes 
Faber, Baldus and …  I invoked the gloss on 
the said chapter 1 on emptio-venditio  
volentem, according to which today the 
bishop customarily does not put a price on 
things, according to the text and the laws 
above invoked. Although Hostiensis, 
Parnomitanus (Abbas Siculus) and Cardinal 
Zabarella argue the opposite, and by and 
large the doctors [with them], as I said 
however the opinion of the gloss is kept in 
this kingdom which is what usually happens 
with judges and magistrates, and with the 
most part of the high judges of the 
Parliaments of the Kingdom …and for this 
opinion see the sound text in … where 
Baldus says so. But in the kingdom of France 
the use is different, for in real actions the 
cleric should respond before the secular 
judge, and since the matter pertains to the 
territory of the King, it ought to be judged 
today according to the laws of the King. 
However, Gulielmus de Cuneo says above, 
that this is the ius commune, and on his 
statement Baldus argues here that law refers 
to a case in a real action, and that law argues 
that the custom of the people is to be kept, if 
such a custom is to be praiseworthy.    
 
Bohier sets out the circumstances in which a secular judge would handle an issue 
related to ecclesiastical administration. This could be symptomatic of the secular state of 
France growing at the expense of the traditional split between Canon and civil jurisdiction in 
certain cases.  Here, it is in the case of a real action. In such circumstances, the parlement 
decides the case when the object in question is from the kingdom of France. He refers to a 
custom that provides for this, moving jurisdiction from Bishops to secular courts. Bohier’s 
reference to the Kingdom of France is notable. By distinguishing the applicability of a 
particular rule he is identifying France as a single entity, aside from the distinct regional 
identity that the Bordeaux parlement, which this case emanates from, would have had. 
Further, Bohier is reinforcing the rule of the King and the secular court over that of Bishops 
and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.   
One of the very first cases in the Decisiones looks to the rules dealing with elections 
in a number of religious orders. This was an area in which Bohier has particular professional 
competence, having published an edition of the Tractatus de Electione, the work by 
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Gulielmus de Mandagoto (d. 1312), in 1509.43 Many offices in the Church were elected, and 
a procedural framework for electoral rules existed alongside these offices. 44   Bohier 
considered the rules regarding election to an office that had become vacant due to 
resignation. The topic of elections form the basis of the first seven cases examined by Bohier 
in the Decisiones. In decisio 2, the issue of “Permutatio, cessio, translatio, & depositio a iure 
aequiparantur” (exchange, concessions, and transfer can be equated in law) is discussed. 
Bohier states: “Quia ista aequiparantur a iure, cessio, permutatio, & depositio, quae sunt 
reservationes in corpore iuris clausae, quarum solus Papa est iudex competens”.45 Bohier 
makes clear that this matter is one solely for the Pope to decide upon, thus clearly setting it 
within ecclesiastical jurisdiction where “only the Pope is the competent judge”.  
The present case considers a real action and so the cleric should respond in front of a 
secular judge. Decisio 2 has been mentioned here to demonstrate that in other areas of law, 
such as rules of election, authority remained with the Pope, who alone was vested with the 
power to decide on rules of election.  
In terms of the ius commune, the term is used here so as to reflect the divergence of 
opinion that existed on this issue. Bohier argues that Gulielmo de Cuneo (d. 1335) states that 
this rule is the ius commune. Following this, reference is made to Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-
1400) who states that this custom is to be followed in the case of real actions. Where the term 
ius commune is cited, a reference to Gulielmus de Cuneo is made, stating: “Tamen Guliel. De 
Cug. dicit ubi supra hodie esse ius commune”. No particular work is cited here. Gulielmus de 
Cuneo is cited elsewhere in this Decisio, just above this particular discussion, and here 
Bohier cites the commentary on the Codex at C.1.3.33 (a. 472) on both occasions. It is not 
clear whether Bohier was in fact referrring to this text here, as he had done earlier, but it is 
likely. Proceeding on that assumption, and looking to this work, it is clear that Cuneo is not 
speaking specifically of custom, as Bohier does in the present case. Cuneo states: “Nam 
coram iudice seculari debeat agitari talis questio non coram iudice canonico.”46 Bohier also 
mentions Baldus. His position on secular and ecclesiastical authority is well known. His 
general position is that “ecclesiastical jurisdiction being autonomous within a civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 1509 (Lyon) is the earliest known printing privilege granted for this work, as noted by E. Armstrong, Before 
copyright: the French book-privilege system: 1498-1526, (Cambridge, U.K., 1990), p. 210.  Bohier also 
published a treatise on the powers of the Papal Legate in France, Tractatus celebris de officio et potestate 
Georgii de Ambasia, (Lyon, 1509). The printing privilege was granted at the same time for both.  
44 R. Helmholz, “Human rights in the canon law”, in J. Witte, Jr. & F. Alexander (eds.), Christianity and human 
rights: an introduction, (Cambridge, U.K, 2010), pp. 99-112 at p. 110.  
45 Own translation: “Because in law, concessions, exchange and transfer can be equated [to eachother], which 
are reserved in real actions, where the Pope is the only competent judge.” 
46 Translation: Such a question ought to be placed before a secular judge, not an ecclesiastical one. 
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community exists in parallel with secular jurisdiction”, but that he does not consider them to 
enjoy equal status.47   
 
3.2 Decisio 228: Number of witnesses 
 
Bohier considers the issue of whether in the time of plague, fewer witnesses were 
required for the creation of testaments. Bohier considers if a custom that provides for such 
cases, and allows for fewer witnesses, is permitted since it deviates from the ius commune 
rule. This is an interesting example of how Bohier contends with the old provision of the ius 
commune, and its operation in the turbulent circumstances of the sixteenth century, where 
plagues were a regular feature.48 He opens the decisio with a question:  
Testamentum tempore pestis factum cum 
quinq; testibus masculis, vel foeminis, aut 
alio minori testium numero, an valeat. 
Whether a testament made in time of plague 
with five or fewer witnesses, either male or 
female, is valid. 
 
Reference to the term ius commune is made early on in this decision. Bohier considers 
whether an exception to the ius commune rule on witnesses renders a testament invalid, or if 
such a deviation is permitted under these circumstances. The first statement follows a 
reference to Joannes Faber49 and reads:  
…vel quia per ipsius salutem rogatus quis 
diceretur, ut ob insignem quorundam & c. 
quod princeps potest ultra iuris communis 
dispositionem in eo… 
…or because the health of anyone would be 
mentioned if requested, as a signal for some 
& that the prince/ruler can provide for more 
than the ius commune does here… 
 
Shortly after this reference, another one is made, this time speaking of specific 
circumstances surrounding the nature of witnesses:50  
…& etiam sanum existente in loco 
contagioso posse testari cum duobus testibus 
rogatis. vero extra locum epidimiae, tunc 
teneatur iure communi testari, & istam 
opinionem tenet Geraldus Mulere in additio. 
…and also a healthy person in a contagious 
environment may make a will with two 
witnesses. And Geraldus Mulere, in his 
addition to (commentary on) Rolandus’s 
treatise … on last wills, in the title on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 J. Canning, The political thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, (Cambridge, U.K., 1987), p. 144.  
48 “Pestis tempore testamentum valet cum pauca numero testium”. Decisio 228, pr. 10. The first half of the 
sixteenth century was marked by plague and famine. France was experiencing outbreaks of disease in the 1520s 
in particular, accompanied by severe food shortages. See H. Heller, Labour, science and technology in France, 
1500-1620, (Cambridge, U.K., 1996), p. 64.  
49 Decisio 228, para 7. “Ioann. Fab. Instit. de fideicommiss. hare. in princ.” 
50 Ibid, para 7. 
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ad Roland. in tract. Florum ultimarum 
voluntatum.titu.de testibus in testamento 
adhibendis.in prima additio. & Guid.Pap.[in 
quaest. 543. in fin.] dicens, se vidisse ita 
servari in testamento, in rure, vel alibi 
tempore pestis conditio, ubi non reperitur 
copia testium, quibus casibus talia 
testamenta coram curato.  
witnesses to employ in a testament, in the 
first addition, and Guidus Papae in the final 
part of quaestio 543, arguing that he had seen 
wills made this way in the countryside, or 
elsewhere in times of plague, where it is not 
possible to find many witnesses, in such 
cases wills [were made] before a curate.  
 
The ius commune is then mentioned in a discussion about whether a specific locality, 
in this case a rural community, can have a custom that varies from the ius commune and is 
allowed to stand:51  
Sed contrarium, quod non valeat 
testamentum tempore pestis conditum, nisi 
interveniant septem testes, prout in alio 
tempore requiruntur… [tenant Rapha. 
Fulgos. Paul. de Castr. Francisc. de 
Areti.Alexand. & Philip.Corne. in dicta lege 
fin. de testamen.] ubi patet, quod solennitas 
relaxatur rusticis tantum testantibus in rure. 
Sed aliis hoc de negatur, signanter secundum 
Bald. si locus iuris est prope locum iuris, [ut 
ipse voluit consilio 223. incipiente, 
mater.volumin. 4. per not.in dicta leg. finale] 
sed ipsemet Baldus in lege 1.C. de summa 
Trinitate videtur velle oppositum, quae refert 
& sequitur Petrus de Anchara. [eius 
discipulus, in repetitio. capitul. Canonum 
statuta. quaestione 13. principal. versicu.] 
sed iuxta  praedicta quaero. dicens, quod 
privilegium particulariter loquens, seu loco 
concessum, videtur non solum loco, sed etiam 
personis concessum… quod si speciale in 
rusticis, ergo in aliis contrarium est ius 
commune [l.ius singulare ff. de regulis iuris. 
& tenet Barto.in l. conficiuntur. codicilli.in 
prima quaestione], etiam si ibi per spacium 
temporis manserunt, sive rus vel villa sit 
prope vel longe, secundum communem 
sententiam Doctorum, ibi & tenet Matthaeus 
in decisione Neapolitana. 
 
But Raphael Fulgosius, Paulus de Castro, 
Franciscus Aretinus, Alexander and Philip 
Cornelius argue the contrary, that a testament 
made in a time of the plague is not valid, 
unless made with the intervention of seven 
witnesses, as required for other times… [lex 
fin. de testamen.] where it appears that a  
solemn requirement may be waived for 
peasants so long as they make their will in 
the countryside. But they deny [as much] to 
others, especially Baldus [does so, according 
to whom] if the legal rule is properly such, as 
he maintains at the beginning of [his] 
consilium 223… But the same Baldus seems 
to be arguing for {lit. to will] the opposite 
[solution] in… where he refers to and follows 
his disciple Petrus de Ancharano, in 
[Ancharano’s] repetitio … but according to 
the aforesaid quaestio [Baldus] argues that a 
particular privilege, or a privilege granted to 
a place, is not granted only to that place but 
also to those people … for if there is a special 
privilege for farmers, so the ius commune is 
the opposite with [the] others… and Bartolus 
argues [the same]… even if they stayed there 
for some time, whether the farm or country 
estate is close-by or is remote, according to 
the common opinion of the Doctors, and this 
is held by Matthew in a Neapolitan decision.  
 
3.2.1 Baldus and the ius commune  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid, para 10. 
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Both references to the ius commune in this case appear to be in line with it, and do not 
offer much in the way of conflict or competition between laws. In this sense, then, they are 
atypical of most other uses of the term in the Decisiones. The use of the term here is not to 
mediate between sources; here the term is mentioned both as a clear statement that the ius 
commune is binding on the parties and also, later, that one of the circumstances outlined 
above would be contrary to the ius commune. Bohier states, through the words of Baldus, that 
there is an exception for farmers, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the position of 
the ius commune is different towards non-farmers. Here, the ius commune is presented 
through the opinion of Baldus. It is therefore reasonable to interpret Bohier’s reference to the 
term here as the Roman law as interpreted by Baldus given his reliance on the source.  
Immediately following the ius commune, Bohier cites the Digest, D.1.3.16, D.50.17 
and Bartolus de Saxoferrato on D.29.7.8. Shortly after, reference is then made to “secundum 
communem sententiam Doctorum”.52 There are no sources cited for these “Doctores”, which 
means that any effort to establish whether these were the same sources as those he used for 
his reference to the ius commune: possibly revealing that they were mutually the same, or 
similar, and representing something of a trend towards the use of certain jurists in his use of 
the term.53  It is possible, and most likely, that Bohier was meaning those jurists mentioned 
earlier in the case. When considering the specific criteria in terms of witnesses at the time of 
the plague, Bohier states “tunc teneatur iure communi testari”, and alongside this cites 
Geraldus Muliere, Guido Pape (1402-1487), and Andreas Barbatius (1400-1479).54 Two of 
these sources have not been cited in any of the other cases in association with the ius 
commune so far in this thesis.  
 
3.3 Decisio 262: Punishment  
 
 
This case is one of procedure, with specific reference to the question of sentencing 
and punishment. It considers the matter of a husband discovering his wife’s adultery. The 
husband kills his wife and the man in question. Bohier asks whether he ought to be given the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Mentioned elsewhere alongside ius commune. See chapter 5 on the Consuetudines, at 7.1.3 where the customs 
on feoffments are considered.  
53 Reference to this term elsewhere in the Decisiones reveals a direct reference to a set of sources for this 
“secundam communem sententiam Doctorum”. At Decisio 262, para 2, he referred to Joannes Faber, Angelus de 
Aretinus, Bartolus, Philippus Decius.  
54 “in prima additio. & Guid. Pap. [in quaest. 543. in fin. Dicens]… Et idem…Andr. Barba…” 
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same punishment as a murderer. The discussion that follows has similarities with the Roman 
law position on the matter (D.48.5).  
The ius commune appears in the part of the discussion that considers custom, and 
more specifically the question of: “Consuetudo quod percutiens se ponat in manibus 
percussi, an valeat”.55  
 
Sed quod offendens ponat se in manibus 
offensi, ut eum verberet, vel vulneret ad 
libitum suum, ut erat de more consuetudine 
Longobardorum & erat Romanorum,[ut 
dicunt Bart. & Angel. in l.1.usque adeo.ff. de 
iniuriis.& pariter Hispanorum, ut refert Ioan. 
de Nauiza in sua sylva. fol. 1.col.3. post prin. 
Versi] & in Hispania. dicens in Hispania 
esse Decreta, per quae mulier & adulter 
traduntur in manibus mariti, qui de eorum 
bonis potest facere quod vult.[allegat. Ioan. 
Lup. in Rubric. Praedicta], de donatio inter 
virum & vxorem charta [12 col. 1. versi. 
habeat aliu & quartum.& pro hoc text. in c. 
reum ad ecclesiam. 17. quaest. 4]. Tamen 
sunt directe contra ius commune [Bart.& 
Ang. in d.l.1 usque adeo & Alex in addi.] 
quia quis non est dominus membrorum 
suorum [l. liber. homo. ff. ad legem Aquil.] & 
talis consuetudo reprobatur… 
But if the offender places himself in the hand 
of the offended party, so that the latter may 
flog him, or wound him at his pleasure, as it 
was the custom of the Lombards and of the 
Romans, as Bartolus [de Saxoferrato] and 
Angelus [Ubaldis] in … and similarly [it was 
the custom] of the Spaniards, as refers 
Iohannis de Naviza… saying that in Spain 
there is a law, whereby wife and lover are to 
be delivered into the hands of the husband, 
who may do as he pleases with their assets, 
as states Johannes Lupus… However, [these 
customs] are directly against the ius 
commune… for no one is the owner of his 




3.3.1 “Directly against the ius commune” 
 
In other cases, the relationship between custom and ius commune has typically taken 
on other forms, without reference to the specific nature of the contrasting provision: whether 
direct or indirect. This present interpretation therefore cannot be termed a uniform rule by 
any means. Typically, according to those other cases in the Decisiones and in the Consilia, a 
balance between the two sources of law has been sought. In those cases, it is shown that that 
custom can be contrary to the ius commune, and that custom should, where possible, be 
interpreted in a way so as to cause minimal harm to the ius commune. There is an assumed 
requirement that attention is still directed towards the ius commune, this effort to keep in line 
with it adding to the idea of ius commune as something existing above all sources of ius 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Decisio 262, pr. 4.  Where Bohier states “quia quis non est dominus membrorum suorum”, it is likely that this 
is because it encourages self-help, which is not desired. There are links with the Roman law here, in terms of the 
lex Aquilia: D.9.2.13. pr.  
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proprium. In this present case, something was preventing Bohier from adopting this 
approach. Perhaps it was the nature of the custom itself which meant the act of interpreting 
the custom was not worthwhile, for he did not regard it equal to the ius commune, or even 
worthy of such interpretative attempts at harmonisation. If this was the case, this would 
suggest a fluid system where the relationship between competing authorities depended on the 
application of the lawyer, judge or jurist in question: that a custom was declared as being 
directly against the ius commune not necessarily because of its content, but the nature of the 
custom itself. There are other cases where ius commune is rejected. This is seen in the case 
of decisio 284, discussed in detail below, where custom is substituted in place of the ius 
commune; a stark contrast to the present outcome. From this variable stance on the 
relationship between the sources, it is therefore difficult to assess the extent to which, 
hypothetically, an indirect contrast with the ius commune in this case would have resulted in a 
different outcome. Because Bohier has not hesitated to demonstrate the superiority of 
customary law in other circumstances, it would seem that if this rule were one that 
transcended all cases, then it stands to reason that he could decide against the ius commune, 
in cases of direct and indirect conflict regardless of the facts of the case.  
It is worth considering whether Bohier intended a contrast here between the position 
of the ancient world, such as the law of the Romans, and with the modern stance on the 
matter, which is represented in the form of the ius commune. In decisio 263, which is 
considered below, there is mention of ius commune Romanorum, which brings into question 
whether Bohier’s use of the term ius commune was always one that was expressly with 
Roman law in mind, or whether this demonstrates his usual reference to the term is one with a 
utrumque ius meaning. If decisio 262 represents a distinction between the Romans and the ius 
commune being drawn, then this is notable as it serves to demonstrate that the ius commune 
as representing a modern position, as being in contrast to the ancient Roman stance. It is more 
lkely that this is an example of the ius commune as a an authority lacking a fixed meaning 
and function, and being used as a repository of rules in order to deal with the legal matter at 
hand. In this current case, this is aimed at limiting the option of self-help for the husband in 
discovering his wife’s adultery.  
 
3.4 Decisio 284: Arbiter  
 
	   123	  
This case refers back to an earlier question, and reference to the preceding decisio 
does reveal a related case. There, further information on the background to the quaestio is 
given.56 It considers an agreement between parties and whether it is valid, where those parties 
involved do not have the authority, or capacity, to enter into such an agreement. It is an 
arbitration agreement, and Bohier asks that since the parties are not lawyers, does this 
represent an official agreement? He states:  
 
De prorogatione compromisi, seu arbitragii, 
si procuratores, non habentes ad id speciale 
mandatum, vel etiam non procurato res, qui 
compromiserunt, vel prorogaverunt, intra 
tamen tempus, prout faciunt aliquando 
Clerici procuratorum, pro quibus comparent, 
licet per Curiam non admittatur, nisi 
substituti sint procuratores, & partes, aut 
altera ipsarum non approbaverint expresse, 
sed tacite procedendo coram tali, tanquam 
arbitro. Quaeritur, an valeat tale 
compromissum, & laudum inde sequutum. 
 
As to the extension of the [arbitral] 
agreement / undertaking, if the counsels [for 
both parties] do not have a special mandate to 
[do] that, or if those who made the [arbitral] 
agreement / undertaking or extended [its 
validity] to a specific time were not lawyers, 
just as the clerks of counsel sometimes do, 
when they appear [in court] in their 
[master’s] stead, although [this] is not 
allowed by the bench, unless the substitutes 
be a clerk of counsel, and the parties, or 
either of them did not approve [of that] 
expressly, but [approved] tacitly in 
continuing [the proceeding] with that person, 
as in the case. The question is, whether such 
an agreement / undertaking and the ensuing 
[arbitration] award are valid. 
 
There is no reference to the term in this earlier decision. In decisio 284, however, the 
term ius commune appears on three occasions,57 all of which appear in the same part of the 
case. The summae of the case is presented as:58    
 
Arbiter qui secundum ius dicere debet, an 
dicere possit secundum ius consuetudinis vel 
statuti… 
Is the arbiter who has to decide according to 
the law allowed to decide according to the 
custom or statute… 
 
This part of the case concerns local law provisions, of custom and statute, and the 
question of their relationship with the ius commune is specifically mentioned:  
 
Tamen adverte ad dictum Alb. qui vult, quod 
si arbiter possit pronunciare secundum ius, 
However, notice what Albericus said, 
according to whom if an arbiter may decide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Decisio 283. 
57 The term “ius commune” strictly once, and “iuris communis” on the second, and “iure communi” on the third 
occasion. 
58 Decisio 284, pr. 6.  
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secundum quod, etiam si dictum non fuerit, 
tenetur lege qualem. & ibi [Bald. & Alber. de 
Rosa. in primo contrario. ff. de arbiter.] 
quod non poterit pronunciare de facto, id est, 
secundum ius consuetudinarium, vel 
statutarium. Dic tamen, quod poterit 
secundum ius consuetudinarium, aut 
statutarium (quod consistit in facto.[l. de 
quibus ff. de legibus.] pronunciare, ut singul. 
tenet. Bald. [in dict. l. qualem.] alias 
gravaret partem, ex quo illud statutum vel 
consuetudo servatur, & tollit ius commune in 
illo loco: ergo subrogatur loco iuris 
communis, quod pariter servari debeat… 
 
according to the law, according to that, even 
if it was not said, he is bound by the law 
qualem and here Baldus and Albericus de 
Rosate … [argue] that [the arbiter] may not 
decide on the facts / de facto, that is, 
according to the customary or statutory law. 
You should, however, say that [the arbiter] 
could [decide] according to the customary or 
statutory law (which consists of facts 
[according to the l. de quibus ff. de legibus], 
as per … otherwise he would burden the 
party who relied on that statute or custom, 
and [so] [the custom / statute] displaces the 
ius commune in that instance, and so [the 
custom / statute] fills the place of the ius 
commune, and the custom / statute must be 
kept as the same… 
 
3.4.1 “Custom fills the place of ius commune” 
 
This passage offers a key insight in terms of judicial approaches to the ius commune. 
Here, the ius commune is set aside, with local custom taking its place. This replacement is 
also very much a conceptual one. Not only does Bohier state that it does away with the ius 
commune in this particular case, but further emphasises that it is substituted in its place. This 
means that the legal theory here is one based on the local rules prevailing over the ius 
commune.  It is worth looking to the rest of the case more closely to try and establish further 
grounds for the judicial decision to not only ignore the ius commune here, but also take the 
dramatic step of substituting it with local law in a deliberate way.   
Following a succession of citations that accompanied the second reference to the term 
iuris communis, it is then mentioned for a third time, still in the same part of the case. Here, 
Bohier states:   
 
nisi tales compromittentes ignorarent 
verisimiliter consuetudines vel statuta, ut 
quia Papa, vel Imperator, aut forensis, qui 
censentur cogitare, & loqui de iure communi, 
& non de municipali, cuius notitiam non 
habent, quod intellige, ut ibi per eum. Ideo 
intelligendum est de mero facto, & de iure 
municipale consuetudinario non scripto, sive 
in scriptis redacto, secundum quod iudicare 
debet, sicut iudex. [l.iubemus. & ibi 
Bald.Paul de Castr. & Iason. C. de iudi. & in 
those who made the arbitration clause might 
have ignored the customs or statutes, so that 
the Pope or the Emperor, or a legal 
professional / lawyer, who are considered to 
think and speak in terms of ius commune and 
not of municipal law, do not have knowledge 
of it for which you should think here of him? 
In the same way is to be understood a simple 
fact, and customary municipal law, either 
unwritten or written down, according to 
which it must be judged, ... here, according to 
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ca. cum venissent.] ibi, secundum ius, & 
bonam terrae consuetudinem, de eo, qui 
mitti, in possessio. 
the law and the good custom of the land, 
about that who is placed in possession. 
 
 
3.4.2 “Speak and think in terms of the ius commune” 
 
This is a crucial passage. It directly continues on from the initial line of argument 
found with the first reference to the term. So, the ius commune is ignored and in its place 
customary law is followed. Yet, he carries on, defending his earlier argument, by saying that 
the Pope, Emperor, and the Forum, are expected to think and speak of the ius commune, as 
opposed to local law. This is understandable: it is unlikely that the Pope or Emperor (likely 
that Bohier means the King here), for example, would have known the law on the ground 
such as custom. The high level law appears to be in the form of the ius commune.   
Bohier is referring to the court’s position on custom, where it is up to the party before 
the court to prove the custom and not for the court to assume its place. This “knowledge”, or 
lack of, is therefore used in a technical sense. It is for this reason, Bohier states, that the ius 
commune, according to some of those sources, would be the preferred source in this case. He 
then reiterates his earlier point by saying that custom is the decisive source here regardless of 
this.  
The reason he gives for the general adherence to the ius commune is vital. Bohier is 
intentionally demarcating his sixteenth-century case and reasoning from that contained in the 
sources he cited. Bohier is referring to the Roman and Canon law as interpreted by those 
authors and works contained in the citations.   
The idea of the ius commune as still the fall-back provision here is made clear by 
Bohier. The ius commune is assumed, and the court thinks along its lines. Custom intervenes 
only when raised by a party and then the role of the ius commune may change. The value of 
this particular passage can be summarised into three main parts. First, Bohier makes a clear 
statement on the general limits of certain kinds of citations, in that their value is compromised 
given that their contents handle Roman law, and so created without regard to customary law 
and contemporary local law provisions.  
Secondly, that custom is not only followed instead of ius commune, but that it is 
substituted without any attempt to strike a compromise between the two. In terms of the 
second of these two findings, this is in stark contrast to the position found elsewhere in the 
Decisiones and earlier in the Consilia too. Elsewhere, the relationship between custom and 
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ius commune has followed a familiar course of compromise. The first of these findings, 
however, is equally, if not more important in terms of understanding Bohier’s understanding 
of the term’s meaning. Not only does Bohier demonstrate that he is willing to go against 
those sources that represent a field of common opinion in favour of customary law 
provisions, but he also offers a clear view of what the ius commune represents in this context.  
Thirdly, the ius commune is the fall-back position of the court and that lawyers and 
judges “think and speak in terms of the ius commune”. This is perhaps the most revealing of 
the three principal findings from this case. Custom intervenes and in this case, overrides the 
place of the ius commune, but it is brought to the court, whereas the ius commune is already 
in position and applies unless otherwise specified.  
There is an extensive list of sources cited alongside the term ius commune in this case. 
The first and second references to the term are made alongside each other and so the sources 
likely represent both uses of the term or, more accurately, the statement within which the 
terms are located.  
His first and main set of citations follow “tollit ius commune in illo loco: ergo 
subrogatur loco iuris communis”.59 There are over thirty different citations here. These 
include Baldus, Bartolus, Andreas Barbatius, Franciscus de Curte (d. 1495), Alexander de 
Imola, Angelus de Aretinus, Ludovici Pontano (1409-1439), Albericus de Rosate (1290-
1354) and Guido de Suza (1225-1292). The references generally include the Consilia of those 
cited, and commentaries on the Digest and Codex. The first of the citations made is to that of 
C.8.10.3 and D.11.4 and then to Baldus on them.60  
The third reference to the ius commune, which is later in the discussion, does not have 
a set of citations directly accompaying Bohier’s statement. Instead, they appear a little later, 
where Baldus, Paulus de Castro (1360-1441) and Jason de Mayno (1435-1519) are cited.61  
Although there are no citations directly accompanying the ius commune, the use of Baldus is 
notable. Bohier’s conception of custom was strongly linked with Baldus’, and this is 
considered in detail in this thesis, in the chapter dealing with the Consuetudines.62 According 
to Baldus, the so-called “natural state” is that where the ius commune operates: it is an 
assumed authority. The common law, the ius commune, is the Roman law for Baldus. In 
terms of the relationship between the ius commune and custom, Baldus views the function of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Translation: Do away with the ius commune in that place: therefore substitute in place of the ius commune.  
60 "[l an in totum. C. de aedifi. Priva]. & not. Bald. in [l.quicunque. col. 3. versi.] sed pone, statuto cavetur. [C. 
de servis fugitivis.] idem Bald. in [l.illa institutio. col. 1 versicu.] sed pone." 
61 “[l. iubemus.] & ibi Bald. Paul. de Castr. & Iason. [C. de iudi. & in ca. cum venissent].” 
62 See chapter 5, 2.1.  
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Roman law as both to supplement it as well as providing a standard for interpretation.63 In 
terms of Baldus’ general position on Roman law, the ius commune, he holds it to be the fall-
back position, and this is echoed here by Bohier.  
 
4. Matrimonial matters  
 
It was acknowledged above that many of the cases considering issues dealing with 
husband and wife, such as dowry and the rights of children, are procedural and so equally 
fitting in the preceding section of this chapter. However, for the purposes of the present study 
and in order to try and identify whether in certain kinds of cases the ius commune is treated 
differently than in other instances, and further to detect whether there are shared citations, 
those decisions are handled in this section only. In terms of defining matrimonial matters, for 
present purposes, such cases are distinguished by the nature of the parties to a case – husband 
and wife – and typically those decisions centred round matrimonial property, such as dowry 
or inheritance by a spouse. In the Decisiones, cases of this nature make up a significant 
proportion of those that have been found to mention the term ius commune.   
 
 4.1 Decisio 113: Dowry  
 
The case considers the provision of a dowry in the case of a husband marrying for the 
second time, and specifically the issue of children and their entitlement to the dowry. From 
the outset, Bohier makes clear that the case concerns the customary law:   
 
Stante consuetudine civitatis Burdegalae, 
quod maritus praemoriente vxore lucretur 
bona mobilia & dotem, vel alibi partem dotis.  
An habeat locum in marito stantibus liberis 
ad secunda vota transiente vel debeat 
intelligi non stantibus ex primo matrimonio. 
 
According to the custom of the city of 
Bordeaux, [when] the wife predeceased her 
husband, the latter would gain her moveable 
property as well as the dowry, in full or part. 
Does the same apply to the husband who is 
going to remarry where there are children, or 
is the rule to be interpreted as [applicable 
only] without children from the first 
marriage? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 J. Canning, (n. 47), p. 149. Canning cites D.12.1.2, 3 as evidence for this.  
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It is a comparatively short case, with just seven central points outlined in the quaestio, 
but the part of the discussion that contains the term ius commune forms the bulk of this 
decisio and is a detailed one. Here, Bohier states:   
 
[1] quod quando consuetudo disponit idem 
quod ius commune, debeat aliquid ultra ius 
operari & idem… debet aliquid addere, & 
ultra operari, ut etiam intelligitur in marito 
habente liberos, & transeunte ad secundas 
nuptias. 
 
[1] when the custom provides the same as the 
ius commune, it should go beyond the law 
and similarly… it should add something, and 
be applicable beyond [the law], as it is the 
case with the husband having children [from 
the first marriage who] remarries. 
 
In this same section, he continues with his treatment of the ius commune, but this time 
moving on to its relationship with statute. 
[2] Et hoc nisi statutum se referet ad ius 
commune, quia tunc debet intelligi secundum 
ius commune… quod statutum disponens 
idem quod ius commune intelligitur, 
secundum ius commune, quia satis est, quod 
producat novum remedium… 
 
[2] And unless that statute refers itself to the 
ius commune, for in that case it ought to be 
understood according to the ius 
commune…[and] what the statute provides is 
the same as what is understood the ius 
commune [to be], according to the ius 
commune, because it is enough that it 
produce a new remedy… 
 
4.1.1 “Beyond the law” 
 
When custom provides for the same as the ius commune, Bohier states, it is possible 
for the former to go beyond the law. Whether this “ius” is to be taken as meaning “ius 
commune”, or not, is not clear. Assuming it is, and this seems likely, then this is a statement 
outlining the ability of custom to go beyond the ius commune. A caveat is issued, with the 
acknowledgment by Bohier that custom says as much as the ius commune, implying a need 
for harmony between the two authorities in any case. Certainly, in this instance, it seems a 
condition for custom “going beyond” the ius commune. This is to be distinguished from 
custom going against ius commune, as in such cases there is rarely shared ground, nor is 
custom’s operation contingent on the ius commune.  
 
4.1.2     “Understood according to the ius commune”  
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Looking to the second of the two main sections contained in this part of the decisio, 
Bohier handles the competing sources of statute and ius commune. He states that this case 
ought to be understood according to the ius commune, and accompanies this with a set of 
citations, the nature of which are considered in further detail below. Here, Bohier states that 
the case he is discussing be understood according to the ius commune and continues by 
saying that where a statute provides for the same as the ius commune, it is understood 
according to ius commune as it is sufficient to produce a new remedy. The first of these two 
statements is reminiscent of the approach seen in the Consilia: a seemingly straightforward 
restrictive approach to ius proprium, and more specifically, always statute. The Consilia 
showed that this outcome was reached by a variety of interpretative approaches carried out by 
Bohier. Navigating the line between statutory authority and the authority of ius commune is 
therefore a familiar task for him.  
 
4.1.3 “Produces a new remedy” 
 
Earlier, it was shown that interpretation was used to make sure a statute was in line 
with the ius commune and so could operate in a given case. Here, there is no mention of the 
need to interpret the statute in this way. Instead, Bohier states that statute provides for the 
same as the ius commune, and, according to the ius commune, this is enough for a new 
remedy to be made.  No references are given in support of this statement. However, it is 
followed shortly after by references to Baldus’ Lectura on C.6.60 (a. 319), (de Bonis maternis 
et materni generis), as well as the jurist’s Consilia. Reference to Baldus’s consilium 12 
reveals a case that reads: “stante statuto quia filia dotata a patre no possit succedere patri 
extantibus fratribus si fuerit dotata a fratre post mortem patris possit succedere patri.”64 For 
Bohier then, the Roman rule of “bona materna” has relevance here. This referred to property 
that “a child-in-power had received from his or her mother at the latter's death.”65 The 
question at the centre of this case is whether a father who has married for a second time, 
following the death of his first wife and mother to his children, is able to retain his first wife’s 
dowry and bring it to his new marriage, or whether it remains with the children. This mention 
of a “new remedy” therefore suggests that certain circumstances can provoke a change in 
normal practice. The extent to which the statute that stands against the ius commune overrides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Translation: According to the statute, a daughter who has received a dowry may not succeed her father if there 
are brothers alive; if she received the dowry from her father after his death she may however succeed him.  
65 T. Rüfner, “Intestate succession in Roman law”, in K. Reid, at al (ed.), Comparative succession law: Volume 
III: Intestate succession, (Oxford, 2015), pp.1-32, at p. 23. 
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the latter or is overridden is not made clear. It therefore seems logical that this statement 
represents Bohier reaching a balance between the two, as a reflection of the complexities of 
family life.66  
 
4.1.4 Competing opinions on the applicability of the ius commune 
 
The crux of this decision is to be found later, and the ius commune makes an 
appearance there also.67 Bohier refers to the “verba universalia” of the statute, and whether it 
ought to be interpreted according to the ius commune. He argues this is not the case. This 
reasoning in the final part of the decisio demonstrates that the role of the ius commune was a 
crucial one to this case. Bohier shows that there is divergent opinion on the matter of statute 
being interpreted according to the ius commune.  
Earlier, it was stated that the two were to be read harmoniously as the ius commune 
was sufficient to create a new remedy. Here, this straightforward approach is brought into 
question, with one side of the argument calling for statute not to be interpreted according to 
the ius commune, and the other, claiming that it ought to derogate as little as possible from it. 
Bohier cites a variety of sources in support of each argument. The call for interpretation away 
from the ius commune was backed by reference to one source – C.5.9.6 (a. 472). For his 
argument in favour of an alternative, pro-ius commune, reading, Bohier uses Jason de Mayno, 
but does not cite a particular work, referring only to the author’s argument that he outlines. 
Following this are some further citations, including the Gloss, and Baldus on C.4.47 (a. 229).  
Essentially, this contentious part of the decisio is a split between a restrictive and 
expansive approach towards the ius commune and its relationship with the ius proprium, 
something that came to mark those opinions the term featured in the Consilia earlier. It has 
been recognised that any extensive interpretation of statute meant choosing “the legal 
mechanism prescribed by the statute in all conceivable constellations of cases”.68 In contrast, 
opting for a restrictive interpretation of a statute in ambiguous cases, or “narrowing the legal 
consequences of a statute” was instead based on the intentions of the statute maker and so 
“limited the applicability of the statute to a few options.”69 Bohier appears to have opted for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 At the beginning of this chapter, reference was made to de Chassat’s nineteenth-century work, Traité de 
l'interprétation des lois, (n. 15). There, it is provided that the interpretation of the ius commune should not 
introduce something new: “nam interpretatio non debet aliquid novi inducere” (p. 218).  
67 Decisio 113, para 7.  
68 S. Lepsius, “Paolo di Castro as consultant”, in A. Armstrong, et al. (eds.), The politics of law in late medieval 
and renaissance Italy, (Toronto, 2011), pp. 77-105, at p. 80.  
69 Ibid.   
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the latter, in accordance with Jason de Mayno, and in line with his earlier discussion at the 
start of this Decisio. There are many citations made by Bohier here. For the first part of the 
discussion, citations are made just before to the term ius commune’s appearance, where there 
is mention of Baldus’ Lectura on C.6.60, which has been considered above.  
The second set of citations is made directly after the reference to the ius commune, 
following Bohier’s statement on “quia tunc debet intelligi secundum ius commune”. The link 
of these sources to the term itself is arguably stronger given this proximity, as it is feasible 
that Bohier had these sources in mind when invoking the term and wished to insert them here 
as an indication of this. Here, he cites X.1.4.8, along with Baldus’ Consilia (consilium 141), 
with Hostiensis and Joannes Andreas on the X.1.3.18. Specific reference is made to a section 
of Baldus’ consilium that is not something Bohier always offers when citing this kind of 
source; suggesting an actual reference to the work, as far as is possible to do so in cases like 
these. The references in this part of the consilium that deals with the ius commune as a term 
are distinctively Canonist and are directly cited immediately following the term that, as just 
highlighted, adds to their value as indications. For the last part of this decisio, where Bohier 
states that a new remedy could be created in certain circumstances, no reference accompanies 
the term. However, in the last sentence from this part of the discussion, Bohier states “Et ita 
videtur tenere” and cites Giovanni Campeggi’s (1474-1539) Tractatus exquisitarum 
questionum super dote, “in 5. parte quaesti. 10”. 
 
 
4.2 Decisio 186: Heritable rights: mother and father 
 
The Decisiones were not organised according to any particular theme or method. 
Instead, the cases stood individually, their contents and nature of the legal problem at hand, 
independent of those immediately around it. This current case, however, was linked to 
another two, and in this sense, was an exception to this general rule of compilation. It appears 
that they all relate to the same case, and have been separated by Bohier, perhaps because of a 
desire to dedicate full discussion to each individual quaestio; a couple in particular, which he 
handled in depth.  An alternative explanation for this grouping may be that the cases relate to 
multiple actions between the same parties, litigated in turn with new arguments being raised 
each time. The term ius commune appears in the first and the third of the cases considered by 
Bohier.   
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The ius commune is mentioned first in a case concerning: “Quaestio alia ex 
praecedenti oritur”.70  The ius commune is mentioned once in this decisio, which belongs to 
the part of the decisio detailed in the summae as  “Mulier intra annum luctus nubens, an 
privetur haereditate a primo viro sibi relicta”.71 The ius commune is mentioned:72  
 
Quid si maritus instituerit vxorem haeredem 
suam, quae intra annum luctus accepit 
secundum virum, an privetur haereditate?  
What if the husband appoints his wife as heir, 
and within a year she takes a second 
husband, is she deprived of inheritance? 
 
The single reference to the ius commune is made here:73  
 
To accompany his statement, Bohier refers to D.5.2.8.5. He continues by putting 
forward another line of argument, with Baldus for support.74 The term ius commune itself is 
used alongside statute, and no effort is made to distinguish the two, suggesting more a 
passive reference to the term than an indication of their mutuality. The ius commune often 
appears in this way, adding further to the argument that the term was in fact loose and general 
in nature. It has been included here so as to demonstrate that the term does not always have 
substantive role in the ratio decidendi of the case, and its appearance was at times more 
rudimentary in its nature.75 What is notable, however, is the tendency of Bohier to refer to it 
in any case, alongside statute, so as to demonstrate convergent rules on the case at hand, even 
when it was not central to his decision.   
 
4.3 Decisio 188: Heritable rights: mente capto 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Translation: Another question arises from the preceding one.  
71 Whether a woman who marries again during her mourning year is to be deprived of the inheritance that she 
received from her first husband.  
72 Decisio 186, para 1.   
73 Ibid, para 2. 
74 “ut ex facti narratione apparet, tamen videtur idem si intra annum secundo nupserit, cum videatur tanta 
licentia secundo nubenti sibi concessa, argument. a contrario sensu quod est validum in iure [leg. 1. & ibi 
Bartol. Bald. Alexand. & Modern. ff. de offic. eius eui manda…]” Own translation: “And on this account, it 
appears that, within a year, it seems to be the same thing if they married a second time, since it is seen as the 
second marriage, [where] such a license has been granted, the opposite is argued, and it is a powerful one in 
law.” 
75 Examples in the Consilia include Cons. 40. 125. 
Et sic proprie & vere secundum eum non 
vindicat sibi locum ius commune aut 
statutum… 
And so properly and correctly according to 
that, this is not the position of ius commune 
or statute… 
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Continuing on from the previous cases, this decisio relates to the specific issue of 
hereditary rights in relation to a mente capto, an insane person, and that individual’s parents.  
 
Et veniendo ad quaestionem nostrum, an 
pater vel mater ad secunda transiens vota, 
perdat facultatem faciendi substitutionem 
exemplarem filio furioso, vel mente capto. 
The question is whether a father or mother 
who remarries loses the right to appoint a 
substitute as heir in lieu of the insane son.  
 
 
The ius commune features prominently in this case. It is considered in the section 
noted in the summae as: “Exemplaris facta ei cui minus legitima est relictum, non valet.” 76 
Here, the term is mentioned five times:77  
 
[1] quia si aucta, ut inquit, fuerit legitima 
iuris communis, ex forma statutorum vel 
consue. secundum quam tenetur relinquere, 
ut hic. Tamen si minus legitima fuerit 
relictam, poterit agi ad supplementum.& 
idem Ioan. Calde.[consil. 32 tit. de testa. 
incip. an si statutum auget legitimam.] volens 
quod si statutum augeat legitimam, habent 
tunc locum iura disponentia de legitima. Et 
istud in terminis sentit… quia si aucta, ut 
inquit, fuerit legitima iuris communis, ex 
forma statutorum vel consue. secundum 
quam tenetur relinquere, ut hic. 
 
[1] because, as it is said, if the legitimate 
portion [of the inheritance] [prescribed by 
the] ius commune was increased, then [the 
testator] would be required to leave it 
according to the provision of the statute or 
custom, as in the present case. But if it was 
left less than the legitimate portion [of the 
inheritance], then one could sue to increase it. 
and the same [says] Ioannes Calderinus in 
[cons. 32, tit. de testamentis, in the incipit 
"whether a statute increases the legitimate 
portion [of the inheritance]", who had it that 
if the statute increases the legitimate 
[portion], then it is possible to dispose of it.  
 
 
[2] Unde hic concurrit consuetudo cum iure 
communi, concurrit quae debet aliquid ultra 
ius operari… 
 
[2] As here the custom agrees with the ius 
commune, it agrees that it should stretch the 
scope of the law… 
 
 
[3] Pro quo facit quod dicit dicit Bal. [in 
Rub. de causa possessionis & prop] quod ubi 
statutum venit ampliative ad ius commune, 
dicendum est idem esse in ampliante quod in 
ampliato… 
 
[3] From that follows what Baldus says that 
when a statute widens the scope [of a rule] of 
the ius commune, it should be said that the 
same applies to the statute that widens the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Translation: An example where it is not valid to leave less than the legitimate portion.  
77 Decisio 188, para 5. The term “ius commune” mentioned three times and “iure communi” twice.  
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[4] licet secus videatur esse, quando statutum 
dicit sufficere pro legitima quintam 
relinquere partem, etiam quoquo titulo, ut 
dicit Bald… 
[4] however, it is different when a statute 
provides that it is sufficient to leave a fifth 
part [of the inheritance] as legitimate quota, 
even on any basis, as says Baldus... 
 
 
[6]  statutum veniens derogative recipere 
interpretationem a iure communi passivam.   
 
[6] when statute derogates, it comes to 
receive interpretation passively by the ius 
commune. 
 
The reasoning in this case is clear, and can be divided into three main arguments. 
First, that where ius commune provides for something that is similar to what is already 
provided by the statute, then it must be of the same idea; ultimately it must not exceed the 
limits of the existing rule in any material sense. Secondly, that where statute derogates from 
the ius commune, it is not to be interpreted according to the latter. Third, continuing from the 
second point made by Bohier, he makes reference to Baldus’ position that the nature of the 
interpretation is of a passive nature.78 It ought to be acknowledged that an alternative reading 
of this text is possible. This is one where Bohier explains that statute can be read in keeping 
with the ius commune, or can be interpreted as distinct from it, where there is evidence of a 
clear departure, but in that case, judges would still think in terms of the ius commune, which 
will therefore have an impact, however inadvertent. However, this interpretation is less 
convincing given that Bohier stresses to qualify statute’s authority through a rebuttal of 
alternative interpretations that would otherwise suggest a harmonious reading. These three 
arguments have been outlined above, but can be summarised thus: where statute offers 
something different to the ius commune, it is invalid; statute needs to be interpreted according 
to the ius commune; and finally statute is automatically assumed to receive passive 
interpretation according to the ius commune. However, it is possible to identify a shared 
approach between this alternative interpretation and the one promoted here, in the sense of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Baldus maintained that all statutes underwent a passive interpretation of the ius commune. See discussion by 
M. Bellomo, The common legal past of Europe, 1000-1800, (Washington, D.C., 1995), [translated from the 
original Italian] [1988], p. 193. This is considered below in the treatment of citations.    
 
 
[5] quoniam statutum derogans seu veniens 
derogative ad ius commune, non debet 





[5] because when statute derogates from the 
ius commune, it should not be interpreted 
according to the ius commune, but simply as 
it is. 
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“passive interpretation” and the idea that judges would think in terms of the ius commune in 
any case, regardless of the manner of statute’s interpretation.   
This case is an example of where the ius commune is mentioned, and here, a number 
of times, but it is not a chief component of the overall decision.  Therefore, the extent to 
which the above three arguments are Bohier’s own, or whether they are only an effort by him 
to expose the different approaches to the case at hand, is not entirely known. This does not 
reduce their value. Bohier’s reference to them is indicative of his recognition that they are 
arguments bearing validity and whether they support or oppose his own concluding remarks 
or decisions (which much of the time remain off the page), or not, is not where the value of 
the reference lies.  
 
4.3.1 When a statute widens the scope of the ius commune 
 
Bohier first states that because custom agrees with the ius commune, it ought to 
stretch its scope - “ultra ius operari” - can also be seen at decisio 113.  There, it was also in 
relation to custom, and so suggests consistency in terms of Bohier’s approach. In this present 
case, Bohier states that statute also has the ability to broaden the ius commune: more 
accurately one of its rules. It is seemingly the case that a rule of the ius commune is prone to 
being altered by ius proprium, and further that it is possible by way of statute. In the Consilia, 
there was a clear dominance of ius commune over statute, in contrast to the more even-keeled 
customary rules, and so this statement by Bohier is most notable. 
Earlier, the occasional expansive role of the ius commune was considered, and a 
definition put forward. There, an expansive effect was defined as the need to interpret a 
source in this way could be conducted with the intention of enabling a more favourable 
conclusion for a legal matter, and to the benefit of those parties before a case. In the present 
decision, this expansive approach reappears, but with the ius commune serving as the subject. 
This is further revealing of how Bohier perceived the nature of the ius commune. If it were a 
loose collection of rules, then the need to broaden it, as Bohier claims statute is able to, would 
surely be unnecessary. When statute and custom are expanded in this way, through the ius 
commune, the content of the rule being broadened is, presumably, though less so in the case 
of custom perhaps, readily identifiable along with the rule’s boundaries. For the ius commune 
to be the subject of expansion, therefore, suggests one of two things. First, that the term was 
something particular, with a set meaning, at least set enough so as to warrant expansion when 
the need arose. Secondly, and more likely, that Bohier is avoiding the need to declare that 
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statute contravenes ius commune in this instance. Ordinarily in those circumstances where 
statute transcends ius commune, Bohier has proceeded by harmonising the former so that it is 
in line with the latter. This case therefore differs from the regular pattern that has been found 
elsewhere in the Decisiones and the Consilia. 
 
4.3.2 Passive interpretation by the ius commune 
 
Later, Bohier states that statute ought to undergo passive interpretation by the ius 
commune. The extension of a statute’s words to include a situation not directly provided for   
was one approach of the commentators, known as “interpretatio activa”. 79 However, they 
also dealt with a statute’s restriction to “exclude cases which its general words seem to 
include.”80 This is referred to as “interpretatio passiva”, and the issue raised here is not 
whether statute’s words ought to be restricted, but whether ius commune will be read into 
statutes.81 It was deemed necessary to “read sound common law policy into loose and widely 
phrased statutory generalisations”.82 On this matter, Baldus stated: “Hoc est dicere, quod ius 
commune informat statuta et vestit, sed non informatur nec vestitur ab eis, et hoc propter 
virutem attractivam, quam habet ius commune ad municipale, non e contra…”83 So, the ius 
commune is read into statutes, and similarly, only those statutes may be “freely extended 
beyond their literal word content that do not restrain the common law.”84  
This example illustrates that there was a requirement, or tendency, to refer to the ius 
commune even where, as shown in the case above, the terms of the statute went beyond it, 
and so underwent an expansive, or passive, interpretation itself. Clearly, the ius commune 
was not a matter of “last resort”85 in judicial practice to choose a rule that suited. If this were 
so, statute would surely have fitted well enough. Bohier refers to Bartolus and to the Digest 
directly, as authority for his statement on passive interpretation. He makes reference to 
Bartolus’ commentary on D.35.2. For Bartolus, statutes underwent a passive interpretation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 S. Thorne, Essays in English legal history, (London, 1985), p. 9.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid.	  
82 Ibid.  
83 Baldus, c.1. X de constitut. 1, 2, 15. Translation: That is to say, that the ius commune informs statutes and 
give legal shape, but it is not informed, nor is given legal shape with them, and have been made for the sake of 
interest, which belongs to the ius commune of the town, and not to the contrary.  
84 Ibid. 	  
85 Bellomo, (n. 78), p. 194.  
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from the ius commune.86 Bellomo has stated that this illustrates “that no norm on any level of 
the ius proprium (royal city, corporative, or other) could be applied without taking the 
accepted doctrines of the ius commune into account...”87 In the present case, Bohier is making 
a clear link with his own attitude towards statute and the ius commune, with that of Bartolus’.  
This decisio is marked by a considerable number of citations, many of which directly 
accompany the use of the term ius commune. For the first part of the discussion, namely that 
which prohibits statute from adding anything further to a rule that is already provided for by 
the ius commune, Bohier cites Baldus’ commentary on C.6.28.4 (a. 531). For the second part 
of his argument involving the term ius commune, Bohier cites Paulus Castrensis (1360-1441), 
Alexander de Imola (1424-1477), and Baldus.   
 
4.4 Decisio 244: Testamentary provision between husband and wife 
  
 This case concerns testamentary provision and the rights and obligations of a 
husband in relation to the estate of his wife. Bohier’s summae informs us of the 
circumstances of the case:88  
 
Maritus qui promisit exequi testamentum 
vxoris, non tenetur in eo quod ultra debitum 
ipsa relinquit. 
 
A husband that promises to carry out the will 
of his wife, is not liable beyond what she has 
left as [her] debt.  
 
 The case also considers the Canon law, with reference to the issue of Papal 
privilege.89 The ius commune is mentioned once in this decision. It is considered alongside 
statute and custom at a crucial part of Bohier’s reasoning:90 
 
quod si vir ex statuto vel consuetudo debeat 
habere dimidiam partem in bonis vxoris, vel 
econtra vxor in bonis viri, & imperator 
concesserit viro vel vxori, ut possit libere 
testari & c. quod vir vel vxor debet testari 
secundum ius municipale seu consuetudo per 
id quod legitur in [l.Gallus.quidam recte ff.de 
For if the husband is entitled to half the 
wife's estate according to the statute or 
custom, or vice versa the wife to the 
husband's and the prince had granted the 
husband or the wife so to freely dispose [of 
their assets] by will etc. that the husband or 
the wife must make their will according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 M. Sbriccoli, L'interpretazione dello statuto. Contributo allo studio della funzione dei giuristi nell'età 
comunale, (Naples, 1974), pp. 440-441. Baldus recounts his master’s view: Super decretalibus, ad X.1.2.9, De 
constitutionibus, (Lyon, 1551).  
87 Bellomo, (n. 78), p. 193.  
88 Decisio 244, pr. 3.  
89 Discussed specifically at Decisio 244, para 3. 
90 Ibid.  
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liberis & posthu.] videlicet ut dimidiam 
teneatur relinquere viro vel vxori, & non 
ultra testari in praeiudicium partis & 
portionis viri: alias esset donare vxori, 
contra consuetudinem & ius commune, 
secundum quod debet regulari privilegium 
aut licentia data:[ut dixi in d.2 col.5 de 
consuetudi.mat.& pro hac Decis.facit quod 
dicit Alb. de Rosa]… 
 
 
the municipal law or [local] custom… it is 
clear that they are bound to leave half [of 
their asset] to the husband or the wife, and 
they cannot dispose [of their assets] by will 
beyond [that] in prejudice of the [legitimate] 
portion of the husband. Otherwise it would 
be making a donation to the wife against 
custom and ius commune, according to which 
the privilege or freedom [that was] granted as 
I said in ... and according to that decisio it's 
applicable as said Albericus de Rosate… 
 
The ius proprium, in the form of both custom and statute, are set off against a specific 
individual privilege made by the Emperor. In turn, local law, in the form of this privilege, 
wins and seemingly trumps both statute and custom. The ius commune is mentioned in 
conjunction with custom; a possible nod to their equal, or at least, similar status. In this case, 
it appears that a specific privilege enjoys what custom typically has done in other cases; 
namely that where it trumps or at least is equal to ius commune.  Like with other cases 
included in this study,91 this case can be reduced to a competition between the secular and 
ecclesiastical. In those other decisions, the ius commune was applied, but recourse was made 
to Papal authority to acknowledge it in a way that suggested a justification for the application 
of the ius commune was needed in those cases that touched on ecclesiastical jurisdiction or 
rules. This present case therefore goes further still by actively approving a Papal privilege 
over the provision of both ius commune and customary law. Just before the term, the Digest is 
cited, at D.28.2. Looking back to the start of the part of the decisio that deals with the ius 
commune, reference is made to Baldus, C.3.28.9 and C.6.42. Earlier still, in the preceding 
part of the case, Bohier cites Baldus again, together with Alexander de Imola, Angelus de 
Aretinus and Jason de Mayno on C.6.42.  
 
5. Other matters  
Some cases do not fit into either of the two categories of procedural or matrimonial 
issues presented here. These are included now, and include cases dealing with the sale of 
property92 and feudal law.93 Despite falling outwith the two main categories that have tended 
to typify those decisions featuring the ius commune, these cases still have the familiar feature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Decisio 2 and 69. 
92 Decisio 231. 
93 Decisio 263.  
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of competition, whether it was between the ius commune and statute, custom, or with feudal 
customary law. These are considered below.  
 
5.1 Decisio 230: Sale of property  
 
The ius commune is mentioned once here, as part of a discussion that also considers 
statute and custom:  
 
Tamen quicquid sit de iure, ut inquit Alberic. 
in [d.l.] extat consuetudo, tamen servatur. & 
in [d. hoc senatusconsultum]. dicit ita servari 
Bononiae, & in Lombardia, & idem in [d.le 
nutu.fideicommissum] quia consuetudo vel 
statutum potest tollere in hoc ius commune 
[l.omnes populi.ff.de iustit.& iure.&l.de 
quibus.ff.de legibus].& maxime, ut delicta 
puniantur… 
however, whatever is [the rule] according to 
the law / whatever it may be de iure, as 
Albericus argued in ... it is to be kept. 
[Albericus] says that, similarly, the [custom] 
of Bologna is observed, and [the same] in 
Lombardy… because a custom or a statute 
can derogate from the ius commune in this 
subject and above all so that delicts be 
punished… 
 
5.1.1 “In hoc ius commune” 
 
In this small section of the case where the term is mentioned, much is revealed. There 
are three main components to this discussion. First, the chief statement that custom or statute 
can derogate from the ius commune in this particular case. Here, custom and statute are used 
interchangeably to represent the ius proprium. This leads to the conclusion that ius proprium, 
generally, trumps ius commune in this case. Secondly, that this finding is applicable across 
Bologna, Lombardy and here. Thirdly, attention ought to be paid to the use of “in hoc” by 
Bohier when referring to the ius commune, as Bohier is either restricting or specifying the 
particular circumstances in which the ius commune can be removed in this way. However, is 
arguably this initial statement – the ius commune can be removed by statute and custom – that 
is most striking.  
A number of the decisions represented in this study have involved the substitution of 
custom in the place of ius commune. Statute, however, has tended to be absent from such 
applications. For custom to replace ius commune then, although still notable, is in line with 
other cases. It is the equation of custom with statute, however, that is surprising, and with it, 
its ability to remove ius commune.   
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Bohier cites D.1.1.9 and D.1.3.32, together with D.9.2.51.94 There is no juristic 
authority to accompany these references. The second of the three Digest citations is cited 
elsewhere in the Decisiones and in the Consilia alongside the term ius commune.  
 
5.2 Decisio 263: Feudal matters  
 
The specifics of this case decided by Bohier are complex. It concerns an area of 
feudal law, and more specifically that of custom. The quaestio at the start of the decision 
offers some context on the matter.95  The ius commune is mentioned twice in this case. Both 
suggest the superiority of customary law over the ius commune.  The first reference is found 
in a discussion about the custom of a court, and the practice of identifying the relevant 
custom (feudal and local) to apply in a case. It reads thus:   
 
Et sic consuetudo Curiae… decidit hanc 
quaestionem, quae consuetud. in hoc attendi 
debet (refs.)... quod particularis & localis 
consuetudo est in causis feudalibus 
decidendis semper attendenda, ac etiam 
praefertur, & postea generalis constitutio 
feudorum, quib. deficientibus, ius commune 
Romanorum.  Et ideo dicit ibi tex. strenuus 
legisperitus rigidas factorum consuetudines 
sic in suis retineat terminis, quod non 
egrediatur ulterius, sed ubi casus, qui 
consuetudine feudi non fuerit comprehensus, 
absque calumnia utatur lege scripta… 
 
And thus the custom of the court ...  decided 
[on] this issue, which should be decided 
according to the custom ... where it is said 
first, that local customs are always to be 
followed and take precedence when deciding 
on feudal matters, and then, general feudal 
law [must be followed], and in their absence 
the ius commune of the Romans. And so the 
text states here [that] a serious jurist [is to] 
uphold the strict customs of the facts on their 
own terms, so not to go beyond [them] but 
where a case is not included in feudal 
custom, that jurist should legitimately turn to 
the written law…  
 
Bohier continues, referring again to the term. Here, he refers to the term in a way that 
has not been identified elsewhere in the Decisiones and Consilia also:96  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 “[l. omnes populi. ff. de iustit. & iure. & l. de quibus. ff. de legibus. & maxime, ut delicta puniantur. l. ita 
vulneratus. ff. ad l. Aquil...]” 
95 “Quaestio for this decision reads as: Quid si per pactum investiturae dicatur vasallum tenere feudum ab 
aliquo domino ad fidem & homagium ligium, ac etiam deverium gratiae, seu de mercede alias appellatum… Et 
etiam recognitiones prestationes fidelitatis idem dicat, & vasallus permutet feudum, rachaptus [sic] visis verbis 
praedictae investiturae, ac recognitiones debeantur domino signanter, cum in una fidelitatis praestatione 
dicatur ultra praedicta verba ad mortuam manum alias appellatum rachaptum.” Translation: “According to the 
terms of the enfeoffment, the vassal is considered as holding the fief from a lord to whom he owes homage, as 
well as the payment of the duties sometimes called rachapt. Homage is paid more than once and similarly is 
fealty pledged. The vassal exchanges fief. The rachapt and feudal duties, considering the wording of the said 
enfeoffment, are surely owed to the lord, for the fealty pledge encompasses the mortmain or rachapt.” 
“96 Decisio 263, para 7.  
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quod in materia consuetudinis argui potest 
per similitudinem consuetudinis, id est, de 
similibus ad similia… quia consuetudines 
locales sunt, & dictuntur in eo loco ius 
commune. 
 
That on the subject of custom, it is possible 
to argue by way of similar customs, that is, 
from similar to similar… since customs are 
local, and in that place they are said [to be] 
the ius commune. 
 
No citations accompany Bohier’s mention of the term ius commune Romanorum here. 
The second reference, however, features some familiar citations. Here, Bohier cites D.1.3.32  
and Baldus.97 The absence of any citations to accompany the first use of the term is 
nonetheless revealing of Bohier’s mindset when using it. When citations do not accompany 
the term it is possible to deduce its mention as being general in nature: a loose term that 
would be immediately clear to both the reader and writer of the legal text.  
 The second use of the term reveals a reference to Baldus and it is an important one in 
terms of revealing Bohier’s approach to custom. In his commentary on D.1.3.32, Baldus 
states that “consuetudo extenditur de similibus ad similia”.98 Here, in this case, Bohier makes 
a similar claim. This suggests that for Bohier, custom extends to similar cases by analogy.99 
He makes reference to this in other works also,100 demonstrating a consistent approach, and 
adoption of Baldus’ stance on this issue.  
 
5.2.2 “Ius commune Romanorum”   
 
The addition of “Romanorum” makes it obvious that he is referring specifically to 
Roman law. Bohier’s need to add this word to the term ius commune does however then 
suggest that the references to the term in all other cases are not strictly referring only to the 
Roman law, in this sense. Is is worth considering whether this was a concerted effort by 
Bohier to demarcate between an idea of ius commune as showing that this is strictly Roman, 
in that it is purposively separate from any other notion of ius commune that includes Canon 
law, for example. Is this revealing of an otherwise utrumque ius version of ius commune? Is 
this the equivalent of ius civile Romanorum?101  Bohier has chosen to term it in this way and 
this is worthy of note.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 “[d. l. de quibus de legi. & Bald. in c.1.Imperiales. versicu. quaero utrum. de pace Constan.] dicens, etiam 
unam quaque civitatem suas proprias habere consuetudines. [l. neminem]”.  
98 The Venice edition (1599), reprinted in 2004 (8 volumes) was used here. 
99 Bartolus, ad D.1.3.32, pr. 5: “Consuetudo extenditur de similibus ad similia” 
100 For example, see Consuetudines Biturigium, (1547), folio 10, nu. 11. Discussed in this thesis at chapter 5 on 
the Consuetudines, at 2.1, “Baldus’ understanding of consuetudo”, and 4.3, “Guardianship: ward’s estate”.  
101 W. Decock, Theologians and contract Law, (London, 2012), p. 32. “Verbum illud ius commune de iure 
communi Romanorum intelligitur” (Decius, Consilia II, 469, incip. "Visa inquisitione", para 12).   
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 Let us assume that Bohier here is referring to the ius commune in this way with the 
“Romanorum” addition without any symbolic purpose; his interpretation of the ius commune 
here is the same as his usual reference and the addition is incidental. This is still important. 
This reveals that his conception of the ius commune generally rests with the Roman law. 
Alternatively, let it be argued that Bohier does mean to distinguish this reference to the term 
ius commune here from others he makes elsewhere; a more likely explanation. This suggests 
that the term encompasses a range of meanings, and therefore calls into question the meaning 
of the other mentions of the term. It leads to the question of whether in cases of a reference to 
the “ius commune” Bohier is typically referring to a utrumque ius understanding of the term. 
Clearly, Bohier felt motivated to distinguish the term and refer specifically to it as a 
representative of the Roman law. The lack of accompanying citations serves to portray the 
term as one of a general nature, representing the Roman law generally, and not necessarily 
through juristic commentaries.  
 
 
5.2.3 “Customs are the ius commune in that place” 
 
It is Bohier’s second use of the ius commune that is arguably most valuable in terms 
of its potential to reveal the meaning he attached to the term. Here, following on from his 
rejection of the ius commune, by favouring customary law, Bohier offers a justification for 
this earlier treatment. He equates custom with ius commune, arguing analogously with the 
two sources. He goes further by referring to customs as local in nature; that their origin and 
value relate to a specific place. In that case, then, he contends, customs are the ius commune 
of the local place within which they operate.   
Elsewhere, when custom and ius commune have met in a source, Bohier has typically 
done one of two things. First, an attempt has been made to interpret in a way so that minimal 
harm is caused to the ius commune, achieving a balanced handling of sources. Or, as seen in 
two cases elsewhere in the Decisiones, delivering an outright statement of custom prevailing 
over the ius commune. Neither is done here. Instead, Bohier says that a type of ius commune 
does apply, but that it is a customary law one. Bohier therefore clearly still felt it was 
necessary to have a ius commune of sorts in existence, despite it being instead of a customary 
nature: by saying that customs are the ius commune of a specific place still acknowledges a 
need or desire for an over-arching authority, floating even, or recourse to something more 
than simply stating a custom applies in this place.  
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It is reasonable to interpret this equation of custom and ius commune here with the 
theory that Bohier saw the term as representing an overarching source of authority expanding 
beyond the specifics of regions and small localities, to which the likes of custom and statute 
applied, and so different to ius proprium. This is not surprising, and correlates with the 
traditional concept of the ius commune as a repository of ideas and concepts, resting 
somewhere above the ius proprium. Whatever Bohier’s conception of the ius commune was, 
he is providing for custom to wield the same authority and bear the same nature. This 
suggests that the term was something more than just a representation of a collective group of 
authoritative citations, though some do appear more often alongside the term than others. For 
if that were the case, this statement of Bohier’s would make little sense. Instead, it is likely 
that here he is alluding to the general assumed dominance of the ius commune which seems to 
have a presumed application in most cases. In this sense then Bohier is calling for the feudal 
customary law in this case to be regarded with the same authority as is typically given to the 
ius commune as standard. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The Decisiones Burdegalenses demonstrates that Bohier referred extensively to those 
jurists belonging to the mos italicus tradition. His reliance on Baldus, in particular, is notable, 
and consistent with the findings from the Consilia.102 This is consistent with Wijffels’ 
contention that the eventual demise of the mos italicus took place in the sixteenth century. 103 
The ius commune often performed the role of “benchmark” against which other 
sources stand. Often the relationship between ius commune and other sources of legal 
authority were varied. This is consistent with the idea of it as benchmark term, as it typically 
does not produce uniform results. Instead, its operation is very much dependent on the 
sources which are held up against it. According to this, then, it is entirely possible for ius 
commune to produce different results according to the individual circumstances of the case, 
and the role of, say, customary law.  
This is also consistent with the idea of “interpretation according to the ius commune”, 
a common approach seen in many cases, including that of passive interpretation.104 The 
language used in such cases, which make up a significant proportion of those examined, adds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See chapter 3 of this thesis.  
103 A. Wijffels, (n. 10), p. 134. See earlier in this chapter at 1.1, “Legal practice and tensions”.  
104 An example of passive interpretation is seen in Decisio 188.  
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further weight to this theory. Where Bohier states “intelligitur secundum ius commune”, 
“interpretabitur secundum ius commune”, or “recipere interpretationem a iure communi 
passivam”, each variation is compatible with the concept of the ius commune as a benchmark. 
Whether the source in question, such as custom or statute, is understood, interpreted or 
receives interpretation by the ius commune, each suggests something of an existing standard 
against which they are assessed before application. Assuming the ratio legis is conceived of 
as referring to the content of the law, the ius commune, it seeks out existing legal interests 
and takes into consideration the surrounding environment within which it is expected to 
operate.105  
 The Canon law enjoys a prominent position among those cases considered. It is well 
represented in the citations used by Bohier, but also in the nature of the cases he considers 
that feature the term, namely those concerning matrimonial issues and procedure. Moreover, 
it arises particularly in those decisions where ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction meet, 
especially where there is doubt over which of the two ought to handle a point of law. In these 
cases, the ius commune is applied in a delicate manner, with Bohier ensuring that recourse is 
made to Papal authority and it is possible to detect a real sense of effort in justifying its use. 
That the ius commune is found in such cases is revealing both in terms of the substantive 
meaning of the term to Bohier, but also what it possibly represented in a conceptual sense in 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 M. Tella, Equity and the law, (Leiden, 2008), p. 154.  








1.  The Consuetudines as a source  
 
Thus far we have only examined reported decisions and legal opinions. The 
Consuetudines Biturigium instead offers an example of a commentary on customary 
law, and a break from recounting decisions and opinions stemming from law in 
action. First published in 1508, the Consuetudines Biturigium is an early example of 
the many written customs ordered at this time.1  Attempts have been made to 
categorise Bohier’s position on custom and its relationship with other sources of law 
in this chapter.  
According to John Ford, Bohier believed custom “should be treated as a 
statute in need of strict interpretation and that in dealing with issues left unresolved by 
the express provisions of the custom he should follow the common opinions of the 
schools.”2 Despite this emphatic statement, when compared with the likes of Charles 
Dumoulin (1500-1566), 3  or Barthélemy de Chasseneuz, 4  for example, Bohier’s 
approach to custom has not received enough attention. This is particularly true in the 
case of understanding its relationship with other sources of law such as the ius 
commune. The position of Dumoulin, for instance, is known: he stated that in France, 
Roman law is followed out of choice, given that it is in line with equity and is 
relevant to the issue at hand, and not because they are bound to follow Justinian and 
his successors. Further, he states that citations are made to Roman law for annotation 
purposes but not in a significant sense.5 Dumoulin’s attitude towards Bohier and his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Consuetudines inclite civitatis et septene Biturigensis (Paris, 1508). See E. Armstrong, Before 
Copyright: The French Book-Privilege System 1498-1526 (Cambridge, U.K., 1990), p. 75 for details of 
printing privilege for this work. The initiative for official reformation and recording of local customs 
came from the king. See below in this chapter at 1.2, and earlier in chapter 2, 9.1.1.  
2 J. Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland During the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2007), p. 268. 
3 On Charles Dumoulin generally see: J. Thireau, Charles du Moulin, 1500-1566: étude sur les 
sources, la méthode, les idées politiques et économiques d'un juriste de la Renaissance, Volume 1, 
(Geneva, 1980).  
4 On Barthélemy de Chasseneuz generally see: J. Pignot, Un jurisconsulte au seizième siècle: 
Barthelemy de Chasseneuz, premier commentateur de la coutume de Bourgogne et président du 
parlement de Provence; sa vie et ses oeuvres, (Paris, 2008).  
5 Ford, (n. 2), pp. 252-253.  
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works on law in action were considered earlier in this thesis.6 He was critical about 
their authenticity and sought to undermine their value. It is likely that this attitude to 
Bohier and his Decisiones have filtered through to his customary law work also.  
While better known than his other works, the role and meaning of the ius commune in 
the Consuetudines has not been the subject of a dedicated study.  
Given the custom-centred nature of the Consuetudines, it is anticipated that 
where the ius commune is mentioned, it will be always regarding its relationship with 
custom, and in this sense, the findings from this work are to be received differently 
from those found in the Consilia and Decisiones, where there is no emphasis on a 
specific source, but only the circumstances of the legal issue or case before Bohier.  
This work is therefore very different to those that are practice-focused, and it is 
appropriate to treat it sensitively.  
 
1.1 History of custom in France 
 
The history of custom is the subject of much literature,7 and specifically the 
peculiar case of the French customs, which have their own unique history. This work 
will not attempt any great literature study of custom and its nature as it exceeds the 
remit of this thesis. Instead, a general history of custom in France will be given. It 
may be brief but will provide context for what follows; namely the treatment of 
custom and its relationship with ius commune in Bohier’s Consuetudines Biturigium.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See chapter 4, Decisiones Burdegalenses, at 1.  
7 For an overview of custom and its place in European history, see D. Bederman, Custom as a source of 
law, (Cambridge, U.K., 2010); A. Wijffels, “Ius commune, comparative law and public governance”, in 
M. Adams and D. Heirbaut, (eds.), The method and culture of comparative law: essays in honour of 
Mark Von Hoecke, (Cambridge, U.K., 2014), pp. 147-160. On the droit commun and custom, see P. 
Petot, “Le droit commun en France selon les coutumiers”, (1960) 38 Revue Historique de Droit 
Français et Étranger 412-429; G. Giordanengo, “Jus commune et 'droit commun' en France du XIIIe 
au XVe siecle’, in J. Kyrnen (ed.), Droit Romain, jus civile, et droit français, (Paris, 2009), pp. 220-
247. On the recording of customary law, see J. Dawson, “The codification of the French customs”, 
(1940) 38 Michigan Law Review 765; R. Filhol, “L'unification des coutumes sous Louis XI”, (1994) 
194 Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger 317. For a comparative perspective, see M. Kim, 
Law and custom in Korea: comparative legal history, (Oxford, U.K., 2012), pp.13-20, and generally on 
this, see A. Perreau-Saussine, and J. Murphy, (eds.), The nature of customary law: legal, historical and 
philosophical perspectives, (Cambridge, U.K., 2007). For an overview of the vast range of customary 
works written throughout France, see J. Caswell and I. Sipkov, (eds.), The coutumes of France in the 
library of congress: an annotated bibliography, (Washington, D.C., 1977). On the later role of custom, 
see Z. Scheider, The king’s bench: bailiwick magistrates and local governance in Normandy 1670-
1740, (Rochester, 2008), pp. 95-123.  
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Treatises, coutumiers, form a genre of legal literature that first appeared in the 
twelfth century.8 They set the customs and usages of a region in writing, and were 
“the legal literature of the lay courts.” 9  The size of such works would vary 
considerably, as did the use of authorities, with some texts making use of Roman or 
Canonic sources, and others little or none.10 The authors of these works were 
associated with the courts, often involved in court pleadings or in a judicial capacity.11 
To take an example from this period, one of the most notable and influential authors 
was Philippe de Beaumanoir (1250-1296), a jurist and royal official, whose Coutumes 
de Beauvaisis is “the longest and most significant work on customary law to survive 
from thirteenth-century France.” 12 His treatment of the common law, the droit 
commun, and its relationship with custom, is noteworthy. Since de Beaumanoir never 
explained what was meant by his reference to the droit commun, there has been 
debate on the meaning he attached to the term. Some argue he was alluding to the 
Roman law, as incorporated into custom, canon law and feudal law.13 Others, such as 
André Castaldo contend that the expression was linked with general customs, and 
when the term was used it was accompanying explicit references to issues of 
customary law and not learned law.14 
In the Coutumiers of the early thirteenth century, then, it is possible that the 
droit commun was customary law.15 Some of the most significant influences in the 
customary law works came via the Canon law, with issues of marriage, dowry and 
inheritance being the most clearly affected.  
By the late fifteenth century, customs, already influenced by the principles of 
the learned law and “reshaped by the decisions on appeal of royal courts, were altered 
by the assemblies of the three estates that approved them and by the royal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A-M. Kuskowski, “The development of written custom in England and in France”, in R. Kaeuper 
(ed.), Law, governance, and justice: new views on medieval constitutionalism, (Leiden, 2013), p. 103.  
9 Ibid.   
10 Ibid.   
11 E. Cohen, The crossroads of justice: law and culture in late medieval France, (Leiden, 1993), p. 32. 
12 F. Cheyette, Dictionary of the middle ages, (New York, 1982-89), p. 144. On Beaumanoir, see F. 
Akehurst, The coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, (Philadelphia, 1992) and 
S. Heller, et al (eds.), Essays on the poetic and legal writings of Philippe de Remy and his son Philippe 
de Beaumanoir of thirteenth century France, (Lewiston, 2001).  
13 Kuskowski, (n. 8), p. 109, and further P. van Wetter, “Le droit romain et Beaumanoir”, in H. Fitting 
(eds.), Mélanges Fitting, (Paris, 1908), 538.  
14 A. Castaldo, “Pouvoir royal, droit savant et droit commune coutumier dans le France du Moyen 
Âge. À de vues nouvelles II. Le droit romain est-il droit commun?”, (2009) 47 Droits: Revue Française 
de théorie, de philosophie et de cultures juridiques 173. 
15 Castaldo further contends that reference to the ius commune in other works, such as thirteenth 
century parlement records, also do not refer to Roman law, but to customary law. Ibid, p. 221.  
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commissioners and the parlements that ratified them”.16 They became royal law, and 
as a result of the process of recording, homologation, became the collective 
“customary law”. The sixteenth century was marked by a period of homologation, 
with customs being reduced to writing and collated systematically en masse. This 
move by King Charles VII was motivated by a desire to increase monarchic control 
over local and regional laws and to promote unity amongst the regions of France. In 
1454, the Edict Montil-lez-Tours required the reordering of customary law in this 
respect.17  
This period of homologation renewed interest into the ius proprium and so 
“provided the reception of Roman law with fresh stimulus.”18 The study of customary 
law in this way hastened the fusion of this law with techniques and concepts that were 
of Roman law origin. Indeed, there are those who saw the Roman law “at least in a 
subsidiary capacity, within the droit de coutumier.”19 These homologated works were 
relied on and used by those in legal practice and were the product of customary law as 
selected, interpreted and recorded by those jurists like Bohier, and directly applied in 
legal practice. Homologation relates to the overarching issue of state-building and 
legal nationalism; both of which were key components of the early modern period, 
and touched upon at the start of this thesis in some detail.20 It is likely that the use and 
meaning of the ius commune as a concept will have changed accordingly. Although 
the Consuetudines Biturigium is not a product of law in action like the Consilia and 
Decisiones, it is ultimately as important: the meaning of customary law and its 
contents had gone through a focused and deliberate movement that involved intensive 
analysis of their contents and scrutiny as to their application, which was then relied on 
in legal practice. Understanding the content of customary law provisions recorded in 
this way is therefore crucial to understanding the practical application of these laws in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 T. Lange, The first French reformation: church reform and the origins of the old regime (New York, 
2014), p. 56.  
17 D. Margolf, Religion and royal justice in early modern France: the Paris chambre de l’édit, 1598-
1665, (Kirksville, 2003), p. 15.  
18 R. Lesaffer, European legal history: a cultural and political perspective, (Cambridge, U.K., 2009) 
[translated from the original Dutch] [2004], p. 364.  
19 A. Tardif, Histoire des Sources de Droit Français: Origines Romaines, (Paris, 1890), p. 278.  
20 See chapter 1, “Bohier’s France: 1469-1539”.  
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practice, and to appreciating the role and meaning of the ius commune in a practical 
sense.21  
 
2. Bohier’s understanding of consuetudo  
 
The early modern idea of custom as an “object of social and historical 
thinking”22 can be seen in the commentaries of François Connan (1508-1551)23 who 
saw the ius civile as not only the particular tradition of Rome, but also generally to the 
customs and laws of modern nations, and to what Baldus calls the modern law of 
nations: ius novissimum gentium. 24  Therefore, custom was the ruler of society.  
Donald R. Kelley has stated that consuetudo could not be “identified with natural 
instinct or with universal reason; nor could it be investigated and understood in such 
naturalistic and super- or subhuman terms”.25 This ties in with a definition of 
consuetudo found in the repertorium to Bohier’s Consuetudines, where he states:  
 
Consuetudo, maxima pars est iuris quo 
mundus regitur… 
 
Custom is the main part of the law 
through which the world is governed… 
 
This statement depicts consuetudo as something with broad application. This 
is mentioned here because of the link between the ius civile, consuetudo and ius 
commune. The ius commune is mentioned in the Digest at D.1.1.6 where it is stated 
that it is a larger body of law in which the ius civile is the subset, and so too is the 
likes of the ius gentium. If, as Connan says, the ius civile is to be thought of as 
encompassing consuetudo, then, according to the Digest, the ius commune ultimately 
encompasses consuetudo also, as it is the larger body of law within which these sit.26 
In basic terms, it is the idea of the written law at the centre, with consuetudo sitting in 
the middle, and the ius commune on the outer periphery that presents itself.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See generally:  D. Kelley, “Second nature: the idea of custom in European law, society, and culture”, 
in A. Blair and A. Grafton (eds.), The transmission of culture in early modern Europe, (Philadelphia, 
1990), pp. 131-172.  
22 Ibid, p. 143.  
23 Commentaria iuris civilis, (Paris, 1557).  
24 Kelley, (n. 21), p. 143. 
25 Ibid, p. 145.  
26 Commentaria iuris civilis (Paris, 1557), fol. 43.  
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Consuetudo, according to Baldus, is used in order to interpret the written law, and in 
turn ius commune is used to interpret consuetudo and written law.27 
 
Looking to the repertorium of the Consuetudines Biturigium, there is a 
mention of the ius commune under the entry for consuetudo:28  
 
Ubi consuetudo se refert iuri communi, 
debet intelligi secundum ius commune. 
  
Where custom refers to the ius commune 
it ought to be understood according to the 
ius commune. 
 
It is not known whether Bohier himself wrote this entry, or whether it is a later 
addition at the time of publication.29 Given that this 1508 edition was published 
within Bohier’s lifetime, it is likely that he had an influence in its preparation. This is 
therefore an example of his thinking in terms of the relationship between custom and 
ius commune. Alternatively, if it is the product of an editorial addition, it is still the 
result of a reference to the content of the work itself and thus a summary of what the 
general approach, or perceived approach, by Bohier was deemed to be. Other entries 
under consuetudo reveal further insights into terminological definitions.  
On those occasions where statute is mentioned, it is done so alongside the 
term consuetudo in the form “statutum vel consuetudo” or “consuetudo, statutum, vel 
lex”. According to Ford, Bohier treated the local customs of France like “statuta”.30 
Further, that in his case, “consideration should be first given to the local custom, then 
to the written law of the feus and then to the civil law.”31 The Digest, D.1.3.32 states 
that custom was a possible source of lex, on the grounds that it expressed the will of 
the populace, like statute.32 Although written, statute does not derive its authority 
from its written status, but from the people’s consent. Its position in relation to statute 
was therefore one of mutuality, at least in a conceptual sense. The practical 
application of this will be shown throughout this chapter when Bohier encounters the 
two alongside one another.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ad D.1.3.32 (fol. 16 v), In primam digesti veteris partem commentaria, (Venice, 1599).  
28 Consuetudines inclite civitatis et septene Biturigensis, (Paris, 1508). 
29 The first edition was published 1508 and is the edition consulted here.  
30 Ford, (n. 2), p. 252.  
31 Ibid.   
32 A. Cromartie, “The idea of common law as custom”, in A. Perreau-Saussine and J. Murphy (eds.), 
(n. 7), pp. 203-227 at p. 204.   
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2.1 Baldus’ understanding of consuetudo 
 
Any law student in the middle-ages would have been received an education 
based on the intensive study of the texts of Civil and Canon law.33 This was 
considered in greater detail earlier in this thesis. 34  Among these, the likes of 
commentators such as Bartolus and Baldus would have featured prominently. Given 
Bohier’s reliance on Baldus in particular, in the Consuetudines, it is possible to infer 
that his exposure to this jurist in his education would have informed his professional 
writing. It will be shown in this chapter that Bohier’s understanding of consuetudo 
was medieval and heavily influenced by Baldus’ own approach to the term.  
Baldus’ commentary on the Digest reveals a great deal about his own 
understanding of the term consuetudo.35 His treatment of D.1.3.32 is especially 
illuminating. Here, Baldus outlines his position on “statutes, senatus consulta, and 
long-established custom”, with some 141 individual points made by the jurist. He 
states that where lex (statute) is deficient, custom stands,36 and further that custom 
extends to similar cases by analogy.37 The use of custom takes place where there is no 
written law, either because there is none or it has fallen into desuetude.38 He 
differentiates between custom and statute through the different nature of their forms: 
that statute is written and custom is not.39 He further elucidates by stating that statute 
can be made at once, but that “consuetudo similis est homini”, in the sense that it 
progresses through time and ages like a human.40 He also states that the communis 
opinio doctorum should be enforced as if they were custom,41 and so demonstrating a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Given Bohier’s Montpellier legal education, it seems likely that he was influenced by the Italian 
approach to the law. See chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis for greater detail on University education of this 
period. Also: R. Helmholz, Natural law in court: a history of legal theory in practice, (Cambridge, 
MA., 2015), pp. 13-40; M. Bellomo, The common legal past of Europe, 1000-1800, (Washington, 
D.C., 1995), pp. 112-125; R. van Caenegem, An historical introduction to private law, (Cambridge, 
U.K., 1996), p. 80; J. Brundage, The medieval origins of the legal profession, Volume 1, (Chicago, 
2008), pp. 323-325; J. Brundage, “The teaching and study of canon law in the law schools”, in W. 
Hartmann, K. Pennington (eds.), The history of medieval canon law in the classical period, 1140-1234: 
from Gratian to the decretals of Pope Gregory IX, (Washington, D.C., 2008), pp. 98-120.   
34 See chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.  
35 Edition used is 1599 (Lyon).  
36 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 1: “Lex ubi deficit, statur consuetudini”.  
37 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 5: “Consuetudo extenditur de similibus ad similia” 
38 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 3:  “In quibus causis est utendum consuetudine”.  
39 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 7: “Lex, & consuetudo quomodo differant”. 
40 Ad D.1.3.32, para 9.  
41 Ad X.1.2.5, “opinio communis habet vim consuetudinis”, Syntagma communium opinionum, (Lyon 
1609), Praefatio, No. 33, cited by D. Ibbetson, “Custom in medieval law”, in Perreau-Saussine and 
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further dimension to Baldus’ understanding of the term consuetudo and it is possible 
to identify such an approach also being employed by Bohier in his Consuetudines.  
David Ibbetson has highlighted the main elements of consuetudo as: 
longstanding nature of a practice (inveterata), stemming from the tacit consent of the 
people; being unwritten (as distinct from statute); may not prevail over a contrary lex; 
and must not be contrary to ratio.42 The issue of popular consent43 in particular was 
vital to Baldus’ approach to consuetudo, and his was marked by a distinctly pro-
populus stance. The suggestion here was to “place the populus above the princeps as a 
source of law, but the more practical purpose was to reinforce the professional 
judicial monopoly over legal interpretation.” 44  In short, authority over the 
interpretation of consuetudo was to be steered away from the sovereign. Indeed, we 
see this preference for populus over princeps in Baldus’ treatment of D.1.3.32, where 
he outlines the view of Placentinus who states that only the princeps makes law and 
that as a result no custom can exist unless induced from the conscience of the 
princeps. In contrast, Baldus argues that this is not the case and that no such 
knowledge is needed.  
Consent underpins consuetudo, according to Baldus. The role of consent in 
Bohier’s understanding of consuetudo, and its similarity with D.1.3.32 was 
considered above.  As will be shown in this chapter, Bohier relies on Baldus’ 
commentary on this section of the Digest in the Consuetudines for a key part of his 
discussion.45  The jurists needed a way to distinguish non-binding practices from 
binding customary law, and they found this in the interlocking criteria of duration, 
repetition, and tacitus consensus.46 The extent to which this authority really stemmed 
from the people is debatable. It is perhaps more accurate to think of it as authority 
stemming from “the exercise of legislative sovereignty by the judges.”47 In this sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Murphy, (n. 7), p. 161. Now also see C. Humfress, “Law and custom under Rome” in A. Rio (ed.), 
Law, custom, and justice, (London, 2011), pp. 23-47.  
42 Ibid.   
43 Ford, (n. 2), p. 268. Earlier in this thesis, it has been recognised that the understanding of popular 
consent would have been with reference to what Ford has called learned opinion. See J. Ford, Law and 
Opinion in Scotland During the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 2007), p. 268. 
44 Kelley, (n. 21), p. 136. See further the recent work of D. Lee, Popular sovereignty in early modern 
constitutional thought, (Oxford, 2016), pp. 122-130.  
45 See below at 4.2.3.1. In the Consilia, it was shown that Bohier relied extensively on Bartolus and his 
approach to D.1.3.32. He relied on this for his treatment of stylus, and also for the concept of custom 
generally. See chapter 3 in this work for the study of the Consilia.  
46 E. Kadens and E.A. Young, “How customary is customary international law?’, (2013) 54 William 
and Mary Law Review 885 at 889.  
47 Ford, (n. 2), p. 311.  
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then, consent may be thought of as representing the authority of judiciary over that of 
the princeps.  
 
2.1.1 Baldus and the ius commune 
 
Baldus views the function of Roman law as both to supplement the customs 
and statutes, as well as providing a standard for their interpretation.48 He held that city 
customs and statutes were able to revoke provisions of Roman law in their own 
territory, in contrast to the position of local laws and canon law.49 He states: “for the 
common law is like the genus and municipal like the species; and if the municipal 
were to be contrary to the common law, it revokes it, both because it is later in time, 
and because species modifies genus.”50  
Where a custom provides for a matter already provided for by the Roman law, 
it does not revoke it, but suspends it according to Baldus. In short, where a special 
custom or statute exists, it succeeds over the ius commune, for it is specific to the 
locality and not of general influence:  
 
I say that local custom prevails there over the usage, that is the observance of 
Roman law; I do not however say that it would fundamentally eradicate the 
Roman law from that place, for these are two different things. For if it were 
completely to eradicate the Roman law from that place, and then, let us 
suppose, a statute were made annulling the custom, that place would be left 
without any law [D.1.2.2,1]. But because the Roman law has not been 
abolished, but only the effect of that law, when the custom has been annulled 
we remain within the common law, and this matter reverts to its natural state, 
because the law was not completely destroyed, only hidden.51 
 
According to Baldus, the so-called “natural state” is that where the ius 
commune operates: it is an assumed authority. The common law, the ius commune, is 
Roman law for Baldus. If Bohier had relied on Baldus’ position on custom, it follows 
that a similar adoption may have been made for the ius commune. If this were the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 J. Canning, The political thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, (Cambridge, U.K., 2003), p. 149; Canning 
cites D.12.1.2, 3 as evidence for this. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid, 149. Canning notes that elsewhere, Baldus states that the ius commune can be revoked by 
custom and statute, by presenting it as a group of mutable enactments. (eg. Inst.1.2.1, n. 19). 
51 Ad D.1.3.32 (fol. 16 v), translation by Canning, (n. 45), p. 150. For an example of this, see below in 
this chapter at 8.1.  
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case, Bohier’s understanding of the ius commune would undoubtedly be linked with 
what is essentially the civilian idea of Roman law.  
Elsewhere in his commentary on D.1.3.32, Baldus mentions the ius commune, 
and briefly considers the question of competition between it and consuetudo. He 
states that where the ius commune dictates that a woman inherits, but the consuetudo 
provides otherwise to the contrary, the woman does not inherit.52 The authority of 
consuetudo here is clear. In his commentary, Baldus refers to the interpretative quality 
of custom: “consuetudo legem interpretatur”.53 Custom is therefore used to interpret 
law.  
It will be shown in this chapter that Bohier adopted many of Baldus’ 
approaches to consuetudo and its relationship with other sources such as statute and 
the ius commune. This is not to say that he was fiercely loyal to Baldus, or even that 
this was a conscious adoption to demonstrate his approval or affiliation.54 Instead, it 
seems likely that Bohier consulted it directly, as far as it is possible to tell, and this is 
significant. The extent to which this is a shared approach with the Consilia and 
Decisiones will be considered at the conclusion of this thesis. For now, however, it is 
stated here at the outset in recognition of how Bohier’s perception and application of 
custom influenced his understanding of the ius commune.  
 
3.   Analysing the Consuetudines 
 
Assessing the incidence and use of the term ius commune in the 
Consuetudines Biturigium enables a comparison to be drawn between this work and 
those that recorded the law in action, such as the Consilia and Decisiones. It will be 
investigated whether the term appears in the same kinds of cases and what citations 
accompany it. In the Consilia and Decisiones, as highlighted earlier, the key markers 
of the ius commune-ius proprium relationship, that of restrictive and expansive effects 
of the ius commune, were not specifically custom law-centred. By the very nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ad D.1.3.32 (fol. 21 v).  
53 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 32.  
54 Xavier Prévost has considered this in the case of Jacques Cujas. He states that Cujas referred to the 
likes of Baldus and Bartolus, but comments on the “uneven use” of their sources, with Cujas referring to 
them in an inconsistent manner. See X. Prévost, “Reassessing the influence of medieval jurisprudence 
on Jacques Cujas’ (1522-1590) methods” in Du Plessis, P. and Cairns, J. (eds.), Reassessing legal 
humanism and its claims: petere fontes?, (Edinburgh, 2016), pp. 88-107, at pp. 100-104.  
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the Consuetudines, the focus is on custom, but this does not mean that statute is not 
considered; it features prominently alongside custom and is therefore considered also.  
 
 
3.1 The language of custom 
 
 
The Consuetudines is written in both Latin and French, the two appearing 
alongside each other throughout. French is used in the written version of the customs, 
which is then followed by comments in Latin, and which form the main body of the 
Consuetudines. The motivations behind the mass recording of custom into written 
collections have been considered already, but it relates also to the issue of language 
that was itself politicised. In 1539, the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêt officially 
removed remnants of written language rivalry between Latin and French when it 
provided for administration and court proceedings to be written only in French to the 
exclusion of the regional variations and Latin.55 The use of both languages in the 
Consuetudines, therefore, can be seen as a balancing of the two languages and what 
they represented at this time in the legal sphere. Such harmonisation was not seen in 
the Consilia and Decisiones, which were both purely Latin-based and so it is 
immediately clear from the outset that the Consuetudines is a very different kind of 
source.    
According to Lawrence M. Friedman, lawyers’ legal thought is bound to its 
culture and this sets the parameters within which legal thought is able to change.56 
This has some relevance in the context of the language of custom. Friedman 
distinguishes between external and internal legal culture: the latter is the culture of the 
lawgiver and those involved in the administration of law.57 The internal legal culture 
of the court in Bordeaux was one rooted in Latin. As the traditional language of the 
court, this is to be expected. However, the shift towards the inclusion of French 
language represented a change not seen in the Consilia and Decisiones, which were 
presented only in Latin. This suggests that the Consuetudines was written for a 
different audience; one that also included those out with legal practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See J. Foyer, “L’ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêt”, (1989) 133 Comptes rendus des séances de 
l’academie des inscriptions et belles-lettres 636; and further, L. Oakes, Language and national 
identity: comparing France and Sweden, (Amsterdam, 2001), pp. 55-56.  
56 L. Friedman, The legal system, (New York, 1975), p. 206.  
57 Ibid. Friedman, p. 223.  
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Immediate similarities between this text and the practice-oriented Consilia and 
Decisiones can still be drawn. As was the case with those two works, there is a visible 
pattern in terms of the areas of law in which the term ius commune is most commonly 
mentioned in the Consuetudines. It arises in those customs dealing with marriage 
(including the likes of dowry58 and rights of married women59), and property (such as 
prescription 60  and retrait lignager 61 ). In addition to such matters, Bohier also 
considers questions of jurisdiction, such as the relationship between the customary 
law of Bourges and customs of neighbouring places.  
 
 





Folio 4 Contractual capacity of married women. 
Folio 6 Fiefs and cens. 
Folio 9 Guardianship.  
Folio 11 Retrait lignager. 
Folio 21 Judges and jurisdiction. 
Folio 33 Prescription. 
Folio 48 Seigneurial system. 
Folio 56 Retrait lignager. 
Folio 61 Marriage ceremony/donations between 
husband and wife. 
Folio 65 Dowry on death. 
Folio 68/69 Donations made during marriage. 
 
 
3.2 Classifying custom  
 
 
In terms of identifying where the ius commune is mentioned, the table above 
demonstrates the areas of customary law where it appears most often. However, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Folio 65. 
59 Folio 4.    
60 Folio 33. 
61 Folio 56.  
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terms of presenting these findings, it is necessary to further categorise these customs. 
For the Decisiones, the study was divided between matrimonial and property matters. 
This classification is not as useful here, as, unlike the Decisiones, the customs are 
already categorised by Bohier into separate areas of law. It has been recognised 
already that the Consuetudines is a very different source from those practical law texts 
examined previously, and so it is therefore deserving of its own classification. 
Findings from the work will, however, be examined with the restrictive and expansive 
applicability test used in the Consilia and Decisiones in mind, and this will be 
considered throughout this chapter.  
Bohier considers the following: marriage and dowry; use and law of the state 
of persons; donations; married women; fiefs and cens; prescription; retrait lignager; 
and judges and jurisdiction. These will be examined in turn. Like the approach 
towards the areas of law considered in the Consilia and Decisiones, it is not possible 
to go into significant detail on individual points of law that arise in each of the 
customs where the ius commune appears. As a terminological study, first and 
foremost, while this chapter will of course consider those kinds of cases that the term 
appears in, the focus that has been present throughout this thesis, on the specific use 
of the term ius commune, will remain. This is equally the case with citations: they are 
only considered where they are regarded as significant.   
 
4. “Customs and uses, the laws of the state of persons”62  
 
4.1. Married women’s contractual capacity63 
 
As part of his treatment of “married women”, here Bohier discusses the rights 
of a married woman to sell or purchase property, in particular the power of her 
husband, and father, over her ability to do so. He states: 
 
Consuetudo vel statutum civitatis, vel 
loci, quod vxor non possit esse in iudicio 
sine consensu mariti, valet…quia in 
iudiciis quasi contrahimus. Nam 
postquam in potestate mariti est, 
The custom or statute of a city or a place, 
states that a wife cannot appear in court 
without the consent of her husband, is 
valid…since in court cases, it is as if we 
are contracting. From the moment the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 “Des coustumes & usaiges, des droictz de l’estat des personnes.” 
63 Folio 4, nu. 4.  
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requiritur eius consensus & authoritas.  
 
wife becomes subject to the husband’s 
potestas, his consent and authority are 
required. 
 
The ius commune is then mentioned once. Following this introduction, Bohier 
enters into a broad discussion about the circumstances in which such a custom exists. 
In support of this, he cites Petrus de Ancharano, Signorollo Homodei, Baldus, and 
Franciscus Aretinus. All mention the prevalence of this custom in various places, such 
as Pavia, Siena and Tortona. Joannes Imola states that custom departs from the ius 
commune and should be interpreted strictly. Bohier disagrees with the grounds put 
forward for this departute, as he says that such a custom has not been introduced “in 
favorem mulierum”. He relies on Bartolus and Jason de Mayno in support of this 
statement.64  
  
4.1.1 A matter of interpretation 
 
Reference is made to Petrus de Ancharano’s consilium, and the discussion 
found there considers statute instead of custom: “unde prohibitio statuti inhibentis 
mulieres maritatas contrahere vel aliquam obligationem inire super dote vel rebus 
aliis a marito possessis.”65 Bohier’s reference to this source then, assuming he 
referred to it, indicates an equation of both custom and statute in terms of the 
standards of interpretation involved. This is different to what was seen elsewhere in 
his other works so far.  
According to Bohier, Franciscus de Aretinus’ consilium is identical to the 
discussion contained here in the Consuetudines. Reference to this source reveals a 
case that handles similar points of law, and Aretinus states: “Secunda ratio fundatur 
quia statutum prohibet mulierem obligari sine consensu viri. Sed ubicunque mulier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 “Et etiam valet consuetudo non possit contrahere sine mariti authoritate: [ut tenet Pet. de 
Ancha.consi.ccclxxxiiii. & Signo. de Hom. consil. clxvi. Bald. consil. ccccxliiii. li. iii.] ubi dicit similem 
consue.esse [Papiae.& Abb.Sic. consi.xl.vol.ii.] dicit pariter esse in civitate Senensi. Et 
illustr.doc.Franci.Areti. recitat [con. Liiii.] esse in civitate Tortonae: & est de verbo ad verbum huic 
similis, ubi eum vide, quando quidem Ioa Imol. [consil.lxxiiii.] dicit esse contra ius commune. [l.ii.C. 
de pact conven. &] est stricte intelligenda: tamen non est, quia non est introducta in favorem mulierum 
secundum Bart. & Ia….”  
65 Consilium 384, Consilia sive juris responsa, (Venice, 1585). Own translation: “from the statutory 
prohibition forbidding married women to contract or enter into any commitment on her husband or 
other property.” 
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prohibetur obligari non videtur prohibita donare.” 66  Therefore, according to 
Aretinus, a woman is prohibited from binding herself, but this restriction does not 
apply in the case of giving gifts.67  
 
4.1.2 Custom and the ius commune 
 
Here, custom stands and does not receive strict interpretation according to the 
ius commune. Bohier acknowledges the opposing view of Joannes de Imola’s 
consilium,68 where the following statement is found: “ius commune in interpretatione 
statutorum laedi non debet”. 69  This citation, although rejected, is nevertheless 
revealing. It referred to statute, not custom. This suggests that here Bohier was 
making an equation between custom and statute. Or, perhaps he did not refer to the 
source himself. Further, Bohier cited this source as evidence of divergent opinion on 
the topic at hand, and not to support his own line of argument. Bohier follows this 
citation with the statement that this view is not to be adopted as this custom is not 
introduced in favour of women and cites Bartolus and Jason de Maino as evidence for 
this.  
The mention of the term ius commune is not strictly by Bohier, but through 
Joannes de Imola. Here, this does not diminish its significance. Instead, it 
demonstrates Bohier’s willingness to go against the ius commune rule and instead 
follow a customary provision, without attempting a strict, and so harmonious, 
interpretation of it. This is in line with approaches to the relationship between the ius 
commune and custom elsewhere; where custom is paramount. However, in many of 
those cases, where a reading in line with the ius commune is possible, custom is 
interpreted in that manner. This is not the case here. While it is true that this mention 
of the term was not necessarily integral to the rule provided by Bohier here, it has 
been included because of the consequences of Bohier acting against the ius commune.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Consilium 54, Consilia Domini Francisci de Aretio (Lyon, 1546). Own translation: “The second 
reason is based on the fact that the statute forbids the wife to bind herself without the consent of [her] 
husband. But wherever the wife is prohibited to bind herself she is not [also] forbidden from making 
gifts.”  
67 See folio 61. This is discussed below at 5.1.  
68 Consilium 79, Consilia (Venice, 1581). 
69 Own translation: “The ius commune ought not to be harmed by the interpretation of statutes.”   
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4.1.3 Ius proprium trumps ius commune  
 
Bohier’s treatment of ius commune in this custom is neither strictly restrictive 
nor expansive, but instead is an example of customary law’s superiority over the ius 
commune in this case. As stated above, this contravention of the ius commune is really 
more an example of Bohier ignoring the opinion of Joannes de Imola who states that 
not following a strict interpretation of custom in this case would result in going 
against the ius commune rule. In this sense then, it could equally be an example of 
Bohier disagreeing with Joannes de Imola’s belief that such a practice would be 
contrary to the ius commune, where he argues otherwise.  
 
4.2 Guardianship: mother’s rights over children70 
 
Bohier explains that the matter before him is specifically in the case of nobles: 
“entre gens nobles”. The custom in question provides that a father has the 
guardianship (put here as baillistre) of his children as minors.71 The second part goes 
on to provide that in the event of the father’s death, the mother has guardianship but 
only where she is aged twenty-five years old or above.  
There are a number of references to the ius commune here. It first appears 
when Bohier considers consuetudo generalis: 
 
[1] Haec consuetudo generalis est iuri 
communi consona non solum inter 
nobiles, sed etiam inter paganos seu 
ignobiles: ut patres habeant tutelam & 
administrationem corporum, & bonorum 
liberorum suorum de nobilis. [l. fi. & ibi. 
doct. Alex. & Ia. C. de testa.mili. & l.cum 
filius fami.ff.eo.ti. & l.ii.ff.de test.tutel.] 
 
[1] This general custom is in accordance 
with the ius commune not only among the 
nobility, but also among pagans or men 
of lower orders: that fathers have the 
wardship and management of body and 
wealth [assets] of their children. 
  
[2] Sed consuetudo disponit, quod mater, 
vel pater succedat solum eius liberis in 
bonis mobilibus, quae plerumque; sunt 
modica, & alii agnati, & cognati in gradu 
re motiores contra ius commune in 
[2] But custom provides that a mother, or 
a father succeeds their children only for 
movable goods, which are typically of 
modest value. The same custom provides 
that other and more distant relatives may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Folio 9, nu. 6.  
71 On the issue of guardianship more generally, see: C. Corley, “Gender, kin and guardianship in early 
modern Burgundy”, in S. Desan and J. Merrick (eds.), Family, gender and law in early modern France, 
(Philadelphia, 2009), pp. 183-222.  
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melioribus fundis succedant.  
 
inherit larger estates, contrary to the ius 
commune. 
 
[3] Imo secundo Bal. si consuetudo, vel 
statutum corrigat ius commune in 
successione, non corrigat in tutela, nec 
econtra, quia per similitudinem casuum 
non inducitur legum correctio, ut dicit 
glossa… 
 
[3] According to Baldus, if a custom or a 
statute correct the ius commune on 
matters of succession, it does not correct 
it on the law of tutelage, because the law 
cannot be amended according to 
analogous cases as the Gloss says...  
 
 
4.2.1 Ius proprium corrects ius commune   
 
The first three references to the term offer a valuable insight into Bohier’s 
attitude towards the matter of competing authorities. In the first instance, he speaks of 
consuetudo generalis and acknowledges that it is consistent with the ius commune 
position on the matter of fathers’ control over their children and their assets.72 He 
acknowledges that this custom and ius commune apply equally among nobles and 
pagans, emphasising the broad scope of this rule as a universal one. This statement of 
compatibility is followed by recognition of inconsistency between custom and ius 
commune in other aspects. While custom states that parents may succeed their 
children, they are only entitled to movables, the same custom provides that other 
relatives have the ability to inherit larger portions of the deceased’s estate. This is 
against the ius commune according to Bohier. The final part of this trio of statements 
is the most important and he clearly sets out the parameters of custom and statute in 
relation to the ius commune: custom and statute can correct the ius commune in cases 
of succession, but not in guardianship. In terms of an explanation for this limited 
superiority of ius proprium, Bohier explains that lex, and here this is clearly meaning 
ius commune, cannot be corrected by mere analogy. So, while this case encompasses 
both succession and guardianship - the rules of which are not to be analogously 
extended to succession - custom provides for extended family to inherit immovables, 
contrary to ius commune.  
Here, ius proprium effectively trumps ius commune, but it is also revealed that 
this is casuistic and so dependent on the nature of area of law that it features in. Of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 This is consistent with the Roman law of patria potestas. Further on this, see L. Waelkens, Amne 
adverso: Roman legal heritage in European culture, (Leuven, 2015), pp. 194-195.  
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course, it does not necessarily follow that rules on guardianship specifically provide 
for the ius commune to apply, but rather because amendments to the law are not 
possible by way of analogous application, according to Baldus, there is no equivalent 
rule for cases of guardianship. This short statement reveals a great deal. Custom 
trumps ius commune here only because it expressly provided so. This implies that 
unless stated otherwise, ius commune applies.  
 
4.2.2 According to the ius commune 
 
Bohier continues to distinguish guardianship and sets out the ius commune 
position:  
 
[4] Et licet de iure requiratur quae? 
Mater sit maior. xxv. annis ut [no. d. 
auth. matri. & auth. sacramentum. c.ti. & 
insti. de fide tut.] & ibi Io. Fa. Christoph. 
Porc. & Ang. Areti… proxi. in gl. iii. 
tamen consuetudo potest etiam mater 
minor habere tutelam suorum liberorum, 
quae videlicet secundum Baldus consilia 
ci. lib. ii. pro qua secundum eum facit 
gloss quam sequitur ibi Bartolus & doc. 
[l. ii. ff. de eo. quod certo loco in glo. i.] 
quae dicit, quod lex statutum, vel 
consuetudo specialis alicuius dici potest 
habilitare minorem ad aliquem actum, 
quod non in alio loco. licet secus 
secundum Bal. [d. consi. ci]. si 
consuetudo vel statutum disponeret, quod 
in omnibus negociis contractibus, & 
iudiciis ac causis legitima aetas 
censeatur esse. xviii annorum, quod non 
extenderetur ad tutelam, ad quam de iure 
communi non admittitur minor xxv annis, 
ut probat per decem rationes singulares, 
ut ibi vide. 
 
[4] However, it is required by law that the 
mother achieves majority at 25 years… 
nevertheless the custom exists whereby a 
mother [who is still a] minor can also 
have guardianship of her children. For 
Baldus in his consilium 101 in book 2, 
interprets the gloss after Bartolus and the 
doctors, at some point in the gloss 1 it 
says that law, statute or some special 
custom can be said to empower a minor 
to do certain things which [the same 
minor] [could] not do in another place. 
Even if, according to Baldus’s consilium 
101, there is a custom or statute which 
says in all contractual matters or legal 
business one comes of age at 18, it does 
not extend to guardianship because the 
ius commune requires one to be over 25, 
which he [Baldus] proves with ten 
specific reasons, which you may see 
there.   
 
4.2.3 Baldus  
 
Bohier’s use of the term ius commune here is closely linked with his reference 
to Baldus. He refers to the jurist for each of the main parts of his argument, while also 
	   163	  
acknowledging the influence of Bartolus on his writing.  The crux of Bohier’s 
argument relies on Baldus’ consilium 101. Reference to his Consilia reveals a detailed 
examination of the issue under discussion by Bohier. Here Baldus states that “habeat 
locum in tutela ad quam de iure communi non admittitur minor xxv.” 73  An 
observation of a terminological nature needs to be made at this point. Baldus’ own 
reference to the term “iure communi” indicates that Bohier’s citation of the jurist and 
this work was therefore referring to something beyond Baldus as representative of the 
term, rather than Baldus himself representing the ius commune per se. Bohier’s 
reliance on this consilium, and it is contended that it was relied on here specifically, is 
in itself evidence of his acceptance of Baldus’ own reliance on other sources. This is 
an obvious point, admittedly, but it is nevertheless important and needs to be stated 
here. So, in effect, when Bohier cites Baldus here, he is relying on the Gloss, for that 
it is what Baldus himself cites. As shown in the excerpt provided above, Bohier adds 
that this view takes after Bartolus’ stance too. Among the ten points made by Baldus 
here, there is a further reference to the ius commune, where he repeats his position 
that it does not allow a minor under twenty-five years of age to have rights of 
guardianship.74 In support of this, Baldus cites the Codex at C.5.30.1 (a. 290).75  
The Roman law position on guardianship was clear: under C.5.32.2 (a. 215), 
widowed mothers were able to ask to be appointed to manage the affairs of their 
children, before they could be legally appointed to perform such a duty, on the 
condition that they made a statement that they would not remarry.76 The Canon law 
position similarly enabled guardianship of children in this way. 77  In Bohier’s 
example, guardianship was clearly permitted, but the age at which the mother would 
be able to, was debated. This is acknowledged by Baldus in his consilium that Bohier 
cites. However, the caveat is made that the rules for contracting and business at the 
age of eighteen do not extend to guardianship. Bohier attaches significance to this 
exception. Looking to Bohier’s later discussion within this part of the Consuetudines, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Baldus, Consilia, Volume 2, consilium 101, pr., (Venice, 1575). Translation: So here the ius 
commune requires one to be over 25 years old to become guardian.  
74 Baldus, consilium 101, “loquendi de tutela sumus in iure communi quo iure minor xxv annis tutor 
esse non post.” 
75 “C. de legitima tutela.” 
76 “Matres, quae amissis viris tutelam administrandorum negotiorum in liberos postulant, priusquam 
confirmatio officii talis in eas iure ueniat, fateantur actis sacramento praestito ad alias se nuptias non 
venire.” See further on this: Waelkens, (n. 69), pp. 240-242.  
77 T. Kuehn, “Daughters, mothers, wives and widows’, in A. Schutte, et al. (eds.), Time, space, and 
women's lives in early modern Europe, (Kirksville, 2001), p. 100.  
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he does mention the rule as contained in C.5.32.2 (a. 215). However, it does not 
appear to be mentioned as part of the discussion as to the age of the mother. 
Assuming Bohier is making a statement generally about the age of a mother in 
relation to guardianship, then, it is possible to demonstrate a reliance on the 
interpretation of Baldus over the direct sources of Roman law, such as that shown in 
the Codex. This suggests that Bohier’s perception of the ius commune, which here 
states a minor cannot be admitted to the role of guardianship, is one directly linked to 
Baldus, and by association Bartolus, whom he mentions here in relation to this point 
too.  
 
4.2.3.1 Consuetudo generalis and consuetudo specialis  
 
Bohier refers to “consuetudo generalis”, and its application among the nobility 
and extending to pagans also. In his final mention of the ius commune he refers to 
“consuetudo specialis” alongside statute. He relies on Baldus’ commentary on 
D.1.3.32 for this. As part of his commentary here, Baldus focuses on the relationship 
between consuetudo generalis and consuetudo specialis. 78  Here, he states that 
according to the glossators, custom is general and trumps lex. If it is a special custom, 
attached to a certain place, it then lifts the lex in that place. Bohier relies on this 
distinction between generalis and specialis and it is mentioned on two occasions. 
According to this, a general custom abrogates a law generally and a special custom 
abrogates a law specially. So, in theory, a special custom could not abrogate a law 
generally.79 
 Baldus was interested in defining the relationship of custom to other sources 
of law and its validity as law itself.  He emphasises the validity of custom, and this 
was undoubtedly motivated by practical considerations of his time, to “justify local 
self-regulation against the undesirable external controls of latter-day emperors and 
popes, but also to provide a basis for the reasonable interpretation and moderation of 
the local statutes in the light of the common law tradition.”80 This conception of 
general and local custom is directly related, and Bohier’s adoption of it is important. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ad D.1.3.32, pr. 19: “Consuetudo quo casu tollat legem”; pr. 26: “Consuetudo specialis non tollitur 
per legem generalem sequentem.” 
79 R. Simonds, Rational individualism: the perennial philosophy of legal interpretation, (Amsterdam, 
1995) p. 81.  
80 Ibid, p. 106.   
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His reliance on this reveals the ius commune as representative of "fundamental 
components", stemming from entrenched Roman and Canon law. The modification of 
those principles – represented by the ius commune - was generally not possible, with 
some notable exceptions: in the case of those topics that were of a Canonic nature, 
such as guardianship and marriage, the Pope was historically vested with the right to 
alter such principles.81  
 The treatment of custom in this way related more generally to the division 
between written and unwritten law. Bohier wished to make clear that laws (including 
custom) could correct other laws, and that they existed in layers. In order to overcome 
the position of C.8.53.2 (a. 397) which held that custom cannot overcome reason or 
law (“verum non usque adeo sui valitura momento, ut aut rationem vincat, aut 
legem”), the approach of general and special customs operated.82 His adoption of the 
“general” and “special” split in custom then ultimately served to elevate custom’s 
authority and made it easier to set against the likes of the ius commune. However, it is 
equally possible to interpret this as enabling the overriding of custom in certain 
circumstances. In the case of guardianship discussed here, this second effect appears 
to have been the dominant one.  
   
4.3 Guardianship: ward’s estate83  
 
Bohier begins with “Licet de iure communi officium tutoris sit gratuitum”, and 
states: 
 
[1] Nam requiritur quod tutor sit nobilis: 
quia si ignobilis habeat tutela, nobilis 
nihil tamen lucratur. [ut i. eo. pe.] cum 
talis tutela nobilis debeat in dicto casu 
regi secundum ius commune, ut ibi 
dicitur secundum quod nihil habere 
debet: ut supra dictum est.   
[1] Indeed it is required that the tutor be 
noble. For if a base person were to have 
guardianship, the noble would however 
gain nothing … for such a guardianship 
has to follow the ius commune, as one 
should conclude that [the guardian] is not 
entitled to anything, as said above. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 J. Brundage, “E pluribus unum”, in M. Korpiola (ed.), Regional variations in matrimonial law and 
custom in Europe, 1150-1600, (Leiden, 2011), p. 36. See Hostiensis on this: Brundage cites him and 
acknowledges that he distinguished between widespread customs, general customs that were observed 
throughout a whole province, and special customs that were limited to a single city or diocese. Summa 
aurea lib. 1, tit. De consuetudine, 11, fol. 15. Also to his Lectura X.1.4.8, 9-10, fol. 31. See elsewhere 
in this thesis, (Chapter 4, 3.1), where Bohier refers to the Pope as the “only competent judge” in certain 
cases: “solus Papa est iudex competens”. See Decisio 2, para 6.  
82 Simonds, (n. 79), pp. 80-81.  
83 Folio 10, nu. 11. 
	   166	  
  
[2] De iure communi secus: quia non 
lucratur bona mobilia sui pupilli. [l. lex 
quae tutores & l. fi & ibi do. C. de admi. 
tuto.] tamen haec consuetudo servatur 
inter nobiles solum, ut supra dictum est, 
per quae deciditur illa vulgata quaestio, 
de paupere tutore, qui post finitam 
tutelam reperitur dives, an praesumatur 
de bonis pupilli: haec consuetudo facit 
quod sic cum fructus & mobilia lucretur. 
 
[2] It is different in the ius commune, 
because a noble person has nothing to 
gain financially from an ignoble person… 
But, that custom is kept only among 
noblemen, as said above. And this is the 
way to solve that common issue about the 
guardian of little means [lit. the poor 
guardian] who after the guardianship is 
over is found to be wealthy, on whether 
[those properties / assets / riches] are to 
be presumed [to come] from the ward’s 
estate. According to this custom, the 
guardian acquires fruits and movables. 
 
This is an example where two approaches to the ius commune and custom 
appear.  In the first instance, Bohier adopts a restrictive application according to the 
ius commune, where in the case of a noble guardian, that individual would not be 
entitled to anything from their ward. However, Bohier then refers to the ius commune 
once again, stating: “it is different in the ius commune”. He explains that under the ius 
commune, the guardian does not gain the movables that belong to their ward. 
However, he qualifies this rule, claiming its application is only in the case of 
noblemen and that elsewhere, such as those involving a poor guardian, that it is 
presumed that their wealth has emanated from the ward’s estate and so the custom 
applies, with the guardian acquiring fruits and movables.  
 
4.3.1 Limited remit of the ius commune 
 
This is not strictly an example of custom overriding ius commune. Instead, it is 
something more akin to custom operating and being applied freely, but still with 
recourse to the ius commune in order to ascertain where it applies. The ius commune 
is still considered, and only dismissed as having relevance in the case of a “poor 
guardian” because Bohier determines that its remit extends only to those of 
“noblemen”. This interpretation of the ius commune leaves him to determine that 
custom can apply without reference to it in other circumstances. In the case of 
noblemen, then, the ius commune has a restrictive application on custom, but in other 
cases, the rule in customary law applies. It is also equally valid to view this as a 
purposively strict interpretation of the ius commune, so as to enable a more expansive 
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application of custom in this case. What is clear, however is that the authority of the 
ius commune rule was such as to cause Bohier to still consider it, even if it was to 
determine its scope a limited one.  
 
4.4 “Guardianship is governed by the droit commun”84 
 
In the introduction to the final part of the Consuetudines where the ius 
commune is mentioned in relation to guardianship, Bohier states that the droit 
commun governs guardianship:85  
quod haec consuetudo se refert iuri 
communi. Ideo secundum ius commune 
debet intelligi. 
 
that this custom refers to the ius 
commune. So it is to be understood 
according to the ius commune. 
 
In short, custom refers to the ius commune and is to be understood according 
to it as a result.86 This is another example of interpretation according to the ius 
commune. Bohier states that were custom refers to the ius commune it is to be 
understood according to the ius commune. This use of “refert” is taken to mean where 
custom refers to an area of law that is already provided for by the ius commune. This 
statement corresponds with the other examples involving guardianship where custom 
and ius commune meet, and which have been considered above. There has therefore 
been a uniformity in approach towards the ius commune role in these customs. In this 
particular instance, Bohier cites Baldus’ Consilia again, this time referring to 
consilium 141.87 Baldus has a prominent presence in Bohier’s treatment of those 
customs that handle guardianship.88 His works have been used for each of the 
different customary provisions examined where the ius commune appears.   
 
4.4.1   Casuistic application of the ius commune? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Folio 11, nu. 13. 
85 (xiii) “Item & sil [sic] ny [sic] a aucun parent ou lignaigier dudit mineur pupille capable davoir [sic] 
ledit [sic] bail: ou si le parent capable ne veult prendre & accepter ledit [sic] bail, ledit [sic] mineur 
doibt [sic] estre gouverne en tutele selon le droit commun.”  
86 This is consistent with the repertorium entry, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, at 2, “Bohier’s 
understanding of consuetudo”. There, it is stated that: “Ubi de consuetudo se refert iuri communi, debet 
intelligi secundum ius commune.” 
87 “Bald. in consil. cxli. incipien. supposito statuto lib. i.” 
88 Folio 9, nu. 6.  
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Bohier’s take on the ius commune-ius proprium relationship in the context of 
guardianship is therefore one predicated on Baldus and is strictly protective of the ius 
commune. This leads to the conclusion that the relationship between the ius commune 
and ius proprium is one whose character depends on the kind of cases they appear in. 
In the case of guardianship, there have been three main approaches.  
First, in the case of a mother’s rights over her children.89 Here, it was shown 
that the ius commune can be corrected by custom or statute. However, it was shown to 
be the case that is cannot be corrected in the case of guardianship. Further, the ius 
commune cannot be amended by way of analogy with other kinds of cases that may be 
similar.  
Second, on the issue of a ward’s estate, it was acknowledged by Bohier that 
cases related to guardianship have to follow the ius commune. However, it was argued 
that custom applies instead of the ius commune because the latter applies only in the 
case of nobility. It was suggested here that the outcome of strict compliance with the 
ius commune would not be favourable towards the guardian in this hypothetical case.  
It seems, therefore that the ius commune was given a restrictive reading by Bohier 
here. It is therefore reasonable to deduce that while guardianship is understood in 
accordance with those rules of the ius commune, it is still possible to follow custom, 
but only in those instances where the ius commune does not expressly provide for the 
circumstances at hand, and where custom offers a fairer alternative. However, this 
drive for fairness is clearly not a universal preoccupation, given the outcome in the 
case of guardianship for mothers under twenty-five where the ius commune position 
was interpreted strictly. Of course, enforcing the position of a woman at this time may 
not have motivated as it would have in other cases perhaps, but it is more likely that 
these two differed because there was a clearly defined rule on the issue of mothers’ 
rights, as seen in the consilium of Baldus provided by Bohier.  
The third reference to the term ius commune offered a seemingly 
straightforward statement on the issue; namely that where custom refers to the ius 
commune it ought to be understood according to it. This is consistent with the above 
approaches in the case of those customs that handle guardianship, except presumably 
with the added caveat that where the ius commune position is lacking, custom can 
apply.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid. See above at 4.2.  
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It is fair to state that where a custom deals with the issue of guardianship, the 
ius commune has a dominant role in its relationship with ius proprium. It is not, 
however, lacking limitations on its superiority. In contrast with other areas of law, 
though, this subject has a clearly defined role for the ius commune, and in this sense, 
then, it is possible to deduce that here the nature of the ius commune depends on the 
kinds of cases it is mentioned in. In terms of understanding what Bohier meant by the 
term, in the case of customs dealing with guardianship, it was very much a term that’s 
definition and operation was rooted in the views of Baldus.  
 
5. “Customs concerning marriage and dowry”90 
 
5.1 Donations between husband and wife91 
 
Bohier considers the matter of donations between husband and wife.  This 
takes place within a larger discussion about the procedures of marriage in terms of 
ceremony and consummation. The term ius commune is mentioned on three occasions 
here, and two incidences of droit commun, which have been included here as they are 
used alongside the ius commune twice.  
 
5.1.1  Competing customs  
 
Bohier considers the customs of Paris and Champagne, and the decision by the 
parlement of Paris on the matter at hand. He states:   
 
[1] Et similiter esset de consuetudine 
disponente (quae?) bona mobilia & 
conquaestus sint inter virum & vxorem 
communis. de qua in leg. quod habeat 
locum in sponsa de praesenti. & huic 
decisioni convenit haec consuetudo: 
tamen per curiam Parlamenti Parisius 
fuit in contrarium iudicatum contra 
quendam nobilem nomine Matthaeum 
sponsum de praesenti qui habere volebat 
ratione consuetudinis Campaniae bona 
[1] And the same is about custom 
providing that movables and what is 
acquired [during the marriage] as 
common [i.e. common ownership] among 
man and wife. And this custom is in 
agreement with this decision. However, 
the Parliament of Paris reached the 
opposite decision against some nobleman 
of the name of Mattheus, united in 
marriage de praesenti, who wanted [to 
follow] the custom of Champagne 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 “Des coutumes concernans les mariaiges & douaires”.  
91 Folio 61, nu. 1. 
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mobilia quae lucrantur mariti nobiles. [ut 
infra eo. si.]   
 
[where] the noble husband acquires the 
ownership of movables. 
 
[2] Sed si fiat pactum inter coniuges: ut 
plerunque nunc sit in contractum 
matrimonii: quod maritus sibi reservata 
quod poterit donare eius vxori constante 
matrimonio: vel in testamento:vel quod 
poterit eam in bonis suis pro cetera parte 
associare, & communem in bonis facere 
si marito placeret. 
 
[2] But if there is a pact between the 
spouses which is very common nowadays 
in matrimonial contracts, that the husband 
may donate the part of his assets that do 
not form part of the common asset to the 
wife during marriage, or in [his] will, he 
can create a common asset through a 
pactum and realise a full communion of 
assets if the husband so wishes. 
 
Bohier states that common ownership, namely where movables and acquired 
assets during marriage are owned in common between husband and wife, is provided 
for in Bourges customary law. The Paris parlement, in contrast, decided in favour of a 
husband who sought exclusive ownership of movables under the custom of 
Champagne. Bohier continues by explaining that where a pact between the spouses 
which provides for some of the assets in common to be separate, then if he donates 
those parts to his wife in life, or through testamentary provision, they still amount to 
an asset held in common ownership. In another case concerning dowry later in the 
Consuetudines, Bohier again considers the divergence of opinion surrounding the 
intricacies of dowry provided for by different localities, and so this part of the 
discussion, which takes place shortly before the ius commune appears, is mentioned 
here now so as to demonstrate something of a consistency in the kinds of cases the 
term is mentioned: namely those involving competing customs in the case of dowry. 
 
5.1.2 According to the ius commune 
 
Reference is made to the ius commune, in accordance with a provision of the 
Codex: 
 
[3] Et sic debet intelligi d. l. quod 
sponsae. Quia licet paria sint, aliquid 
fieri tempore prohibito, vel conferre in 
tempus prohibitum: ut ibi tamen morte & 
traditione rei confirmabitur secundum ius 
commune per illam reservationem factam 
animo donandi… Et maxime quando ille 
qui donat, vel qui reservavit posse 
[3] And the l. quod sponsae [C.5.3.4] 
must be interpreted this way. For 
although it is the same doing and 
conveying something during a time in 
which it is not permitted, here however 
[what was done] in time of death and for 
the conveyance is to be confirmed, 
according to the ius commune, on the 
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donare, erat inferior alio coniuge: quia 
non videtur donasse intuitu libidinis seu 
coniugalis affectu: sed ut acquireret sibi 
illum honorem & parentelam alterius, 
puta si plebeius dives accepisset 
nobilissimum am pauperem, vel senex 
adolescentulam: quia tunc non est 
simplex donatio, immo constant 
matrimonio facta valeret de iure: quia est 
remuneratoria. ideo valet [ut not. Bar. in 
l. si ita stipulatu…]  
 
basis of that reservation made in the mind 
of the giver… And especially when he 
who makes the donation, or reserves the 
possibility to do so, was of an inferior 
[social] status in respect to the other 
spouse, for in such a case he may not be 
considered to have made the donation for 
lust or marital affection, but in order to 
acquire the status and the relatives of the 
other spouse, say, if a rich peasant took a 
very noble [but] poor woman [for wife], 
or if an old man [took] a teenager girl. 
For then it is not a simple donation, and 
so even if made during the marriage is 
valid in law, for it is “remunerated”… 
 
The term appears again shortly after, as part of the same discussion:  
 
[4] Item haec consuetudo hoc sentit dum 
dicit. Et aultrement contracter selon 
disposition de droit commun. Igitur debet 
consuetudo ista regulari, & intelligi 
secundum ius commune… 
 
[4] Also this custom says this is the 
meaning. And otherwise to contract 
according to the provision of the common 
law. A custom therefore ought to be ruled 
by it, and understood according to the ius 
commune… 
 
At the opening of this part of Consuetudo Bohier states: “Et aultrement 
contracter selon disposition de droit commune”.92  This line is repeated verbatim in 
the above part of the discussion, and addressed directly. Here, it is clear that Bohier 
provides for custom to be understood according to the ius commune in such 
circumstances. In the first mention of the term, Bohier states that the ius commune 
asks that the giver of donation adhere to the mental reservation made. He cites a 
provision of the Codex, C.5.3.4 (a. 239) and states that the custom be interpreted in a 
way that is in line with this rule, and then the ius commune as evidence for the same 
point. It is therefore possible to view this reference to the ius commune as shorthand, 
or representative of sorts, for the Codex rule just mentioned. Bohier makes one final 
reference to the term here:   
 
[5] Unde secundum hanc consuetudinem 
talis donatio reciproca facta in contractu 
matrimonii est valida & firma, cum haec 
[5] Hence according to the custom such a 
donation has become reciprocal in 
contracts of marriage that are strong and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Own translation: “And otherwise contract according to the provision of the common law.” 
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consuetudo permittit ante 
solennizationem [sic] matrimonii 
secundum dispositionem iuris communis, 
ut supram dictum est, donationes fieri 
inter virum & vxorem. 
 
firm, since this custom permits the 
solemnisation of the marriage, it is 
according to the disposition of the ius 
commune, as mentioned above, [in the 
case of] donations between a man and his 
wife. 
 
Here, again, custom is according to the ius commune. As is typical of many of 
the examples where custom and ius commune meet, there is the tacit, or sometimes 
express, sense that where custom is in line with the ius commune and is applied 
according to it, it is done as a matter of choice, rather than compliance with a 
mandatory rule. It is therefore more like a desire to follow “best practice” in many 
cases, and this seems to be the situation here.  
 
 
5.2 Dowry on death93 
 
The issue of dowry, death and domicile are considered here. Bohier discusses 
what happens to the property of a married couple when either husband or wife dies. 
Where the ius commune is mentioned, he asks which custom ought to apply here: 
either where the contract of marriage was signed, or the domicile of the man. This 
question of domicile and competing customs was seen above in the case of 
donations.94 The position of neighbouring localities in this case are mentioned, 
namely Orléans, Tours and Paris.95 The ius commune is mentioned once here:   
 
Nam hic debet dotari de consuetudine ubi 
alias in contractu matrimonii non fuerit 
dotata: solum de medietate usufructus 
haereditagiorum mariti, ut hic, & inter 
nobiles lucratur omnia mobilia post 
contractum vero matrimonii traducitur ad 
locum & domum viri ubi alia consuetudo 
vel statutum viget quod maius habeat 
doerium, vel lucretur: ut Parisius 
medietatem omnium bonorum que 
maritus tempore contractus matrimonii & 
durante matrimonio habuit… vel forte 
Indeed here it ought to apply the custom 
to provide a dowry when it was not 
provided for in the contract of marriage. 
But this applies only to half of the 
husband’s bequest. In the present case, 
among nobles, [the husband] acquires any 
mobile assets [of the dowry] and brings it 
to his household, where another custom 
or statute applies, and it allows to acquire 
a larger part of the dowry: so in Paris [the 
custom is of / for] half of all assets that 
the husband had both at the time of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Folio 65, nu. 5. 
94 Folio 61, nu. 1. 
95 The 1547 (Paris) edition of the Consuetudines Biturigium used here has the customary law works for 
Tours and Orléans bound together; Pyrrho Englebermeo, Aurelianorum item consuetudines, and Joanne 
Sainson, Turonum item consuetudines. 
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quod nihil lucretur, vel maritus possit 
donare vxori constante matrimonio, aut 
alias servatur ius commune. Quaeritur an 
consuetudo loci contractus matrimonii, 
aut loci domicilii viri debeat attendi. 
 
contract of marriage and during the 
marriage… Or perhaps [we should 
conclude] the custom / statute of the 
region where the husband has his 
household could be that nothing is 
acquired, or [that] the husband is allowed 
to make donations to the wife during the 
marriage, or that elsewhere the ius 
commune applies. The question is 
whether the custom of the place of the 
contract of marriage, or of the place of 
the domicile of a man ought to be 
observed. 
 
5.2.1 “Or that elsewhere the ius commune applies” 
 
Baldus considered a similar case.96 There, he “focused on the conflict of laws 
between local statutes and the ius commune rather than on the conflict between the 
two local jurisdictions.”97 He stated that under the ius commune, the law of the place 
of the dowry payment took precedence, and in this case, it was the husband's 
domicile.98 Julius Kirshner has considered this matter, and identifies the reference to 
the ius commune here as “synonymous with Justinian's Corpus iuris or Roman law, 
not the revisionist opinions of medieval jurists.”99 Baldus’ stance on the conflict of 
laws saw him develop a “multi lateral approach”,100 based on his assumption that 
“law is made by different sovereign states, and the question is what to do when the 
laws of these states conflict.”101 Rules were developed in order to handle the conflict 
of laws,102 which “concerned the discrete and limited modifications that a principality 
or city might make to general rules of tort, contract or property.”103  
Bohier’s stance in this case is clearly influenced by the medieval approach. He 
sets out the divergent approaches to the matter. Custom is to be applied in order to 
provide a dowry when not given in marriage, but only involves half of the husband’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See J. Kirshner, Marriage, dowry and citizenship in late medieval and renaissance Italy, (Toronto, 
2015), pp. 177-180.  
97 Ibid, p. 177.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 J. Gordley, “Extra-territorial legal problems in a world without nations: what the medieval jurists 
could teach us”, in G. Handl (et al), (eds.), Beyond territoriality: transnational legal authority in an 
age of globalization, (Leiden, 2012), pp. 35-52. p. 41. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Perhaps most famous of these works is that of Bartolus’ commentary, J. Beale (ed.), Bartolus on the 
Conflict of laws, (Cambridge, MA., 1914). 
103 Gordley, (n. 100), p. 44.  
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bequeath.  The underlying problem is the question of which law ought to apply in 
order to ascertain the amount of assets due in the provision of dowry. This 
calculation, Bohier contends, depends on whether the place of the husband’s 
household ought to be observed or the place of the contract of marriage. Hypothetical 
situations are outlined and the relationship between custom and the ius commune is 
brought up, albeit briefly. The matter of domicile versus place of contract is 
considered and Bohier proposes as an apparent alternative, the application of the ius 
commune. The term appears where Bohier considers the situation where a husband, 
according to the custom of his domicile, were to acquire nothing, perhaps as a result 
of no such custom existing which offers the provision of dowry where none existed in 
the marriage contract. In this circumstance, it seems that Bohier refers to the ius 
commune so as to offer an alternative to what would otherwise be a harsh situation. In 
this sense, the ius commune appears to be above, or at least not affected, by the rules 
of customary law localities and is able to be drawn upon to offer equitable outcomes 
in those cases where custom is silent, or indeed not favourable.  
 
5.2.2 No Citations 
 
No citations accompany this reference to the ius commune. Given the 
similarity between Bohier’s approach and that of Baldus’, in a similar case, it is 
surprising that no reference is made to the jurist. Perhaps it is because the work is so 
familiar that there is an assumed awareness for the reader, and that no reference is 
required.  
This absence of authority in support of his use of the term is seen elsewhere in 
Bohier’s works.104 For the purposes of the present discussion, however, this lack of 
authority is rather problematic. For, if the ius commune were drawn upon in order to 
deliver some favourable outcome, in terms of a real and tangible solution, a reference 
to the terms of this alternative and possibly better rule would have been helpful. 
Ultimately, then, Bohier was referring to the term in a loose sense, rather than to a 
specific rule. Here, it seems that in the context of different regions and their divergent 
customary laws, Bohier’s use of the ius commune here reveals its trans-regional 
nature and its potential for solving problems such as competing customary law rules. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See for example in the Decisiones, at Decio 2, 113 & 263.  
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The extent to which the provision of the ius commune rule would have offered 
something different to that which was already given by the customs of different 
regions is unclear, but what is important is that it was still used by Bohier in this 
context as an alternative to custom in those situations where custom was not 
necessarily lacking in its provision, but where an alternative solution could be found 
in the ius commune.  
 
6. “Customs that touch upon donations”105 
 
6.1 Donations made “inter vivos”106  
 
Bohier considers the matter of donations made inter vivos: a voluntary gift 
made during a person’s lifetime.107 Although not a lengthy consideration of the topic, 
Bohier’s mention of the ius commune makes it worthy of inclusion here:   
 
Item limita hanc consuetudinem non 
habere locum in donatione iuramento 
vallata: sed solum in donatione 
simpliciter facta: cum haec consuetudo 
simpliciter loquens, non intelligitur de 
donatione iurata, [ut tenet Io. de Imol. in 
tertio membro. versi. nunc pro 
declaratione materiae an per statutum 
possit prohiberi & c. in c. cum contingat. 
de iureiu.] quia consuetudo & statutum 
debet interpretari secundum ius 
commune. [ut l.ii & ibi doct. C. de noxa. 
acti & c. cum dilectus & ibi Abb. Sic. de 
consuetudi. & Bar. Sozi. defensis. in l. 
fructus. co. ii. versi. confirmo. ff. solu. 
matrimo. &] hic in ii se refert etiam ad 
ius commune & dicti supra de prescrip. vi 
& de consuetudine retractus. i. sed de 
iure communi potentius cooperatur actus 
iuratus qua non iuratus. [ut l. cum pater. 
filius matrem ff. de lega ii. & d. c. um 
contingat. & c. quavis pactum. de pac. 
lib. iv. ita tenet Alex. in consi. cxxv. col. 
penul. versi.] Pro hoc etiam bene facit. 
This custom does not apply to the case of 
a donation supported by an oath: but only 
if the donation is made simply: as this 
custom is not much elaborated / provides 
only for a basic case, it is not understood 
as [applicable to] a donation by oath…  
for / since the custom and statute should 
be interpreted in accordance with the ius 
commune ... According to the ius 
commune a sworn act is stronger than an 
unsworn act [or: an act without an 
accompanying oath], but only if the 
donation is made simply: with this 
custom it is said simply, and is not 
understood as a donation by oath… 
besides, statutes or customs do not 
provide for the case in which an oath has 
taken place… 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 “Des coustumes [sic] touchant donations”. 
106 Folios 68 & 69, nu. 1. 
107 A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 443. 
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Lib. i. preterea statutum vel consuetudo 
non intelligitur providere in casu, in quo 
iuramentum intervenit. 
 
6.1.1 “Interpreted in accordance with the ius commune” 
 
Interpretation according to the ius commune is a line seen throughout Bohier’s 
works.108 Here, Bohier is referring to both custom and statute. He continues with an 
explanation of what the ius commune provides on this issue: that a sworn act is 
stronger than an unsworn one, but with the caveat that this is only the case where the 
donation is made simply. He continues by comparing the position of custom that 
provides that the oath is said simply and is not understood as a donation by oath.  
Here, custom does not apply, because of two main reasons. First, this is due to 
the limits of the particular custom, which, according to Bohier, provides only for a 
basic case, presumably meaning it is either to be strictly interpreted or its content is 
limited, thus restricting its applicability. The call for the custom to interpreted 
according to the ius commune comes after this statement of custom’s limited role, and 
so it is possible to interpret this as the ius commune coming into play because of this 
gap in custom’s function. A caveat is added which perhaps more accurately reveals 
the role of the ius commune here, and so stands as the second of Bohier’s two reasons 
for non-application of custom. He states that there is no statutory or customary law 
provision for those cases where an oath has taken place in donations. The role of the 
ius commune therefore appears to be predicated on the absence of satisfactory ius 
proprium provision.  
 
7. “Customs that touch upon prescription”109 
 
7.1 “Mala fide” possession110 
 
Where Bohier considers prescription, the ius commune has a crucial role. The 
term is mentioned, both directly and as part of citations, four times. In the passage 
preceding the term’s appearance, Bohier states that Canon law, which does not allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See, for example, Decisio 113 and 188. 
109 “Des coustumes [sic] touchant prescription”. 
110 Folio 33 & 34, nu. 1.  
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positive prescription in bad faith, amends secular customs and statutes where they do 
permit this. If Canon law is an integral feature of the ius commune, which Bohier 
implies elsewhere, this therefore means that the ius commune does not allow positive 
prescription in bad faith. Later, in the same passage, it is made clear that good faith is 
a necessary prerequisite for positive prescription according to the ius commune. 
Bohier states: 
 
[1] [Panormitanus, Consilia, consilium 
76] ubi dicit quod si consuetudo vel 
statutum permittat prescriptionem quod 
intelligatur secundum ius commune ut 
interveniat bona fides. 
 
[1] Where he says that if a custom or 
statute allows prescription that it ought to 
be understood in accordance with the ius 
commune so that [the requirement of] 
good faith be applied/so to apply good 
faith[‘s requirement]. 
 
Panormitanus’ Consilium 76 states the following: “quia statutum loquens in 
materia iuris, debet intelligi secundum ius commune, scilicet ubi intervenit bona 
fides”.111 This is therefore clearly an example of Bohier demonstrating his support for 
Panormitanus’ position here. Nonetheless, it is revealing of Bohier’s own approach to 
the ius commune given that his reliance on Panormitanus here is clearly so strong 
given his almost verbatim application of his views, and so revealing of how he views 




The term appears again, twice where Bohier considers ecclesiastical estates:112 
 
[2] ideo infeudationes ipsorum non 
valent, unde consulo propter periculum 
animae novas infeudationes a papa 
obtineant, & erunt tuti adversus omnes. 
& ide dico in Cistercien. quando decimas 
habuerunt a laico quam non possunt 
contra curatos de iure communi fundatos. 
 
[2] As feoffments of ecclesiastical estates 
are invalid, to avoid putting the soul in 
danger, my advice is to let them obtain 
new feoffments from the pope, so that 
[their feoffment] will be fully safe. The 
same applies [towards] the Cistercians 
when they received the tithe from a 
layman, which they cannot exact from 
curates who base their rights on the ius 
commune. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Own translation: “that statute speaking in this matter of law ought to be understood according to the 
ius commune where good faith intervenes.” 
112 Folio 34, nu.1. 
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[3] nam certum est quod ei qui 
praescribit decimas in certa parrochia, 
non debentur decimae novalium quae in 
eadem parrochia insurgunt: sed ei ad que 
de iure communi pertinet in illa parro 
chia decimarum perceptio… 
 
[3] as it is clear that tithes for newly-
enclosed fields are not due to that who 
has usucaped the right to collect them for 
a specific parish, but to that who has the 
right to collect the tithes in that parish 
according to the ius commune.   
 
Where fields have been enclosed after the right to collect tithes has been 
usucaped, the right to collect the tithes in that particular parish falls to the individual 
whose right it is under the ius commune. Bohier is making a distinction here between 
the authority and right of the tithes collector according to the local parish rules, and 
that of the ius commune. Here, he states that regardless of what rights have been 
passed by way of agreement according to the order and arrangements of a specific 
local parish, the right remains with the ius commune. The right to collect tithes, then, 
according to this statement, is something that emanates from the ius commune. The 
authority of the individual parish clearly sits somewhere beneath that of the ius 
commune, and this sense of hierarchy is evocative of the relationship between other 
local law provisions and the ius commune; where interpretation ought to be made in 
accordance with the latter, for instance. Here, instead of a custom or statute, it relates 
to ecclesiastical administration, and more generally the rules of a local parish in 
relation to the ius commune. It is still, however, a story of the local rule versus the ius 
commune, and is a relationship that is immediately familiar from elsewhere in the 
Consuetudines.  
The tithe was a controversial tax, historically assumed as the “most contested 
and hated asset of the Church”, and was the subject of protests and riots over the 
centuries that it existed.113 Among other concerns,114 such unrest came from the belief 
that the revenues from tithes were in practice not used for the benefit of local 
churches, but only for the benefit of those in positions of significant power in the 
ecclesiastical community such as Bishops and Abbots.115 Bohier’s approach to this 
issue, and opinion that the right to collect tithes rests with the ius commune and not 
the local parish, then, demonstrates that the ius commune is representative of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 J. Goldsmith, Lordship in France: 1500-1789, (New York, 2005), p. 60.  
114 Periodic famine and the steady expansion of upper-class land ownership were some of the other 
motivations for revolt on this issue. Ibid, p. 60.  
115 Ibid.   
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larger ecclesiastical orders and used here to enforce the authority of those orders over 
the rights of the local ones.   
 
7.1.2 The “droit escript [sic]”116  
 
In a later part of the treatment of prescription, the ius commune is mentioned 
again in a section entitled “droit escript [sic]”, written law:117   
 
[4] Consuetudo vel statutum referens se 
ad ius commune… statutum enim inquit 
loquens in materia iuris & per verba iuris 
omnes recipit interpretationes in materia 
illa a iure dictas. 
 
[4] Custom and statute refer to the ius 
commune… Statute is said to deal with 
the law and it is according to the law that 
it should be interpreted, according to the 
interpretation provided for that subject. 
 
Custom and statute refer to the ius commune, and on this matter, statute “deals 
with the law”, and so is to be interpreted “according to the law”. Here, it is possible to 
interpret the references to “iuris” as meaning the ius commune, which was mentioned 
just above. Bohier provides that such interpretation should follow that which is 
provided for the area of law. It is not immediately clear to what interpretative 
guidance Bohier is referring to here. In this case, attention ought to turn to Bohier’s 
citations in support of this statement. They include D.35.2.1 (on the the Lex Falcidia), 
and Decretals III.4.6 and 2.14.2. If “iuris” is to be understood as a general reference 
to the ius commune, which is quite possible, then in this case, it is to these texts that 
Bohier finds the authority of the ius commune.  
 
7.1.3 Statute and ius commune  
 
It is possible to interpret this treatment of the ius commune as meaning that all 
jurists’ interpretations, more specifically that of the communis opinio doctorum, of the 
ius commune, of its terms, rules and provisions are applicable to this statute. This is 
an important point made by Bohier. Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that Baldus 
regarded the communis opinio doctorum as a custom of sorts. Perhaps here too Bohier 
is applying this logic, and so using the set of opinions as a custom and in turn an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 “Ser [sic] a garde droit escript [sic]”. Folio 37, nu. 6.  
117 Folio 37, nu. 6.  
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interpretative aide by which he assesses the statute. It demonstrates the central role of 
the ius commune in relation to the interpretation of statute. Elsewhere in Bohier’s 
handling of statute and ius commune, a pattern of interpretation is visible. In the 
Consilia, it was shown that statutes needed to be interpreted according to the ius 
commune.118  In the Decisiones, however, a less uniform approach to the relationship 
was revealed.119  
Bohier does not include custom in this statement, having just mentioned 
custom and statute together shortly before. Therefore, this ought to be read as an 
intentional separation of the two and an effort by Bohier to demonstrate this particular 
aspect of the statute-ius commune relationship.  
 
 
8. “Customs concerning judges and their jurisdiction”120 
 
 
In a departure from the majority of instances where the ius commune appears, 
here the term arises in the part of the Consuetudines that considers “les juges & leur 
jurisdiction”.121 Bohier addresses the issue of penalties for heresy or crimes against 
the King. He refers to the rule that existed in the town of Bourges, where he states that 
residents who commit a crime would lose their heritable and moveable property. The 
customary law of the region is considered together with other laws of neighbouring 
areas and the relationship between the two, with specific reference to customary law 
being considered in addition to the law of high treason. He states:  
 
an deficiens speciali consuetudo loci sit 
recurrendum ad consuetudinem 
vicinorum locorum, vel ad ius 
commune… 
 
whether in the absence of a special local 
custom, recourse ought to be made to 




8.1 Neighbouring customs or the ius commune 
 
This is a crucial passage in Bohier’s Consuetudines. Here, emphasis ought to 
be placed on two main points. First, that it appears, in this case certainly, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 See consilium 8 and consilium 46.  
119 See decisio 188 in particular.  
120 “Des coustumes [sic] concernans les Iuges & leur jurisdiction.” 
121 Folio 21, 10.  
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neighbouring customs or the ius commune are referred to only for the purposes of 
standing in for local custom of the region because it is lacking on a particular matter. 
Second, that both neighbouring customary law provision and the ius commune are 
being referred to here as equally valid alternatives, and in this sense, almost 
interchangeable.  
Indeed, if a ius commune rule existed already for this situation, then why 
would it not be a case of the ius commune automatically applying, instead of this 
almost last resort to invoke it? Certainly, in other cases where the ius commune is 
mentioned, Bohier typically recognises its use, either as a restrictive or expansive 
influence on the ius proprium. Here, it stands as something different. Together with 
customs of neighbouring regions, it represents more a repository of alternative 
solutions rather than something that already stands as a rule alongside this custom that 
needs to be followed, or at least acknowledged. This different treatment, almost as a 
last resort, along with other customs, is perhaps attributable to the fact that it is a 
matter of criminal law being considered.   
The role of neighbouring customs as sources of alternative authority is 
considered elsewhere in the Consuetudines, where the ius commune is mentioned, and 
Bohier looks at the issue of dowry on death.122 There, however, such customs are 
examined because there was a question of whether the customs of the marriage 
contract, or the domicile of the husband ought to apply. Here, in contrast, reference is 
made to the customs as a source of authority and in this case, their mention along with 
the ius commune implies that there is either equal choice between the two alternatives. 
There is no further explanation on this issue, other than a set of citations following 
this point, and so it is not possible to conclude which of the two ought to be chosen 
here. Accompanying this statement is a set of citations, including Baldus’ and 
Panormitanus’ (1386-1445) commentary on the Decretals, X.1.31.11 and X.1.4.6, as 
well as Luca de Penna’s (1325-1390) commentary on the Codex, C.11.15.1 (a. 391). 
Further, mention is made of Joannes Faber on I.1.2.9.  
The role of the ius commune here, then, is as a substitute of sorts, equal to 
other customs. The impact of the ius commune, though not specified, is therefore one 
of an expansive nature, since custom is lacking, but one that differs from its 
relationship with local law elsewhere.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Folio 65, nu. 5. See above at 5.2.  
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9.  “Retrait Lignager” 
 
9.1 Custom provides the retrait lignager 
 
Bohier considers the right of retrait lignager: a privilege awarded to extended 
family (kin).123 It appears relatively late in French law (thirteenth century), and is a 
successor to the custom known as laudatio parentum of the Franks (a. 820), where 
heirs agreed in writing to the alienation of property.124 Known as a "lineal repurchase 
right",125 the retrait lignager represented the right of first refusal of lands belonging to 
kin. As standard, such lineage would include houses and land rents.126  
 
9.1.1 “In accordance with ius commune and divine law”127 
 
Et maxime quia haec consuetudo 
retractus est favorabilis. & secundum ius 
commune & divinum… 
 
And especially because the retrait 
lignager provided for by that custom is 
favourable, and is in accordance with the 
ius commune and divine law… 
 
Custom provides the foundation for the retrait lignager rule here, and Bohier 
refers to it providing a favourable outcome in this case. This does, however, suggest 
that this custom, if it were to offer a less favourable result, would not necessarily 
apply. Further, listing the other merits of this custom, Bohier states that it is “in 
accordance with the ius commune and divine law.” The extent to which is needs to be 
in line with both is unclear, but it is clear that when a custom is in accordance with the 
ius commune it adds to the custom’s authority and its application.  
 
9.1.2 “statute or custom that does not deviate from the ius commune” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 For a definition of family and terms of “kinship” in early modern France, see J-L. Flandrin, 
Familles: parenté, maison, sexualité dans l'ancienne société, (Paris, 1976), pp. 17-21. An example of 
the retrait lignager in action can be seen in chapter 4 of this thesis, where Jacques Cujas considers the 
matter.  See 1.2, “Jacques Cujas: a practical comparison”.  
124 J. Goody, The development of the family and marriage in Europe, (Cambridge, U.K., 1983), p. 230.  
125 Ibid.  
126 It excluded usufruct and furniture.  On retrait lignager, see L. Falletti, Le retrait lignager en droit 
coutumier Français, (Paris, 1923); P. Ourliac, "Le retrait lignager dans le sud-ouest de la France", 
(1952) 30 Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger 328.  
127 Folio 56, nu. 3.  
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The term is mentioned for a second time, together with the datio in solutum: 
namely the payment of a thing other than that which originally was due to the creditor 
which is accepted as a discharge of the original obligation.128  
 
Praeterea statutum vel consuetudo quae 
non est exorbitans a iure communi 
disponens de venditione habet locum in 
datione insolutum… 
 
Besides, a statute or a custom that is not 
exorbitant and does not dispose of the ius 
commune on the issue of sale is 
applicable in the datio in solutum… 
 
 
9.1.3 Central or incidental? 
 
It is clear that compliance with the ius commune, for both statute and custom, 
is important in this case. In both mentions of the term, Bohier acknowledges that it is 
this harmonious relationship between ius commune and the local law that enables 
either statute or custom to apply in this case. It is not clear what would have happened 
if the sources of law were not agreeable. Elsewhere in the Consuetudines, as well as 
the Consilia and Decisiones, expansive and restrictive approaches dominate the 
findings. There are those incidences, however, where ius proprium, more specifically 
that of custom, trump ius commune.129  
In the present case, on this issue of retrait lignager, which has not been 
considered previously in this way, it is not possible to speculate on the outcome. It is, 
however, possible to suggest that here the ius commune, in the first mention of the 
term and the pairing with “divine law”, may be thought of more as an added weight to 
the authority of custom. The use of the term “maxime” is suggestive of an 
afterthought in terms of custom’s apparent compliance with the ius commune on this 
matter. It is further aided by the fact that it is “favorabilis” and so implies an element 
of choice in terms of custom’s application here. The pairing with divine law is worthy 
of note also. The two are cited in a way that suggests an equivalence, at least in terms 
of their status: “secundum ius commune et divinum”. The ius divinum, a positive legal 
disposition stemming from God, 130  is perhaps most typically paired with ius 
humanum, and so while it is not being suggested that this coupling with ius commune 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 A. Berger, Encyclopedic dictionary of Roman law, (New Jersey, 2004), p. 424.  
129 An example in the Consuetudines is found above at 4.1.3. In the Decisiones, see 6.1 (Decisio 230).  
130 W. Decock, Theologians and contract law: the moral transformation of the ius commune (ca. 1500-
1650), (Leiden, 2012), p. 83.  
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symbolises Bohier’s sense of mutuality between these two terms, it is still nonetheless 
indicative of his conception of ius commune as being something of a loose, general, 
but of a powerful nature, such as these terms, and more akin to a category of rules. 
This idea is further bolstered by the lack of accompanying citations to specific jurists 
or works.  
The second reference to the term ius commune here suggests a greater need for 
compliance between it and local law; something more than an incidental 
acknowledgement and booster to custom’s application. In this case, custom and 
statute are paired together, and Bohier states that their non-deviation from the ius 
commune enables the datio in solutum rule to apply.131 Bohier cites Franciscus de 
Aretinus’ Consilia in support of this statement. Reference to the consilium mentioned 
reveals a case handling an issue of contractual agreements in death and the rights of 
heirs.132 There is no express mention of the term ius commune in this consilium, and 
so the citation does not represent this specific reference to the term by Bohier, or, 
indeed perhaps is indicative of the kind of jurist and work Bohier had in mind when 
referring to the term: Aretinus as a representative of the ius commune in this case.  
 
10. “Customs of fiefs and cens” 
 
10.1 Seigneurial system133 
 
The fiscal and jurisdictional network of lordship encompassed the entire 
landmass of France, and those lands that were subject to droits seigneuriaux 
underwent expansion in the early modern period.134 Bohier considers the matter of 
land ownership, and makes this succinct yet clear statement on the compatibility of 
the rule in question with the ius commune:    
  
non est exorbitans a iure communi, sed 
est profecto secundum ius commune. 
 
is not a deviation from the ius commune 
but rather its implementation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 D.12.1.2.1 and Inst. 3.29, pr. 
132 Franciscus de Aretinus, Consilia (Lyon, 1546), consilium 124.  
133 Folio 48, nu. 18. 
134 Goldsmith, (n. 113), p. 14.  
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Citations here include Franciscus de Aretinus’ consilium 124, which Bohier 
also refers to in relation to the ius commune elsewhere in the Consuetudines.135  
Reference is made to Aretinus again, and also to Baldus, both on D.2.15.8.  
 
10.2 The division of land136   
 
This part of Bohier’s Consuetudines is a crucial exposition of the ius 
commune. In three sections, he mentions the rights of the King, Temporal Lords, 
Bishops and Archbishops, and that these rights are based on the ius commune. Each 
mention of the term will now be considered. The first reference to the ius commune 
appears underneath the title of “est fonde de droit commun”, namely that this “is 
based on the common law”. He states:  
 
[1] An rex & alii domini temporales 
fundent eorum intentionem de iure 
communi super dominio rerum infra suos 
limites constitutarium… 
[1] Whether the king and other temporal 
lords derive their claim in ius commune 
on the ownership of things within the 
constituted boundaries [i.e. its proper 
limits]… 
 
[2] Et etiam fallit in episcopis & 
archiepiscopis, qui de iure communi 
habent intentionem fundatum. [ut. xvi. q. 
vii. omnes Basilicae.] & est bona ratio 
secundum docto.  ubi supra, quia fines 
episcopatuum stabiles sunt nec mutantur. 
[ut ca. quod supra his de voto.] ideo 
iudices ecclesiastici super limitatione 
finium episcopatuum non currunt ad 
laicorum divisiones. [ut. c. i. de 
religiosis.] licet Ioan. Andr. post Inno. in 
[c. nimis. de iure iuran.] dicat quod 
dominus terrae qui habet iurisdictionem 
de iure communi. hoc verum secundum 
Anto. de But. si constat de dominio eius 
ab imperatore concesso. alias non… 
 
[2] And the same applies to bishops and 
archbishops, who according to / by the 
ius commune have a grounded claim [i.e. 
on ownership of things], and the doctors 
agree, as [said] above, for the boundaries 
of archbishoprics are stable and do not 
change… and so ecclesiastical judges do 
not hasten to the divisions of secular 
people…. although Joannes Andreae 
following Innocent IV … says that [it is] 
the lord of the land who has jurisdiction 
according to the ius commune. That is 
true according to Antonio de Butrio if it 
appears that his dominium was granted by 
the emperor, otherwise not. And Abbas 
Siculus holds the same.  
 
In the second of the sections handling the ius commune, Bohier claims that the 
ius commune provides that the “dominus terrae” has jurisdiction. The basis of this 
claim rests with Joannes Andreae, who follows Innocent IV on this matter, and that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See above at 9.1, where Bohier considers the issue of retrait lignager, in Folio 56, nu. 3. 
136 Folio 50, nu. 24. 
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further supported by Antonio de Butrio. Bohier’s rationale for the “grounded claim” 
on the ownership of land by bishops and archbishops is that it is not only rooted in the 
ius commune, but also that that the boundaries of archbishoprics are stable and 
unlikely to change. He mentions ecclesiastical judges and notes that they are not 
occupied by the needs, and presumably the rules, that determine the land divisions for 
secular people, or perhaps more generally those who are not belonging to an 
ecclesiastical order. It is not clear what is meant here, but it is likely Bohier is making 
a clear distinction between the rights pertaining to land and boundaries that apply to 
certain individuals, in this case bishops and archbishops, from those of lesser status.  
 
[3] Et idem dico in christianissimo 
domino nostro Francorum rege, quod in 
imperatore ut habeat intentionem de iure 
communi fundatam. unde dicit Bald. 
 
[3] And I say the same about our most 
Christian French king, that for the ius 
commune his claim derives from the 
emperor, according to Baldus. 
 
 
According to Baldus, the claim of the French King under the ius commune 
derives from the Emperor. For Bohier then, it is Baldus that provides this particular 
rule, through his lectura on C.7.16. It is reasonable to suggest that this reference to 
Baldus is in fact indicative of who and what he has in mind when using the term ius 
commune here. Baldus is also referred to, along with Joannes Andreae and Antonio de 
Butrio, who were mentioned above, in the second reference to the term also.137  
This practice of equating contemporary individuals and procedures with 
Roman ones was in no way unusual.138 Bohier has previously equated the Roman 
praetorian praefect with the French magistrate or judge.139 It seems likely that Bohier 
is stating that the authority of the ius commune derives from the Roman law, which 
was represented by “imperatore”. This ultimately relates to split jurisdiction, between 
secular and ecclesiastical. For Bohier, the “imperatore” symbolises the former and it 
is there that the authority of the king stems from.  
 
11.    Conclusion   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Citation reads: “"Bald. in c. significavit. de rescript." 
138 Considered in greater detail in this thesis at chapter 3, 3.2.6, “Conflict and competing sources: 
stylus, custom and ius commune”.  
139 Ibid, on consilium 8.  
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In the final conclusion, I will bring out broader lines of sight, but for now I 
will highlight three of the main findings from the Consuetudines Biturigium. The 
relationship between custom and the ius commune appears to have varied, with the 
latter having both an expansive and restrictive effect on local law. There are three 
main findings from the study of the Consuetudines Biturigium. 
First, Bohier made a distinction between consuetudo generalis and consuetudo 
specialis, where he relied on Baldus’ commentary on the Digest (D.1.3.32).140  Here, 
he states that according to the glossators, custom is general and trumps lex. If it is a 
special custom, attached to a certain place, it then lifts the lex in that place. Bohier 
relies on this distinction between generalis and specialis and it is mentioned on two 
occasions. According to this, a general custom abrogates a law generally and a special 
custom abrogates a law specially. This general custom would have represented a 
regional rule with broad application, in contrast to a special custom that was even 
more specific in its scope, such as applying only in a particular town. In theory, a 
special custom could not abrogate a law generally.141 His adoption of the “general” 
and “special” split in custom then ultimately served to elevate custom’s authority and 
made it easier to set against the likes of the ius commune. However, it is equally 
possible to interpret this as enabling the overriding of custom in certain 
circumstances.  
Secondly, Bohier relied heavily on Baldus as a source of authority, which was 
also shown in the preceding chapters of this thesis. The jurist is a prominent feature of 
Bohier’s Consuetudines, and his role is a significant one, with citations to his work 
appearing at crucial points of discussion. For Baldus, the ius commune is Roman law, 
and the “natural state”142 of things is where Roman law operates, and is used as a 
supplement for custom and a standard for their interpretation.143 Adopting Baldus’ 
position on a number of key issues suggests an adoption of the jurist’s approach to 
custom, at least in terms of its defining characteristics and relationship with other 
sources; set out in his commentary on D.1.3.32.144  
Finally, examples of expansive application can be found where Bohier 
considers dowry and that of judges and jurisdiction. These two topics are united by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 See above at 4.2.3.1.  
141 Simonds, (n. 79), p. 81.  
142 Ad D.1.3.32. See above at 2.1.1.  
143 Canning, (n. 48), p. 149.  
144 See above at 2.1.  
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the particular context within which the term ius commune arose: both involved a 
jurisdictional question. In the case of dowry, the question was which of the two laws 
(custom and ius commune) ought to apply in order to ascertain the amount of assets 
due under a dowry; on the matter of judges and jurisdiction, it was considered 
whether neighbouring customs or the ius commune ought to apply.  In each of these 
cases, the ius commune is offered as an alternative outcome, and as a contender for 
filling a legal gap alongside regional customs of neighbouring localities.  
  





In this work, I have examined the life and publications of a sixteenth-century 
French legal practitioner, Nicolas Bohier, using the principles of a microhistory. As 
an object of study, Bohier is particularly important for at least two reasons. First, he 
left a considerable oeuvre of written legal opinions, law reports and work on 
customary law. This sets him apart from many of his contemporaries. In second place, 
compared to the academic jurist teaching at a university in the early modern period 
and producing academic works based on Roman or Canon law, the traditional focus 
of legal historical studies, the legal practitioner and their works have long been 
overlooked in traditional accounts of legal history.1 This thesis, therefore, aims to 
provide a more balanced picture that also takes legal practice into account. The role of 
the practitioner has been singled out as important here, not only because of the 
potential to provide a more nuanced picture regarding the narratives of European legal 
history, but also because of his potential to reveal the meaning of the term ius 
commune in legal practice, through an examination of its relationship with the ius 
proprium, one of the most nebulous and understudied aspects of the development of 
national legal orders in the early modern period in Europe.  
Calls for a dedicated work into the relationship between ius proprium and ius 
commune in the early-modern period have been made on a number of occasions. In 
2000, for example, Paul Hyams stated that the apparent dissonance between usage in 
the ius commune and customs “set the scene for further and more profound 
assimilation of learned legal concepts into local law”.2 He spoke of the need for an 
inquiry to test this view.3 This is exactly what this thesis aimed to do. Bohier was 
chosen, not only because of the reasons outlined above, but also because he stood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for instance F. Wieacker, A history of private law in Europe, with particular reference to 
Germany, (Oxford, 1996); R. Lesaffer, European legal history: A cultural and political perspective, 
(Cambridge, U.K., 2009) [translated from the original Dutch] [2004]; P. Stein, Roman law in European 
history, (Cambridge, U.K, 1999).  
2 P. Hyams, “Due process versus the maintenance of order in European law: the contribution of the ius 
commune’”, The moral word of law, (2000), pp. 62-90, at pp. 64-65, n. 5. Hyam refers to R. Aubenas, 
“Quelques réflexions sur le problème de la pénétration du droit romain dans le midi de la France au 
moyen âge”, (1964) 76 Annales du Midi 371, who shares the view that more work is needed on this 
topic. See also D. Heirbaut, “Who were the makers of customary law in medieval Europe? Some 
answers on sources about the spokesmen of Flemish feudal courts”, (2007) 75 The Legal History 
Review 257 at 273-274. There, Heirbaut recognises that the legal practitioner is key to understanding 
the customary law and that further research is required on his role.  
3 Hyams, (n. 2).   
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somewhat apart (though not totally removed) from those traditional representatives of 
the “torch of learning”. His education at Montpellier, a university synonymous with 
the Ultramontani, informed his understanding and approach to the law. The 
Ultramontani of the twelfth century, were inspired by Italian scholarship, and this 
would have had an impact on the education the university's students received, even 
into the late fifteenth century, which is when Bohier attended.  
France was not yet fully developed as a nation state by the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, and was without a comprehensive state bureaucracy. This would 
have undoubtedly had consequences for the law and for the legal practitioner. Legally 
speaking, the territory of France was a proverbial mosaic of different laws and 
customs. Its legal system was therefore fragmented, with a diversity of legal regimes 
from region to region and a division between the Northern customary law (pays de 
coutumes) and the Southern version of written law regions (pays de droit écrit), which 
relied more heavily on Roman law.4 Therefore, given the role of custom in France, the 
potential for investigation into its relationship with ius commune has been 
considerable. This has been a central aim of this thesis.  
Bohier’s role, first as legal practitioner and later as judge, would not only have 
been to ascertain which law applied to a particular case, but also to grapple with the 
question of source competition. No fixed hierarchy of legal sources existed in France 
during this period. As Bohier’s oeuvre clearly shows, apart from sources familiar to 
contemporary lawyers such as statute (statutum) and custom (consuetudo), ius 
commune, whatever this term means, was clearly also a source of law. The fact that 
the term is used in practitioner literature such as records of decisions and legal 
opinions, demonstrates that the term ius commune clearly also had a role to play in 
legal practice. Therefore, its relationship with other sources will have been the key to 
its survival in this period.  
The vantage point that a microhistory of a lawyer and his works offers is a 
valuable one. Legal humanism, the intellectual movement synonymous with 
sixteenth-century France is a much-contested topic, and its influence in the early 
modern period has recently formed the subject of systematic debate.5 It has, for 
example, been suggested that while legal humanism was a largely academic exercise, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 M. Bellomo, The common legal past of Europe, 1000-1800, (Washington, D.C. 1995) [translated 
from the original Italian] [1988], p. 102.  
5 P. du Plessis and J. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing legal humanism and its claims: petere fontes?, 
(Edinburgh, 2016).  
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legal practice continued to remain under the influence of late-medieval legal practice 
using the works of the Italian commentators such as Bartolus and Baldus.6  Looking 
to a legal practitioner in the courts from the first half of the early modern period, then, 
shifts the central point of enquiry from legal humanism visible in the studies of jurists 
teaching at the universities, to legal practice. Owing to the problems with classifying a 
jurist from this period as “humanist” or “other” recently highlighted by Alain 
Wijffels,7 attempts to categorise Bohier as belonging to a particular school of thought 
have been avoided. My thesis reveals, instead, that Bohier’s priority, as a practitioner, 
was to resolve the legal issue before him. He did not select authorities as symbols of 
an underlying intellectual affiliation, although there are certainly patterns in his 
citation practices, which will be outlined below.  
The merits of a microhistory have been set out in the introduction to this work. 
It is characterised by a focus on certain cases, persons and circumstances, which 
allows an intensive historical study of the subject, giving a different picture of the past 
from investigations about “nations, states, or social groupings”.8 The microhistory has 
an objective that is more far-reaching than that of a case study: microhistorians 
typically look for answers to “great historical questions”, when studying small 
objects, even if this process is not always successful. 9  Looking to the legal 
practitioner instead of those academic jurists traditionally affiliated with the 
university offers a different perspective on the relationship between the ius commune 
and ius proprium in France. This study has sought to better inform the doctrinal 
history on this period, as it is not possible to show the complexities of the law of early 
modern France with dogmatic approaches alone.  
Law in action is best demonstrated through a microhistory as it provides a still 
picture of a person and their actions. While the merits of a microhistory are clear, 
certain caveats are required. The findings from this thesis do not represent a 
comprehensive account of the role of the ius commune in early modern France. A 
study of this kind falls well outside the boundaries (not to mention word-limits) of a 
thesis. It would require a much more extensive study of all of the records of the 
parlements together with a comparison of academic writing from the same period. 
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7 Ibid.  
8 S. Magnússon & I. Szijártó (eds.), What is microhistory?, (London, 2013), p. 5.	  
9 Ibid.  	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Instead, by providing a microhistory on the relationship between the ius commune and 
ius proprium in the case of Bohier and his works, this is an attempt to start this 
conversation.  
The ius commune has been a term without a definition fit for its early modern 
operation. The traditional narrative of legal history in this regard has tended to reach 
for the medieval meaning as equally applicable for the early modern period. This 
thesis has shown that while there is some merit in this, given that there is a reliance on 
those jurists of the mos italicus, such an assumption ultimately neglects legal practice.  
This thesis has three key conclusions. First, for Bohier, the term ius commune 
did not have one single function in reaching legal decisions. His approach to the 
function of the ius commune varied from case to case. Bohier regularly calls for an 
interpretation according to the ius commune, where the ius proprium derogates from 
it. He sets out the need for the interpretation of words or terms of law to occur in the 
light of the ius commune, and acknowledges that it can be contrary to the ius 
proprium. The term is used so as to harmonise a custom, or statute, so that it is 
possible to apply the ius commune. This can be restrictive and expansive in its 
approach. The restrictive approach is where the role of the ius proprium is limited by 
Bohier’s invocation of the ius commune. The expansive approach is more complex. 
An example of this can be seen where Bohier states that recourse ought to be made to 
neighbouring customs or the ius commune where a local custom is silent.10 There, it 
served as a repository of alternative solutions. There are also instances where the ius 
proprium trumps ius commune. While an effort is typically made to make custom fit 
in line with ius commune provision in such cases, if custom were to fail, it could 
theoretically remain valid and in operation regardless of its incompatibility.   
In second place, for Bohier, the term ius commune did not have a fixed 
meaning, although Roman law clearly plays a significant role. Its appearances in the 
Consilia, Decisiones and Consuetudines were not joined by an underlying theme or 
approach to the term. There were patterns, such as restrictive and expansive 
applications of the term, as shown above. However, these were not uniform and the 
outcome of a case could not be predicted according to the role of the ius commune in 
Bohier’s reasoning. Bohier used the term in an interpretative sense, relying on it as a 
constructive aid, to manage competing sources of law such as custom and statute. A 
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good example of this can be seen in one instance where Bohier referred to the ius 
commune Romanorum in the Decisiones. 11  This is evidence of an attempt to 
distinguish this particular reference to the term from others elsewhere. The addition of 
Romanorum suggests a departure from a utrumque ius meaning of the ius commune, 
and instead demonstrates a specifically Roman meaning. Bohier was dealing with 
feudal law here. He provided an overview of how competing sources ought to be 
handled: first, local customs are followed and take precedence in feudal matters; then, 
where no custom is found, the ius commune Romanorum.12 This shows that the term 
ius commune encompasses a range of meanings. Bohier makes a conscious effort to 
distinguish this example from the other occasions that he uses it. This also suggests 
that in those other instances the term encompasses more than just the Roman law.  
Finally, for Bohier, the ius commune was a floating authority in the sense that 
its role as a repository of rules could be drawn on as authority for a range of legal 
issues, and served as an omnipresent authority. Its influence spanned beyond small 
localities and regions. The ius commune served as a benchmark for Bohier. It was the 
fall-back provision alongside which other sources operated.  In the Decisiones, Bohier 
stated that in a real action, a cleric is bound to respond before a secular judge. Further, 
that the court, Pope and Emperor “think and speak in terms of the ius commune”13 and 
had no knowledge of custom. According to Bohier, the ius commune was the assumed 
authority and the court thought along its lines. Custom therefore only intervenes when 
brought by a party and the role of the ius commune may change in response to this. 
The ius commune was the high level law. Custom, in contrast, worked from the 
ground-up.  
In identifying these three key elements of functionality, meaning and 
authority, this thesis has offered something new to the field of European legal history. 
There has not, until now, been a study dedicated to understanding the role of the ius 
commune in legal practice. While the results of this work cannot be generalised too 
far, they offer a new picture of the ius commune, through a new kind of study. 
Bohier’s understanding of the ius commune as not having one single function and no 
fixed meaning, offers a firm outline of a term that had certain place in legal practice, 
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but its form was a loose one, and its mode of operation responsive to the facts of the 
case before the parlement.  
Any study of Bohier’s understanding of the term ius commune also has to take 
account of his use of sources. Sources from the mos italicus had a clear role in the 
work of the legal practitioner; and this is a view supported by the likes of Wijffels.14 
Bohier cited Baldus and Bartolus in particular, extensively and consistently across the 
three works examined. In the chapter dedicated to the Consilia, consilium 8 was 
considered in detail. It was singled out as a particularly good example of Bohier’s 
approach to custom, statute and stylus and demonstrated his handling of those 
competing sources, setting the tone for the rest of this thesis. Bohier’s understanding 
of custom in this case was an approach echoed throughout the rest of his works. He 
held custom according to Baldus and Bartolus, whose understanding of D.1.3.32 and 
C.8.52.2 was predicated on “consent” and “frequent use”, and treated these parts of 
the Corpus iuris civilis as problem-solving texts that aided legal interpretation. This 
consilium revealed that for Bohier, the main reason for reducing court decisions to 
writing is for instruction for a judge, and that judges do not have the power to 
introduce by way of stylus something contrary to the ius commune.   
Bohier’s understanding of custom was predicated on the notion of consent.  
He habitually referred to Baldus and Bartolus when considering custom. For Bartolus, 
consent was paramount in law making and could override the will of a superior force. 
Custom and statute shared a consensual underpinning that was rooted in the consent 
of the people (the former tacit and the latter express) and so did not require superior 
consent for their authority. This was Bohier’s approach. He relied on the jurist to 
handle competing laws and remedy their conflicts by reference to their underlying 
nature. He adopted the commentator-stance on custom. This is clearly seen in his use 
of the consuetudo generalis and consuetudo specialis distinction, as well as the 
analogous application of customs.  
The competition between ius commune and ius proprium, especially custom, 
was equally a contest between the princeps and the populus. It marked a tension 
between the exercise of legislative sovereignty and the rule of law and the emerging 
absolutist power that came to mark the early modern period. Wijffels pointed to a 
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“structural shift in thinking” in the mid to late sixteenth century, where Italian 
methods would eventually be replaced by the usus modernus. He acknowledged that 
the authorities relied on in courts, however, still belonged to the mos italicus.15 My 
findings are consistent with those of Wijffels.  Bohier referred extensively to those 
sources that represented the old tradition. The so-called “fault line”16 in the middle of 
the sixteenth century fell after Bohier’s lifetime. His reliance on sources belonging to 
the late medieval period demonstrates that at the brink of this shift, lawyers were still 
referring to such material. The use of Baldus in particular cannot be excused as 
merely routine or a nod to the old ways. Bohier relied on him directly, and his 
understanding of custom was based on his.   
While it is accepted that it cannot be known for sure whether Bohier actually 
referred to the sources he cited,17 there were instances where a verbatim reproduction 
of a jurist’s work appeared in his writings.18 In such circumstances, it is highly likely 
that he did refer to the source cited. Bohier had a preference for particular jurists and 
their works. Those from the School of Orléans feature prominently, as do the works 
of Alexander de Imola and Filippo Decio.  
Throughout the textual chapters of this work, there emerged a pattern of 
citation borrowing by Bohier, who relied on certain jurists’ citations for Roman law 
(including the Digest and Codex) as well as medieval juristic opinion. Most notable 
among these is the case of Alexander de Imola, who featured prominently along with 
the citations he used in his own work, in Bohier’s Consilia, in particular consilium 
8.19 Recent studies on this practice by other jurists are worth a comparative glance. 
An example can be seen in the case of Scotland, where Adelyn Wilson has 
demonstrated that there was a distinctive pattern of citation borrowing in the case of 
Stair, who regularly relied on the citations of Gudelinus for citations of Roman law 
and continental jurists, and Vinnius for Roman law also.20  
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17 M. van Ittersum, “The working methods of Hugo Grotius: Which sources did he use and how did he 
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The overwhelming motivation for the selection of a source was necessity of 
practical application, more than any overarching consideration to the juristic school to 
which the author belonged, or a desire to demonstrate an academic affiliation by the 
practising lawyer. Certainly, Bohier had preferences for certain jurists and their 
works: Baldus, in particular, but this regular reliance is equally likely to have been out 
of convenience than a deep personal loyalty to the commentator. Bohier’s view of the 
ius commune was one of a repository of authoritative sources, and he used it in a 
pragmatic sense. For Bohier, the ius commune was therefore a source of authority that 
was utilised for professional necessity, to handle contemporary cases with the ability 
to refer to a selection of texts and jurists that were deemed reputable in legal practice.   
Baldus and others like him would have featured prominently in Bohier’s legal 
education, and his works were widely available.21 Further, their contents were likely 
to have been second nature to Bohier, especially Baldus’ commentary on the Digest, 
which is peppered throughout all of the works examined.  That works such as Baldus 
and Bartolus’ commentaries on the Corpus iuris civilis were still being printed and 
widely circulated long into the early modern period, it is fair to assume that as a 
practitioner, Bohier’s adoption of their stance on a range of topics was rooted in a 
combination of familiarity and search for comprehensiveness on issues such as 
handling competing laws (Baldus in particular). Bohier stated that the court thought 
“in terms of the ius commune”.22 In this case, those based in the court would have 
reached for those jurists that represented the old tradition.  
 This tells us that the legal practitioner was relying on the jurists of the mos 
italicus in the first half of the sixteenth century. Bohier’s professional life was split 
between the north and south of France, spending time in Paris as well as Bordeaux 
and so this finding has relevance for all of France. His reliance on these sources calls 
into question the traditional preoccupation with legal humanism and the desire to 
categorise those in the law into humanist and “other”.  
 The kinds of cases where the term ius commune most frequently appear in, is 
noteworthy. Those focusing on marriage-related issues such as dowry and contractual 
capacity of a wife, feature prominently as well as guardianship. Procedural matters 
and jurisdiction also make up a significant proportion of those considered.   
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The term ius commune often appears in ecclesiastical matters. These include 
clerical privilege, papal benefits and evictions. The term’s role in such cases varies. 
There are those where it is a crucial part of Bohier’s reasoning. This can be seen 
where Bohier sets out the circumstances in which a secular judge would handle an 
issue related to ecclesiastical administration. There, it was stated that for a real action, 
the parlement hears and decides the case when the thing in question is from the 
territorio Regis.23 The treatment of the ius commune reveals Bohier negotiating a 
careful balance between Papal authority and that of the parlement. In terms of 
understanding why so many examples of Canon law issues were included in the 
Decisiones, it is likely that Bohier wished to reflect the significant number of cases of 
this nature that appeared before the parlement in his reported decisions. It was just 
considered that in certain instances a secular judge would handle a matter of an 
ecclesiastical nature, and so this probably reflects this. 
The ius commune also appears in questions of jurisdiction. In such instances, 
the role of the ius commune was to offer an alternative source of authority. The 
position of neighbouring localities and their value on those occasions where the 
custom of the region is lacking, features in both the Consuetudines and the 
Decisiones. On the question of domicile, where Bohier deliberates which ought to 
apply – that of the marriage contract or of the husband – the role of the ius commune 
is clear.24 There, it is offered by Bohier as an alternative solution, much like recourse 
to the neighbouring customs would also be.  
While there are patterns in terms of where the term appears, with those of an 
ecclesiastical nature and matrimonial matters at the forefront, there is no rigid pattern 
in terms of how the ius commune operates in these cases, certainly not one that 
suggests a strict source hierarchy in any case. The fact that there are certain cases 
where the term has a more prominent role than others demonstrates two main things. 
First, that the legal issue at hand was one that traditionally relied on the rules and 
provisions of the ius commune, perhaps stemming from the Roman law. Secondly, 
that Bohier used the term as a tool in order to balance competing authorities and 
interests, and that these areas of law were characterised by plurality of sources. There 
was a need to refer to the ius commune as a repository of ideas, alternative solutions 
and an interpretative aid, for certain kinds of cases more than others.   
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24 Fol. 65, nu. 5. See Chapter 5, at 5.2.  
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 I am not claiming the final word on Nicolas Bohier. A more comprehensive 
study of other lawyers in other parlements during this period is needed, and I hope to 
revisit this. A history of lawyers and practice in early modern France and their 
relationship with the ius commune and ius proprium still needs to be written, and this 
is the start of that conversation. Douglas Osler asked why the sixteenth-century was 
overwhelmingly associated with legal humanists and not “the collections of legal 
opinions of contemporary jurists, the Consilia, or the Decisiones of the great regional 
and national supreme courts”.25 This work ought to be read as an attempt to redress 
this imbalance, even if on a microhistorical scale.   
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